Potencia tu agente
Instalación del publicador. No es un endpoint de PlugMCP.
Host a copy with our keys and logs.
Aún no hay una versión empaquetada en el registro. Sigue el README del repositorio.
¿URL remota o un comando en tu máquina? En qué se diferencian las dos instalaciones
Ejecutar en PlugMCP
A new server you create. It is not this listing's official endpoint. Use the publisher install when you want their URL and their credentials.
AbrirFind and remove WordPress malware - the whole kill chain, not just the visible shell - from a single site or an entire fleet, with an AI assistant that previews every change before it touches your server.
Free and open source (GPL), for any WordPress site owner: a solo blogger with one site, a freelancer cleaning up a client hack, or a host managing thousands of installs. You drive it in plain language through Claude; it does the SSH and WP-CLI work, shows you a preview, and never does anything irreversible without your confirmation and a backup.
By Wbcom Designs (Varun Dubey) · Ongoing threat research: WP Vanguard
Most scanners grep for known signatures and call a site "clean." Real WordPress infections do not work that way - they reinfect. They leave a fake mu-plugin that re-drops the payload, a rogue admin, a cron job, a poisoned .htaccess, an SSH key, a zero-byte decoy a signature scan cannot even see. Delete the visible shell and it is back within the hour.
This tool hunts the entire persistence chain and removes it safely:
object-cache.php / db.php), DB-payload options, cron-guard hooks, theme functions.php injections, rogue admin accounts, SSH-key backdoors, and UA-cloak .htaccess rules.confirm=True; deletions quarantine first (recoverable) and refuse to run without a recent backup.The SC/SCOCV drop-in backdoor case study documents a live cleanup of a self-reinfecting backdoor family across a 22-account cPanel server: the reinfection vectors, the detection gaps that let it survive earlier cleanups, and how each layer was removed. More write-ups live in docs/case-studies, with new threat research published at WP Vanguard.
You do not write code or run commands. Install the server once, then just talk to Claude in plain language - it does the SSH and WP-CLI work and shows you a preview before it changes anything.
1. Install it once (about 5 minutes - see Installation).
2. Add your site so Claude knows how to reach it. Tell it something like:
"Add my site example.com - SSH host 203.0.113.10, port 22, user bob, WordPress at /home/bob/public_html, using my SSH key."
3. Ask for what you need, in plain English. For example:
"Scan example.com for malware and show me what you find." "My site got hacked - find the backdoors and clean it up." "Check all my sites and tell me which ones are infected." "Reset the admin passwords on example.com and remove any rogue admin accounts." "Harden example.com, but keep automatic plugin updates working."
4. Review the preview, then confirm. Scans are always read-only. Anything destructive (deleting files, resetting passwords, replacing core) shows you exactly what it will do and waits for your go-ahead, and it refuses to run irreversible steps without a recent backup.
That is the whole loop: ask, preview, confirm, re-scan. New to it? Start with Your First Scan or the task-by-task Usage Guide.
SAFETY: This tool performs irreversible operations on live sites (file deletion, database modification, password resets, core replacement). Always take a full backup first. Destructive tools require
confirm=Trueand show a preview manifest before running. See the Tool Risk Matrix. The authors are not liable for data loss.
New here? The Usage Guide walks the backup → preview → execute → re-scan workflow task by task. Hosts and agencies: the Wiki has setup guides, daily-scan automation, and the fleet playbook.
Before using any cleanup or hardening tools on a live WordPress site:
Create a full server backup (files + database). Use your hosting provider's backup tool or:
wp_backup_database("site-name")
A database backup alone is not sufficient - back up the entire wp-content/ directory as well.
Test on staging first if possible. Clone the infected site to a staging environment and run cleanup there before touching production.
Keep an SSH session open to monitor the server during cleanup. Watch for errors or unexpected behavior.
Note current admin passwords before running wp_reset_passwords. After reset, the old passwords are gone permanently.
Destructive tools require confirm=True. Tools like wp_reinstall_core, wp_reset_passwords, wp_complete_cleanup, etc. will show a preview manifest when called without confirm=True. Review the manifest before confirming.
All tools are classified into three risk tiers:
These tools only read data. No files or database records are modified.
These tools make changes that can be undone or automatically create backups.
confirm=True)These tools permanently delete files, reset credentials, or overwrite data. Always create a backup first. Tools marked with confirm will show a preview manifest when called without confirm=True.
Persistence and reinfection vectors that signature scanners miss:
object-cache.php / db.php / advanced-cache.php, hidden .sc_* directories, DB-payload options, cron-guard hooks, theme functions.php injection, and self-reinfecting mu-plugins, in one dedicated tool~/.ssh/authorized_keys (survives every file/DB cleanup).htaccess - the "Block for Chrome" / #KH..YS marker rules, including at the site rootComplete setup from scratch on a fresh Mac. Takes ~5 minutes.
curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh)# Python 3.12 (macOS system Python is too old for the mcp package)
brew install [email protected]
# sshpass (required for password-based SSH auth)
brew install sshpass
git clone https://github.com/vapvarun/wp-malware-cleanup-mcp.git ~/.claude/wp-malware-cleanup-mcp
cd ~/.claude/wp-malware-cleanup-mcp
# Create venv with Python 3.12
uv venv --python 3.12 .venv
# Install dependencies into venv
uv pip install -r requirements.txt
# Register globally (available in all Claude Code sessions)
claude mcp add -s user wp-malware-cleanup -- \
~/.claude/wp-malware-cleanup-mcp/.venv/bin/python \
~/.claude/wp-malware-cleanup-mcp/server.py
claude mcp list
# Should show: wp-malware-cleanup: ... ✓ Connected
Close and reopen Claude Code so the new MCP tools are loaded.
The claude mcp add command in Step 4 automatically writes to ~/.claude.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"wp-malware-cleanup": {
"command": "/Users/YOU/.claude/wp-malware-cleanup-mcp/.venv/bin/python",
"args": ["/Users/YOU/.claude/wp-malware-cleanup-mcp/server.py"]
}
}
}
Add to ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"wp-malware-cleanup": {
"command": "/Users/YOU/.claude/wp-malware-cleanup-mcp/.venv/bin/python",
"args": ["/Users/YOU/.claude/wp-malware-cleanup-mcp/server.py"]
}
}
}
Note: Replace
/Users/YOUwith your actual home directory path.
~/.wp-sites/
└── sites.json # Site configurations (shared with wp-site-doctor-mcp)
~/.wp-malware-cleanup/
├── sites.json # Legacy copy (kept in sync for backward compatibility)
├── quarantine/ # Quarantined malicious files
├── reports/ # Generated cleanup reports
├── scans/ # Persisted scan results, one JSON per run (since 2.2.0)
│ └── <site>/<scan_id>.json
├── logs/ # Per-site action logs
└── threat_intelligence.db # Local threat intel SQLite DB
Site configurations live at ~/.wp-sites/sites.json so both this MCP and
wp-site-doctor-mcp see the same
sites. A copy is also written to the legacy location so any existing tooling
that reads the old path keeps working.
The shared registry is read tolerantly (since 2.2.0): unknown keys written by another MCP are ignored rather than crashing the loader, so the two servers can evolve their own fields without corrupting the shared file.
Every whole-site wp_scan run (quick/full/deep) also writes a
structured result record to ~/.wp-malware-cleanup/scans/<site>/, so scan
history is queryable and can be diffed before/after a cleanup.
After setup, restart Claude Code and use these tools in conversation:
With password auth (common for InstaWP, managed hosting):
wp_add_site(
name="my-site",
host="147.182.198.163",
username="sshuser",
wp_path="/home/sshuser/web/example.com",
auth_type="password",
site_url="https://example.com"
)
With SSH key auth (recommended for production):
wp_add_site(
name="client-blog",
host="example.com",
username="deploy",
wp_path="/var/www/html",
auth_type="key",
key_path="~/.ssh/id_rsa"
)
Grouping sites that share a server / cPanel account (host_group):
# Two sites under the same cPanel user - group them so cross-site reinfection
# can be reasoned about. host_group defaults to `host` when omitted.
wp_add_site(name="shop-acme", host="srv12.host.net", username="acme",
wp_path="/home/acme/shop", auth_type="key", host_group="acme")
wp_add_site(name="blog-acme", host="srv12.host.net", username="acme",
wp_path="/home/acme/blog", auth_type="key", host_group="acme")
On shared hosting, one infected site commonly reinfects its siblings under the same account. Setting a shared
host_grouprecords that relationship for fleet-wide reasoning. Update it any time withwp_update_site("blog-acme", host_group="acme").
# Password auth - provide password each time (not stored on disk for security)
wp_test_connection("my-site", password="your-ssh-password")
# Key auth - no password needed
wp_test_connection("client-blog")
Security note: Passwords are never stored on disk. They are passed via the
SSHPASSenvironment variable at runtime and discarded after the SSH session ends.
wp_scan("my-site", password="your-ssh-password")
wp_list_sites()
wp_fleet_status() # instant scorecard from the last stored scans
wp_fleet_status(refresh=True) # quick-scan every site first, then report
wp_host_group_status("acme") # one cPanel account + reinfection assessment
All scans run through a single tool, wp_scan(name, scope="full"). Pick a
scope for depth or a specific area; if unsure, use the default full.
wp_scan("my-site") # full scan (default)
wp_scan("my-site", scope="quick") # 2-3 min triage
wp_scan("my-site", scope="deep") # most thorough, step-by-step
wp_scan("my-site", scope="uploads") # one targeted category
Whole-site scopes (quick/full/deep/verbose) persist a result for the
fleet scorecard (wp_fleet_status); targeted scopes report without changing the
site's overall verdict.
Backup gate (since 2.2.0). Tools that delete data they cannot restore -
wp_clean_db_spam,wp_delete_malware_options- refuse to run unless a recent backup is found in the action log (within 30 minutes). Runwp_backup_database("site")first, or passforce=Trueto override when you accept the risk. Reversible tools (quarantine-based, likewp_quarantine_fileandwp_clean_uploads_php) are not gated - their preview explains recovery.
Anonymized malware case studies are available in docs/case-studies/. These document real-world infections with:
# Site with SSH key
wp_add_site(
name="site1",
host="server1.example.com",
username="deploy",
wp_path="/var/www/site1",
auth_type="key",
key_path="~/.ssh/id_rsa"
)
# Site with different port
wp_add_site(
name="site2",
host="server2.example.com",
port=2222,
username="admin",
wp_path="/home/admin/public_html",
auth_type="key",
key_path="~/.ssh/server2_key"
)
# Scan all sites
wp_batch_scan()
# Scan only pending sites
wp_batch_scan(status_filter="pending")
# 1. Backup first!
wp_backup_database("infected-site")
# 2. Run full scan
wp_scan("infected-site")
# 3. Audit suspicious users
wp_list_admins("infected-site")
wp_audit_user("infected-site", "suspicious_user")
# 4. Delete malicious user
wp_delete_user("infected-site", "suspicious_user", "real_admin", confirm=True)
# 5. Clean malicious files
wp_clean_uploads_php("infected-site", confirm=True)
wp_remove_mu_plugin("infected-site", "malware.php")
# 6. Reinstall core and plugins (confirm=True required for destructive tools)
wp_reinstall_core("infected-site", confirm=True)
# 7. Harden security (confirm=True required)
wp_reset_passwords("infected-site", confirm=True)
wp_regenerate_salts("infected-site", confirm=True)
wp_disable_file_editing("infected-site")
wp_add_security_htaccess("infected-site")
# 8. Update everything
wp_update_all("infected-site")
# 9. Verify cleanup
wp_scan("infected-site")
# 10. Generate report
wp_generate_report("infected-site")
# Preview what will happen (dry run - no changes made)
wp_complete_cleanup("infected-site")
# Review the manifest, then execute
wp_complete_cleanup("infected-site", confirm=True)
Backup Database
wp_backup_database("site-name")
Run Full Scan
wp_scan("site-name")
Check Recently Modified Files
wp_scan("site-name", scope="recently-modified")
List Admin Users
wp_list_admins("site-name")
Find Recent Users
wp_find_recent_users("site-name", days=30)
Audit Suspicious Users
wp_audit_user("site-name", "suspicious_username")
Delete Malicious Users
wp_delete_user("site-name", "hacker", "legitimate_admin", confirm=True)
Clean Uploads Directory
wp_clean_uploads_php("site-name", confirm=True)
Remove Malicious MU-Plugins
wp_scan("site-name", scope="mu-plugins")
wp_remove_mu_plugin("site-name", "malware.php")
Quarantine Suspicious Files
wp_quarantine_file("site-name", "/full/path/to/file.php")
Reinstall WordPress Core (preview first, then confirm)
wp_reinstall_core("site-name") # Preview manifest
wp_reinstall_core("site-name", confirm=True) # Execute
Verify Core Files
wp_scan("site-name", scope="core")
Reinstall Affected Plugins
wp_reinstall_plugin("site-name", "plugin-slug")
Reset All Passwords (preview first, then confirm)
wp_reset_passwords("site-name") # Preview affected users
wp_reset_passwords("site-name", confirm=True) # Execute
Save the new passwords securely!
Regenerate Salts (preview first, then confirm)
wp_regenerate_salts("site-name") # Preview
wp_regenerate_salts("site-name", confirm=True) # Execute
Disable File Editing
wp_disable_file_editing("site-name")
Add Security Rules
wp_add_security_htaccess("site-name")
Fix Permissions
wp_fix_permissions("site-name")
Update Everything
wp_update_all("site-name")
Final Verification Scan
wp_scan("site-name")
Generate Report
wp_generate_report("site-name")
Always use SSH keys instead of passwords:
# Generate SSH key
ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "malware-cleanup"
# Copy to server
ssh-copy-id -i ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 user@server
~/.wp-sites/sites.json (shared
with wp-site-doctor-mcp) and mirrored to ~/.wp-malware-cleanup/sites.json
for backward compatibility.password parameter; they pass through as an env var to sshpass, never
appearing on the command line.ps - tools that need to run SQL
go through WpConfigService.run_query(), which delegates to WP-CLI's
wp db query. Credentials stay inside the WP-CLI process. Fixed in 2.1.0.wp-content/quarantine/. Originals are renamed with a timestamp + hash
for traceability.All actions are logged to ~/.wp-malware-cleanup/logs/{site-name}.log
ssh -p PORT user@hostInstall WP-CLI on the WordPress server:
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wp-cli/builds/gh-pages/phar/wp-cli.phar
chmod +x wp-cli.phar
sudo mv wp-cli.phar /usr/local/bin/wp
chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_rsawp --infoIf using password authentication:
sudo apt install sshpassbrew install hudochenkov/sshpass/sshpassFor large sites, increase the timeout:
Some legitimate code may trigger false positives:
Review each finding manually before taking action.
This project includes a threat intelligence database that automatically learns from every cleanup. No manual steps required - every scan and cleanup action feeds data back into the local DB.
Every detection and cleanup action is automatically recorded to the threat database:
This means:
known_malicious_files and can be matched against any file with wp_threat_check_file("site", "/path/to/file"), including on a different site.wp_scan(scope="malware-patterns") (and the full scan) greps every active threat-DB signature across the site - so a signature learned while cleaning site A detects on site B. String signatures match literally; regex signatures use PCRE.cleanup_records builds a searchable history of every action across all sitesSync with community-contributed signatures and contribute back:
# Sync latest signatures from GitHub
wp_threat_db_sync()
# Check current database stats (includes cleanup_records count)
wp_threat_db_stats()
# After confirming malware, teach the system
wp_threat_learn_from_cleanup("/path/to/malware.php", "abc123hash", "backdoor", "Description")
# Export for contribution
wp_threat_export()
Since v2.1.0 the codebase is split into a thin entry point plus three packages:
wp-malware-cleanup-mcp/
├── server.py # 60-line entry point: setup_logging() + import tools + mcp.run()
├── config.py # Config dataclass + every malware/cron/HTTP detection constant
├── models.py # SiteConfig, ScanResult, DatabaseCredentials, exception hierarchy
├── database_v2.py # Threat-intel SQLite store (thread-safe, WAL)
├── threat_feeds_v2.py # GitHub community-signature sync + pattern analysis
│
├── core/ # Shared services - pure logic, no MCP coupling
│ ├── sites.py # SiteManager (mtime-cached, dual-write to shared registry)
│ ├── paths.py # WpPaths helpers (uploads_dir, plugins_dir, …)
│ ├── wpconfig.py # WpConfigService.get_db_credentials + run_query via WP-CLI
│ ├── safety.py # require_confirm(), safety_banner(), log_action()
│ ├── reports.py # ScanReport / CleanupReport markdown formatters
│ ├── orchestrator.py # Step / Orchestrator primitives for scan + cleanup pipelines
│ ├── threat_db.py # facade over database_v2 + threat_feeds_v2
│ └── legacy.py # compat shims for helpers still in transition
│
├── tools/ # One module per tool category - each registers @mcp.tool()
│ ├── _registry.py # shared FastMCP instance
│ ├── sites.py # add/update/list/get/remove/test_connection (6 tools)
│ ├── scanning.py # verify/scan_* + quick/deep/full scans (17 tools)
│ ├── cleanup.py # quarantine/clean_*/complete_cleanup/backup (8 tools)
│ ├── hardening.py # permissions/salts/wpconfig/mu-plugin/etc. (7 tools)
│ ├── reinstall.py # core/plugin/all-plugins/all-themes (4 tools)
│ ├── users.py # list_admins/audit/find/delete/reset/revoke (6 tools)
│ ├── threat.py # wp_threat_* (db stats, sync, learn, …) (13 tools)
│ ├── reporting.py # generate_report/case_study/export_sites (3 tools)
│ ├── batch.py # batch_scan/batch_update/update_all (3 tools)
│ ├── background.py # start_background_scan/status/result/list (4 tools)
│ ├── misc.py # version/read_file/check_cron/monitor_http (4 tools)
│ └── interactive_scans.py # internal worker for background scans
│
├── utils/ # Low-level helpers
│ ├── ssh.py # SSHConnectionPool (ControlMaster), run_ssh_command, run_wpcli
│ ├── validation.py # path-traversal defense, shell escaping, log redaction
│ └── progress.py # ProgressReporter, TaskManager, BackgroundTask
│
├── scripts/
│ ├── count_tools.py # walks the FastMCP registry; `--diff` checks tools-baseline.txt
│ └── tools-baseline.txt # frozen 75-tool roster; CI's parity check
│
└── tests/
├── conftest.py # MockSSH fixture + with_site fixture
├── test_sites.py # SiteManager (mtime-invalidation, dual-write, migration)
├── test_wpconfig.py # asserts DB password never appears on `mysql` command line
├── test_safety.py # confirm gate, backup warning, banner
├── test_confirm_gates.py # the four destructive tools that need confirm=True
├── test_scanning_integration.py # MockSSH-driven smoke tests for scanning tools
└── … # paths, reports, orchestrator, validation, models
Dependency rule (one-way): tools/ → core/ → utils/ → models/. Tools
never import from server; server.py only knows about tools._registry.mcp
and side-effect imports the tools package to trigger registration. This lets
you add or rename tool modules without touching server.py.
Contributions are welcome! Please:
make smoke && make parity && make test before submittingTo contribute malware signatures:
wp_threat_export() to export your local signaturescommunity-signatures.json or community-hashes.jsonGuidelines:
git clone https://github.com/vapvarun/wp-malware-cleanup-mcp.git
cd wp-malware-cleanup-mcp
# Create a venv (Python 3.10+) and install dev dependencies
python3.12 -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate
make install # equivalent to: pip install -e ".[dev]"
tools/ (or create a new one - register
it in tools/__init__.py so the side-effect import wires it up).@mcp.tool() (import mcp from tools._registry).core.get_site_manager() for site lookups, core.WpPaths for path
construction, and - for destructive tools - core.safety.require_confirm()
for the confirm gate.scripts/tools-baseline.txt (or regenerate the file).mock_ssh + with_site
fixtures in tests/conftest.py.make smoke # python -c "import server"
make parity # asserts tools/__init__ wires up exactly the 75 baseline tools
make test # full pytest run (excludes the 6 known-pre-existing validation
# failures tracked separately)
make test-all # everything, including the known failures
make lint # ruff check (config in pyproject.toml)
MockSSH (in tests/conftest.py) replaces utils.ssh.run_ssh_command and
run_wpcli with a deterministic stub - register responses with
mock_ssh.expect(substr_or_callable, (success, output)) and inspect issued
commands via mock_ssh.calls. Integration tests for scanning/cleanup/threat
tools should go through this fixture rather than hitting a real server.
This project is free software, licensed under the GNU General Public License v2.0 or later (GPL-2.0-or-later) - the same license as WordPress core. See the LICENSE file for the full text. You are free to use, study, share, and modify it; derivative works must remain under the GPL.
Author: Varun Dubey Company: Wbcom Designs
For support, questions, or custom development:
A fleet-operations release that turns the per-site cleanup tool into a fleet incident-response console, plus a deep re-audit that fixed a large amount of functionality the 2.1.0 package-split refactor had shipped silently broken.
Breaking
wp_scan(name, scope="full"). The 17 separate scan tools (wp_full_scan, wp_quick_scan, wp_deep_scan, wp_scan_uploads, wp_scan_webshells, …) are removed as individual tools; scope selects depth (quick/full/deep/verbose) or a category (uploads, webshells, themes, core, plugins, hidden-admins, cron, wpconfig, db, …). Scripts calling the old tool names must switch to wp_scan(scope=...).wp_threat_sync_wpscan, wp_threat_sync_patchstack, wp_threat_sync_all, wp_threat_download_plugin_signatures, wp_threat_learn_from_plugins, wp_threat_report) - they called methods that did not exist and crashed at runtime, advertising external feeds the server could not fetch.New - fleet console
wp_fleet_status - at-a-glance scorecard across all sites, worst-first, risk-scored. Instant from stored scans, or refresh=True to quick-scan first. Clean siblings of an infected site (same host_group) are flagged AT RISK.wp_host_group_status - one server / cPanel account's sites plus a cross-site reinfection assessment and suggested clean order.host_group on wp_add_site / wp_update_site to record which sites share an account.New - incident response
wp_incident_report - client-facing "proof of clean": infection timeline, IOCs (path + hash), before/after comparison, and a clean sign-off when the latest whole-site scan is clean. Anonymized by default.wp_clean_cron_events - delete malicious wp-cron hooks (the #1 reinfection vector).wp_clean_malicious_htaccess - quarantine hostile .htaccess/.user.ini that re-enable PHP execution or redirect traffic.wp_scan(scope="wpconfig") - read-only scan for injected code in wp-config.php (survives core reinstalls).wp_complete_cleanup now removes cron + .htaccess, scans wp-config.php, then runs a post-cleanup verification scan and sets status from the result - it no longer reports "clean" unconditionally.New - threat intelligence
wp_scan(scope="malware-patterns") greps every active signature - community-synced and learned-from-cleanup - so a signature learned cleaning one site detects on the next. (grep -F for strings, grep -P for regex, invalid patterns dropped, best-effort.)~/.wp-malware-cleanup/scans/<site>/ (capped at 200/site), enabling history and before/after diffs. Targeted scans are recorded but never set the fleet verdict.Improve
scandir/is_writable); backup/migration plugins added to the false-positive paths; the obfuscation scan now also catches eval($var) and variable-function backdoors ($f($_GET[...])).wp_clean_db_spam, wp_delete_malware_options) with a force=True override.sites.json loader tolerates unknown keys instead of renaming the file to .bak, so it coexists with other MCPs.Fix (refactor-orphaned silent failures)
wp_complete_cleanup was a near-no-op - it called ~14 functions never imported into its module; wrapped in try/except, every step failed silently. All imports fixed; a full-chain test now guards it.wp_generate_report, wp_generate_case_study, wp_export_sites, wp_quick_scan, wp_deep_scan, wp_batch_scan, wp_threat_db_sync, wp_threat_export, and wp_full_scan steps all referenced names removed by the refactor and failed silently. Fixed and covered by a static undefined-name (F821) sweep and an execute-every-tool smoke test.wp_audit_user crashed (UnboundLocalError) on a user with a missing registration date.validate_hostname rejects invalid IPv4; generate_secure_filename keeps the extension dot (backups were missing .sql); sanitize_filename returns unnamed for blank input.Tools: 75 → 59. Tests: 152 passing, no skips.
tools/ (sites, scanning, cleanup, hardening, reinstall, users, threat, reporting, batch, background, misc).core/ package - SiteManager, WpPaths, WpConfigService, require_confirm(), ScanReport, CleanupReport, threat DB facade, scan orchestrator.wp_reinstall_plugin, wp_clean_core_injections, wp_delete_malware_options, wp_remove_mu_plugin. Each now requires confirm=True; without it they return a preview manifest.wp_scan_hidden_admins and wp_scan_app_passwords previously built mysql -u <user> -p<pass> commands visible in ps on the target. They now route through WP-CLI via WpConfigService.run_query(), keeping credentials inside the WP-CLI process.database.py, threat_feeds.py) deleted; V2_MODULES_AVAILABLE branching removed; legacy fallback SSH impls removed.pyproject.toml, Makefile, and MockSSH test fixture added. Test count: 75 (up from 33 unit tests in 2.0.0).wp_scan_hidden_plugins, wp_scan_themes, wp_clean_core_injections, wp_delete_malware_options, wp_revoke_app_passwords, wp_complete_cleanup, wp_scan_hidden_admins, wp_scan_app_passwords, wp_scan_webshells, wp_harden_wpconfig, wp_install_security_mu_plugin, wp_full_harden, wp_generate_case_studywp_threat_db_sync)MCP server for cleaning malware from WordPress sites via SSH and WP-CLI. Batch operations for 20+ sites.
Herramientas
Aún no hay lista de herramientas. Los servidores remotos la reciben tras la primera comprobación de estado.
Preguntas frecuentes
Copia en esta página la configuración stdio para Cursor, Claude Desktop, Claude Code o VS Code. Usa la instalación del publicador, no un proxy de PlugMCP.
Este registro no indica ninguna variable de entorno obligatoria.
Wp Malware Cleanup se ejecuta localmente por stdio.
Última comprobación: 2026-10-27. MCP server for cleaning malware from WordPress sites via SSH and WP-CLI. Batch operations for 20+ sites.