BLACKVEIL DNS
Know where you stand.
Source-available DNS & email security scanner for Claude, Cursor, VS Code, and MCP clients across Streamable HTTP, stdio, and legacy HTTP+SSE.
Power your agent
पब्लिशर का अपना URL। PlugMCP एंडपॉइंट नहीं।
Host a copy with our keys and logs.
https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/mcpऊपर दिया Claude बटन नाम और URL भरकर Claude खोलता है। पुष्टि आपको वहीं करनी होती है।
claude mcp add --transport http com.blackveilsecurity-dns https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
{ "mcpServers": { "com.blackveilsecurity-dns": { "command": "npx", "args": [ "-y", "mcp-remote", "https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/mcp" ] } }}claude_desktop_config.json
रिमोट URL या आपकी मशीन पर कमांड? दोनों इंस्टॉल में क्या अंतर है
PlugMCP पर चलाएँ
A new server you create. It is not this listing's official endpoint. Use the publisher install when you want their URL and their credentials.
लॉन्चClaude Desktop (one-click install):
Download the Blackveil DNS extension and open it — the current 81-tool surface is available instantly. Verify your download.
Claude Code (one command):
claude mcp add --transport http blackveil-dns https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/mcp
Then ask: scan anthropic.com
Smithery (one command):
smithery mcp add MadaBurns/bv-mcp
Verify the endpoint is live:
curl https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/health
No install. No API key. One URL for hosted HTTP:
Endpoint https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/mcp
Transport Streamable HTTP · JSON-RPC 2.0
Auth None required
Transport support:
Streamable HTTP: POST /mcp, GET /mcp, DELETE /mcpNative stdio: blackveil-dns-mcp CLI from the blackveil-dns npm packageLegacy HTTP+SSE: GET /mcp/sse bootstrap stream plus POST /mcp/messages?sessionId=...For Streamable HTTP, clients should retain the Mcp-Session-Id returned by initialize and send it on every subsequent request, including notifications. Send the negotiated version in MCP-Protocol-Version; unsupported values are rejected with HTTP 400, while expired or terminated sessions return 404 and require a fresh initialize.
spf delegation label, then cross-references DMARC enforcement to determine real exposuregenerate (artifact=fix_plan) produces provider-aware prioritized actions; its record artifacts (spf_record, dmarc_record, dkim_config, mta_sts_policy, rollout_plan) output ready-to-publish records; validate_fix confirms whether a fix was applied successfullymap_supply_chain correlates DNS signals to build a full third-party dependency graph with trust levels and risk signalssimulate_attack_paths enumerates specific paths (spoofing, takeover, hijack) with severity, steps, and mitigationsmap_compliance maps scan findings to NIST 800-177, PCI DSS 4.0, SOC 2, and CIS Controlscheck_authoritative_dns_infra and check_root_server_set query authoritative and root nameservers directly over TCP/53, and for authenticated callers check_authoritative_dns_infra also tests whether a domain's nameservers refuse a zone transfer (no zone data is retrieved) 81 MCP tools · 7 prompts · 6 resources
Email Auth Infrastructure Brand & Threats Meta
───────────── ────────────── ─────────────── ───────────────
check_mx check_dnssec check_bimi scan_domain
check_spf check_ssl check_tlsrpt batch_scan
check_dmarc check_ns check_lookalikes compare_domains
check_dkim check_caa check_shadow_domains compare_baseline
check_mta_sts check_http_security explain_finding
check_subdomailing check_dane
check_mx_reputation check_dane_https DNS Hygiene Remediation
check_svcb_https ───────────── ───────────────
check_ptr check_txt_hygiene generate (one tool;
Intelligence check_srv artifact=fix_plan,
───────────── check_zone_hygiene spf_record,
get_benchmark check_resolver_ Discovery dmarc_record,
get_domain_rank consistency ───────────── dkim_config,
get_provider_ discover_brand_ mta_sts_policy,
insights check_dbl domains rollout_plan)
assess_spoofability check_rbl brand_audit_single validate_fix
map_supply_chain cymru_asn brand_audit_batch_
analyze_drift rdap_lookup start
resolve_spf_chain check_nsec_ brand_audit_status
discover_subdomains walkability brand_audit_get_
map_compliance check_dnssec_chain report
prioritize_portfolio_
leads
simulate_attack_paths check_fast_flux list_brand_audit_watches
check_agent_discovery check_dnskey_strength
check_llms_txt check_authoritative_dns_infra
check_root_server_set register_brand_audit_watch
delete_brand_audit_watch
+ check_subdomain_takeover (standalone tool + internal — runs inside scan_domain)
+ check_authoritative_dns_infra and check_root_server_set (authoritative DNS infrastructure profile)
+ batch_scan_start / batch_scan_status / batch_scan_findings
(async start → poll → fetch sibling of batch_scan)
+ sge_quickscan (NZ Secure Government Email readiness for one domain)
+ discover_brand_domains_start / discover_brand_domains_status / discover_brand_domains_findings
(async start → poll → fetch sibling of discover_brand_domains, for clients that time out on the ~24s sync call)
Operator-deploy only (BV_RECON binding; degrade to unprovisioned on self-hosted BUSL deployments):
+ check_realtime_threat_feed — curated intel-gateway threat feed lookup
+ scan_buckets_start — async cloud-bucket discovery scan (start → poll → findings)
+ scan_buckets_status — poll status of a running bucket scan
+ scan_buckets_findings — retrieve findings for a completed bucket scan
+ osint_investigate_domain_start — async domain OSINT investigation (start → poll → report)
+ osint_investigate_infrastructure_start — async deep-infrastructure OSINT (domain, IP, or org)
+ osint_investigate_supply_chain_start — async supply-chain OSINT investigation
+ osint_investigate_username_start — async username OSINT (owner/enterprise tier only)
+ osint_investigate_email_start — async email OSINT (owner/enterprise tier only)
+ osint_investigation_status — poll status of any running OSINT investigation
+ osint_investigation_report — retrieve report for a completed OSINT investigation
Internal-only compatibility surface (withdrawn from public `tools/list`; the three active Microsoft 365 / Entra tools proxy through `BV_WEB` and degrade to unprovisioned without it):
+ query_signins — query Microsoft Entra sign-in logs for a tenant
+ query_ual — DEPRECATED tombstone; valid, authorized calls return query_ual_deprecated with no tenant-data access
+ get_ca_policies — retrieve Conditional Access policies for an Entra tenant
+ assess_coverage — assess Conditional Access coverage gaps for an Entra tenant
+ map_registrar_products — map a domain's gaps to registrar brand-protection products
_meta)tools/list returns every tool with server-specific discovery metadata under each tool's _meta (the MCP-sanctioned extension point), so a client can group or filter the surface without hard-coding tool names:
group — functional group (email_auth, infrastructure, brand_threats, dns_hygiene, intelligence, remediation, discovery, identity_secops, meta).tier — scoring tier (core / protective / hardening); absent for non-scoring tools.scanIncluded — true when the tool runs inside scan_domain's parallel audit.recommended — present (true) only on the curated starter set (scan_domain, explain_finding, compare_baseline); omitted otherwise. A client facing the full surface can lead with tools.filter(t => t._meta.recommended) to avoid overwhelming an LLM with all tools flat. Every tool is still listed — this is an additive signal, not a filter.check_authoritative_dns_infra measures authoritative DNS infrastructure posture for a hostname over direct DNS-over-TCP/53 from a single vantage, via the BV_INFRA_PROBE service binding: TCP/53 reachability, the authoritative AA flag, recursion exposure, SOA serial consistency across nameservers, DNSKEY/RRSIG presence (not validation), IPv4/IPv6 answer parity, and unsupported-query handling. For authenticated callers only, it also runs a zone-transfer refusal test (first response only — no zone data is ever retrieved) and CHAOS version.bind/id.server disclosure. It does not measure, and reports as inconclusive: UDP/53 reachability, amplification, EDNS large-response/truncation, DNS cookies/RRL, BGP origin, RPKI, route-leak signals, anycast diversity, vantage latency, and RIR/RDAP.
check_root_server_set queries a rotating sample of 3 root servers per call and compares the priming NS set, glue, SOA serials, and cross-root consistency with the embedded official root hints, via BV_INFRA_PROBE.
Self-hosted or local deployments without BV_INFRA_PROBE still return structured partial results. The worker-only mode records the embedded root hints and marks every live-probe capability inconclusive rather than pretending it ran; both tools then withhold their verdict (checkStatus: 'error', excluded from scoring) instead of grading reference data.
The server classifies detected MCP clients by their default response format:
claude_mobile, claude_code, cursor, vscode, claude_desktop, claude_connector, windsurf (auto-format: compact)mcp_remote, blackveil_dns_action, bv_claude_dns_proxy, unknown (auto-format: full)The bv_load_test class identifies internal load/chaos/tranco-scan traffic so it stays out of real-client analytics segments.
The comprehensive chaos suite validates session stability, authentication precedence, format negotiation, and transport-specific edge cases across Streamable HTTP and Legacy SSE for its supported client fixtures. Without an API key it exercises the public/free-tier path; with a valid key exported as BV_API_KEY, it covers Bearer authentication, legacy self-host ?api_key= compatibility, authenticated SSE bootstrap, and authenticated batch behavior.
Run the client/session chaos suite locally: python3 scripts/chaos/chaos-test-clients.py.
Run repeat force-refresh scans to detect production scoring drift:
BV_API_KEY=... python3 scripts/chaos/score-stability-test.py --count 20 --rounds 3 --concurrency 5
The stability harness negotiates MCP protocol 2025-06-18, accepts JSON and Streamable HTTP SSE responses, and exits non-zero on any transport/tool error or score/category drift. Use --from <json-file> with a JSON array of domains for a targeted provider-diversity sweep.
SSOT guardrails are enforced by focused audit tests:
TOOLS registry, not hand-written — npm run generate:tool-surface rewrites every advertised count, and npm run check:tool-surface fails CI if any drifts. Counts advertised to clients use the public surface (TOOLS minus internal-only tools), so the number in the docs, the badge, the VS Code listing and the resources/read copy is the number tools/list actually returns.Every scan_domain / batch_scan result carries three reproducibility stamps. They are three different namespaces — do not compare them to each other, and do not read any of them as the npm package version unless it says so:
scoringModelVersion is independent of dnsChecksPackageVersion and is normally lower — for example model 1.10.0 alongside package 1.18.0. That is not a version gap, and it does not mean a consumer's vendored copy scores differently from the hosted service: the package advanced eight minors without changing scoring policy. Reading the model version as the package version has twice triggered a false "engine version gap" investigation, which is why both are now emitted side by side.
When you publish or cite a score, record scoringConfigHash — not either version number. It is the value that identifies the exact scoring configuration behind a result, so two scans carrying the same hash were graded under the same rules.
GET /badge/<domain> returns an embeddable SVG — the badge at the top of this README is a live scan of our own domain. It needs no authentication and is subject to the same anonymous rate limits and daily caps as a public scan.
The badge shows the same customer-facing letter scan_domain reports — the NIST-aligned 6-band grade (A+ ≥95, A ≥90, B ≥80, C ≥70, D ≥60, F <60) — so a domain cannot show one grade on its badge and a different one in its report. Two further states are stated rather than papered over:
<grade> partial — the scan was graded, but did not complete every check (a WAF challenge, a timeout, an unreachable host). The hover/aria title gives the exact coverage, e.g. 17 of 19 checks measured. The grade and its colour are unchanged: coverage and posture are different axes.unknown — the domain could not be measured at all. The badge says so instead of substituting a letter, which would publish a failing grade nobody measured.See docs/scoring.md for the grade scales and the evidence rules behind them.
MCP Client
│
│ POST /mcp (JSON-RPC 2.0)
│
┌───▼──────────────────────┐
│ Cloudflare Worker │
│ │
│ Hono ─► Origin check │
│ ─► Auth │
│ ─► Rate limiting │
│ ─► Session mgmt │
└───┬──────────────────────┘
│
┌───▼──────────────────────┐
│ Tool Handlers │
│ 19 scoring categories │
└───┬──────────────────────┘
│
┌───▼──────────────────────┐
│ Generic Scoring Engine │
│ Three-tier model │
└───┬──────────────────────┘
│
┌───▼──────────────────────┐
│ Cloudflare DoH │
│ DNS-over-HTTPS │
└──────────────────────────┘
BV_INFRA_PROBE service binding supplies live DNS-over-TCP/53 authoritative DNS and root-server evidence for the authoritative DNS infrastructure profileBV_CERTSTREAM service binding supplies Certificate Transparency names for discover_subdomains and SAN correlation. Operator deployments point it at the owned bv-ct-index sidecar (packages/bv-ct-index), a forward-only names index built from the public CT logs; source order stays binding, then crt.sh, then CertSpotter, then the last-known-good cache, so the direct sources remain the fallback. See docs/bv-ct-index-runbook.mdbv-wasm-corecompact vs full) based on client User-Agentdiscover_brand_domains / brand_audit_*)The discovery_mode argument accepts two values:
classic (the default everywhere this repo runs out-of-the-box) — the public, BUSL-licensed signal-sweep pipeline. Uses only public-internet data sources (DNS, RDAP, CT logs, MX/TXT inspection). This is the only mode supported for self-hosted deployments and the only mode the open test suite covers end-to-end.tiered — layers a portfolio-aware Tier 0 / infrastructure-graph Tier 1 / declared-evidence Tier 2 pipeline in front of the classic sweep. Tiered mode requires private BlackVeil-internal cross-Worker bindings (BV_INFRA_GRAPH, BV_INTEL_GATEWAY, BV_ENTERPRISE) that are not packaged with the open distribution — they live in BlackVeil's production deploy overlay (.dev/wrangler.deploy.jsonc) and call into proprietary Workers. Self-hosters cannot enable tiered mode without those bindings.BlackVeil's hosted production at dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com flips its runtime default to tiered via the env var BRAND_AUDIT_DISCOVERY_MODE_DEFAULT="tiered" in the private overlay; the public schema default in src/schemas/tool-args.ts stays 'classic' permanently so anyone building from main gets the BUSL-licensed behaviour unchanged. An explicit caller-supplied discovery_mode always wins over the env default.
The free tier requires no authentication. Authenticated requests bypass per-IP rate limits and follow your tier's daily quota. Hosted production supports:
Authorization: Bearer <KEY>X-API-Key: <KEY> — for clients that cannot set Authorization. If both are sent, Authorization: Bearer wins.ENABLE_OAUTH=true; owner-key consent is separately gated by ENABLE_OWNER_OAUTH=true.The ?api_key=<KEY> fallback is legacy/self-host compatibility only. BlackVeil hosted production sets REJECT_QUERY_API_KEY=true; clients that cannot send headers should use OAuth or an mcp-remote header bridge.
For full hosted setup examples, stdio usage, OAuth setup, and legacy fallback endpoints, see docs/client-setup.md.
This repository's root package ships a blackveil bin (src/cli.ts, built to dist/cli.js): a client for the hosted endpoint, not a local scanner. It calls https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/mcp and works without a key; set BLACKVEIL_API_KEY to use a keyed tier's quota (keys are never accepted on the command line). BLACKVEIL_MCP_URL overrides the endpoint (HTTPS required except loopback).
blackveil scan example.com --format json
blackveil check spf example.com
blackveil batch --file domains.txt --fail-below 70
blackveil policy example.com --policy policy.json
blackveil drift save example.com --out baseline.json
blackveil drift compare example.com --baseline baseline.json
blackveil evidence verify baseline.json
Commands: scan, check, batch, policy, drift save|compare, evidence verify. Output formats (--format): human (default), json, ndjson, evidence; --out <file> writes to a file, --fail-below <0-100> or --policy <file> turns a scan into a pass/fail gate. Exit codes: 0 pass, 1 verified policy or integrity failure, 2 usage/input, 3 auth/quota/transport/tool error, 4 ungraded/inconclusive. blackveil --help prints the full usage (source of truth: src/cli/command.ts).
The npm package blackveil-dns is frozen at 2.13.0 (published 2026-05-12), and that artifact carries only the blackveil-dns-mcp stdio bin, not blackveil, so npm i -g blackveil-dns does not install this CLI. Publishing is closed by policy (#719, closed as not planned). Build from source (npm ci && npm run build) for the CLI, or use blackveil-dns-action in CI; it calls the hosted endpoint and needs no npm package.
The hosted engine is also reachable without MCP framing through BlackVeil's public API (pointer only; the API's own docs are authoritative):
POST https://www.blackveilsecurity.com/api/v1/tools/lookup — OpenAPI spec at https://www.blackveilsecurity.com/openapi.json.POST https://www.blackveilsecurity.com/api/scan/v1/scan with a tenant API key, on plans that include API access (see Pricing).These settings apply to operators running their own deployment. They are optional — self-hosted (BUSL) deployments fall back to privacy-preserving defaults when they are unset.
The public /mcp path writes a per-event access log enriched with geolocation and network identity. The write path, PII depth, and retention are operator-controlled:
These live under the internal auth gate (/internal/*) and are called by bv-web, not the public surface:
Free-tier daily limits depend on whether you send a key. Anonymous (no key): 25 scan_domain scans/day per IP, across at most 12 distinct domains/day. Free key: 50/day per tool. Free keys do not carry the REST scan API (see REST / HTTP); "API access" above means that keyed API. Limits are read from TIER_DAILY_LIMITS, FREE_TOOL_DAILY_LIMITS and FREE_DISTINCT_DOMAIN_DAILY_LIMIT in src/lib/config.ts.
Offensive/recon and multi-domain tools (subdomain discovery, attack-path simulation, lookalike/shadow-domain detection, fast-flux detection, supply-chain mapping, real-time threat feed, bucket/OSINT investigations, batch_scan, compare_domains, brand audits) require a paid plan (Developer tier or higher); free, unauthenticated, and agent-tier callers get an HTTP 403 upgrade-required response. Unauthenticated callers are additionally capped at 12 distinct domains per day (best-effort, fail-open). The OSINT/bucket status and report pollers stay free; the brand-audit and brand-discovery pollers (brand_audit_status, brand_audit_get_report, discover_brand_domains_status, discover_brand_domains_findings) have no unauthenticated allowance and return HTTP 429 without a key.
These demonstrate core functionality — paste any of them into Claude with the Blackveil DNS connector enabled:
This tool is intended for authorized security assessments of domains you own or have explicit permission to test. Do not use it for unauthorized reconnaissance, harassment, or any activity that violates applicable laws. Findings from attack simulation, spoofability, and subdomain discovery tools should be used to improve your own security posture, not to exploit others.
If you discover a vulnerability in a third-party domain, please follow coordinated disclosure practices.
The supported self-host path is the stdio bin (blackveil-dns-mcp) for non-commercial use. The Cloudflare Worker configuration in this repository references BlackVeil-private bindings and is not a third-party deploy target. Under the LICENSE Additional Use Grant, providing the Licensed Work as a hosted service to third parties for a fee, or embedding it in a commercial product, is commercial use and needs a separate licence from BLACKVEIL. Commercial licences are available on request via https://blackveilsecurity.com/contact.
Built and maintained by BLACKVEIL — NZ-owned cybersecurity consultancy.
Privacy Policy · License (BUSL-1.1 → MIT on 2030-03-17)
DNS and email security scanner with 82 MCP tools for SPF, DMARC, DNSSEC, SSL, and brand audits.
{ "mcpServers": { "com.blackveilsecurity-dns": { "url": "https://dns-mcp.blackveilsecurity.com/mcp", "headers": {} } }}60 टूल
FAQ
| Look up and validate the DMARC record for a domain. Shows the enforcement level (none/quarantine/reject), alignment mode (strict/relaxed), and aggregate/forensic reporting destinations. Use to determine a domain's DMARC enforcement level, whether it sends aggregate reports, or if it is protected aga |
| check_dkim | Look up DKIM records for a domain. Probes common selectors, validates the signing algorithm used for outgoing email (RSA-1024/2048, Ed25519), and reports key strength. Use to verify that outbound email signatures are cryptographically sound. Part of the scan_domain audit. |
| check_dnssec | Check DNSSEC status for a domain. Verifies whether DNS is tamper-proof and protected against cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks by validating DNSKEY and DS records. Reports whether DNSSEC is enabled and validating. Part of the scan_domain audit. |
| check_ssl | Check the HTTPS/TLS posture of a domain: HTTPS reachability, HSTS policy, and HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect. Also returns certificate metadata (issuer, expiry date, days remaining, SAN count) read from public Certificate Transparency logs — this describes the most recently LOGGED certificate, which may dif |
| check_mta_sts | Check whether a domain enforces SMTP TLS for inbound mail via MTA-STS, protecting against downgrade attacks. Queries _mta-sts.<domain> and fetches the policy file, reports mode (enforce/testing/none) and MX coverage. Use to verify whether inbound SMTP is protected against TLS downgrade or MITM — dis |
| check_ns | Audit a domain’s nameserver delegation and redundancy. Identifies the DNS hosting provider and, when the infrastructure probe is available, directly compares parent and child NS sets, verifies authoritative AA responses, and checks required glue addresses. Use to detect stale registrar delegations, |
| check_caa | Look up CAA records for a domain. Shows which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Part of the scan_domain audit. |
| check_bimi | Check the BIMI brand-logo record at default._bimi.<domain>. Validates the logo URL (l=) and the presence of mark-certificate authority evidence (a=) — the a= tag is a bare URL, so the certificate type (VMC or CMC) is not determined — and verifies the DMARC enforcement prerequisite (p=quarantine/reje |
| check_tlsrpt | Check whether a domain has SMTP TLS Reporting (TLS-RPT) configured. Queries _smtp._tls.<domain> for the v=TLSRPTv1 record and validates its reporting destination (rua= mailto:/https:), flagging a missing record, duplicate records, or an invalid/absent reporting URI. Complements MTA-STS by giving vis |
| check_http_security | Audit a domain's browser-facing HTTP security headers over HTTPS. Inspects Content-Security-Policy (flagging unsafe-inline/unsafe-eval/wildcards), X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, and the cross-origin isolation headers (COOP/COEP/CORP), and detects CDN/WA |
| check_dane | Check DANE/TLSA certificate pinning for SMTP at port 25. Resolves the domain's MX hosts and looks up TLSA records at _25._tcp.<mx-host>, validating their syntax, usage/selector/matching-type fields and DNSSEC backing on the MX host's zone. The record is reported as present but UNVERIFIED: there is n |
| check_ptr | Verify forward-confirmed reverse DNS (PTR/FCrDNS) for mail servers. Part of the scan_domain audit. |
| check_dane_https | Verify DANE certificate pinning for HTTPS connections. Looks up TLSA records at _443._tcp.{domain} (port 443) and validates their syntax, usage/selector/matching-type fields and DNSSEC backing. The record is reported as present but UNVERIFIED in every deployment: comparison against the certificate t |
| check_svcb_https | Validate HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) for modern transport capability advertisement. Part of the scan_domain audit. |
| check_lookalikes | Detect active typosquat and lookalike/homoglyph domains that impersonate your brand and could be used in phishing. Identifies character-substitution and visual-confusion domains registered by attackers. Distinct from check_shadow_domains (TLD variants with auth gaps) and discover_brand_domains (legi |
| check_subdomailing | Detect SubdoMailing risk: analyzes the SPF include chain for dangling or hijackable subdomains that could let an attacker send email as the domain. Use when you want to know if an SPF include chain can be hijacked through a dangling domain, or to detect subdomain mailing risk hidden in SPF includes. |
| scan_domain | Run a full DNS and email security audit for a single domain. Aggregates every scan-included check in parallel (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, DNSSEC, TLS/SSL, MTA-STS, CAA, BIMI, subdomain takeover, and more) and returns an overall security score, NIST-aligned letter grade (6-band A+/A/B/C/D/F), maturity stage, |
| batch_scan | Bulk-scan up to 10 domains in parallel. Runs a full security audit on each domain in the list and returns score, NIST-aligned letter grade (6-band A+/A/B/C/D/F), and finding counts per domain. Use when you want to audit multiple domains at once or do a bulk scan of several domains simultaneously — d |
| batch_scan_start | Start a durable asynchronous scan of 1–10 domains. Returns a stable job ID; replaying the same idempotency key with the same principal, normalized inputs, and scoring versions returns the same job. |
| batch_scan_status | Read the owner-scoped status of an asynchronous batch scan. |
| batch_scan_findings | Fetch owner-scoped findings for a completed asynchronous batch scan. |
| compare_domains | Side-by-side security comparison of 2–5 domains. Shows relative scores, category gaps, and unique weaknesses for each domain. Use when comparing your security posture against a competitor, or doing a head-to-head comparison between multiple domains. |
| compare_baseline | Compare a domain's current security configuration against a fixed policy baseline to determine compliance. Use to check whether a domain meets a policy requirement — not for tracking improvement/regression over time (use analyze_drift) and not for comparing multiple domains (use compare_domains). |
| check_shadow_domains | Find alternate TLD variants of a domain (e.g. example.net, example.co) that have weak or missing email authentication and could be used to spoof email. Use when asked about TLD variants with email auth gaps — distinct from check_lookalikes which detects typosquat/homoglyph impersonation domains. |
| check_txt_hygiene | Audit TXT records for stale entries and SaaS exposure. |
| check_mx_reputation | Check whether the mail server (MX) IP addresses are listed on spam blocklists (Spamhaus, Barracuda, SORBS, and other RBLs). Also verifies reverse DNS for MX hosts. Use when you want to know if your mail server IP is blacklisted, or if your MX is on any blocklist — distinct from check_rbl which check |
| check_srv | Map a domain's DNS-visible service footprint by probing 19 common SRV record prefixes (email, calendar, messaging, directory, web) in parallel. Returns discovered services and flags insecure service advertisements — e.g. plaintext IMAP/POP3/LDAP without an encrypted variant. A domain with no matches |
| check_zone_hygiene | Audit DNS zone hygiene: identifies sensitive or forgotten subdomains exposed in DNS, stale SOA records, and zone propagation issues. Use to find any sensitive subdomains that should not be publicly visible, or to audit overall DNS zone cleanliness. |
| generate | Generate a DNS/email security remediation artifact. Artifact types: spf_record (build a new SPF record), dmarc_record (create a DMARC policy), dkim_config (DKIM key setup), mta_sts_policy (generate an MTA-STS policy file), fix_plan (prioritized remediation plan for all findings), or rollout_plan (ph |
| get_domain_rank | Rank a domain against its country or global cohort using the GSI benchmark corpus. Accepts a domain score (from scan_domain) and optional country/sector; returns a percentile: "scores better than X% of peers". Owner-gate exempt — public cohort data only. |
| get_benchmark | Get industry benchmark data: shows what percentile a domain's security score ranks at within its sector or country cohort, the mean score, and the most common DNS security failures across the industry. Use when asked how a score compares to the industry average, what percentile a score is in, or wha |
| get_provider_insights | Get security benchmarks and common configuration issues for a specific email or DNS service-provider cohort (e.g. Google Workspace customers, Microsoft 365 customers). Use when asked how an email service provider compares to competitors on security posture, or to see typical misconfigurations for a |
| assess_spoofability | Compute a composite email spoofability risk score (0–100, higher = more spoofable) by combining SPF trust surface, DMARC enforcement, and DKIM coverage. Returns a risk level (minimal→critical), per-control sub-scores, and plain-language summary of how easy it would be to spoof email from the domain. |
| check_resolver_consistency | Check DNS consistency across 4 public resolvers. |
| explain_finding | Explain a finding with impact and remediation. |
| map_supply_chain | Map DNS-visible third-party service dependencies for a domain. Correlates SPF, NS, TXT verifications, SRV services, and CAA records to reveal which third-party vendors can send email as the domain, control DNS, or access integrated services. Use when asked to map third-party or supply-chain dependen |
| analyze_drift | Measure whether a domain's DNS security posture improved or regressed by comparing the current state against a prior scan snapshot. Returns a drift classification (improving/stable/regressing/mixed), score delta, and lists of improvements and regressions. Use to answer "did our security score improv |
| validate_fix | Re-check a specific security control after applying a fix, to confirm the finding is now resolved. Use only when a fix has already been applied and you want to verify or confirm the remediation was successful — not for initial inspection of a record. |
| resolve_spf_chain | Trace the full SPF include chain for a domain. Recursively resolves all includes, shows lookup count, tree depth, and flags circular includes or exceeding the 10-lookup limit. |
| discover_subdomains | Find subdomains of a domain using Certificate Transparency logs. Reveals shadow IT, forgotten services, and unauthorized certificate issuance. Returns a CT SAMPLE, not an asset inventory: the count is a lower bound, a host with no publicly-logged certificate never appears, and the result carries a p |
| map_compliance | Map scan findings to compliance frameworks: NIST 800-177, PCI DSS 4.0, SOC 2, CIS Controls. Shows pass/fail/partial status per control. |
| sge_quickscan | Answer, for ONE domain, whether it meets the New Zealand Secure Government Email (SGE) requirements agencies must satisfy by October 2026. Reports all seven SGE controls — DMARC p=reject, SPF -all, DKIM, SMTP transport TLS, MTA-STS enforce, TLS-RPT, full sub-domain coverage — each as satisfied, not |
| prioritize_portfolio_leads | Rank a brand’s portfolio (or an explicit domain set) into prioritized registrar-partner sales leads by product-gap value × severity. Multi-domain, paid. Reuses map_registrar_products per domain, then ranks. Distinct from map_registrar_products (per-domain product mapping) and batch_scan (raw scores) |
| simulate_attack_paths | Analyze current DNS posture and enumerate specific attack paths an adversary could exploit, with severity, feasibility, steps, and mitigations. |
| check_dbl | Check domain reputation against DNS-based Domain Block Lists (Spamhaus DBL, URIBL, SURBL). Returns listing status with decoded return codes. |
| check_rbl | Check MX server IP reputation against 6 DNS-based Real-time Blocklists (SpamCop, UCEProtect, Mailspike, Barracuda, PSBL). Resolves MX hosts to IPs first. |
| cymru_asn | Map domain IPs to Autonomous System Numbers via Team Cymru DNS. Returns ASN, prefix, country, registry, and organization for each IP. Flags high-risk hosting ASNs. |
| rdap_lookup | Fetch domain registration data via RDAP (modern WHOIS replacement). Returns the domain registrar (the company the domain was registered with), registrant contact, creation/expiration dates, EPP status codes, and domain age. Use when asked who registered the domain, who the registrar is, or when the |
| check_realtime_threat_feed | Check a domain against BlackVeil real-time threat intelligence (curated intel-gateway feed). Distinct from DNSBL checks. Operator-deploy only; degrades to info when unprovisioned. |
| check_nsec_walkability | Assess zone walkability risk by analyzing NSEC3PARAM configuration. Detects plain NSEC zones, weak NSEC3 parameters, and opt-out flags. |
| check_dnssec_chain | Walk the full DNSSEC chain of trust from the DNS root down to the target domain, tracing DS/DNSKEY records and algorithm usage at each zone level. Use when asked to trace the chain of trust from the DNS root, or to see the full DNSSEC delegation path step by step. |
| check_agent_discovery | Assess the security posture of IETF BANDAID agent-discovery records (draft-mozleywilliams-dnsop-dnsaid). Detects SVCB agent records under _agents/_index._{protocol}._agents, reports whether the discovery zone is DNSSEC-anchored (unsigned = spoofable agent endpoints), evaluates DANE/TLSA binding trus |
| check_llms_txt | Inspect a domain's published /llms.txt and /llms-full.txt for links and install instructions an AI agent could inherit from someone else. Parses and dedupes the links (same-origin vs external), sweeps external link hosts for dangling CNAMEs and deprovisioned-service fingerprints (evidence of a dangl |
| check_dnskey_strength | Audit the cryptographic strength of DNSKEY signing algorithms used for DNSSEC. Reports which algorithm is used for DNSSEC signing keys (RSA/SHA-1, RSA/SHA-256, ECDSA P-256, Ed25519, etc.), flags deprecated algorithms (RSA/SHA-1, DSA), independent of whether the DNSSEC chain validates. Use when asked |
| check_fast_flux | Detect fast-flux DNS behavior: performs multiple rounds of A/AAAA queries and checks whether IP addresses are rotating rapidly on each DNS query (a sign of botnet or malicious infrastructure). Compares IP answer sets and TTLs across rounds to identify rapidly rotating infrastructure used to hide mal |
| check_subdomain_takeover | Sweep subdomains for dangling CNAMEs pointing to deprovisioned cloud services that could be claimed by an attacker (subdomain takeover vulnerabilities). Detects 16 provider families (AWS S3/CloudFront, Azure Front Door/CDN/Blob/App Service, GCP Cloud Storage, Heroku, GitHub Pages, Vercel, Firebase, |
| check_authoritative_dns_infra | Measure authoritative DNS infrastructure posture for a hostname over direct DNS-over-TCP/53 from a single vantage: TCP/53 reachability, the authoritative AA flag, recursion exposure, SOA serial consistency across nameservers, DNSKEY/RRSIG presence (not validation), IPv4/IPv6 answer parity, and unsup |
| check_root_server_set | Query a rotating sample of 3 root servers per call and compare the priming NS set, glue, SOA serials, and cross-root consistency against the embedded official root hints. Uses BV_INFRA_PROBE when available; without it, returns the embedded hints as reference data only. |
इस पेज पर Cursor, Claude Desktop, Claude Code या VS Code के लिए http कॉन्फ़िग कॉपी करें। यह पब्लिशर का इंस्टॉल इस्तेमाल करता है, PlugMCP प्रॉक्सी नहीं।
इस रिकॉर्ड में कोई ज़रूरी एनवायरनमेंट वेरिएबल दर्ज नहीं है।
BlackVeil DNS & Email Security Scanner तक HTTP से पहुँचा जाता है।
पिछली जाँच 2026-10-22 को हुई। DNS and email security scanner with 82 MCP tools for SPF, DMARC, DNSSEC, SSL, and brand audits.