Power your agent
पब्लिशर का अपना URL। PlugMCP एंडपॉइंट नहीं।
Host a copy with our keys and logs.
https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcpऊपर दिया Claude बटन नाम और URL भरकर Claude खोलता है। पुष्टि आपको वहीं करनी होती है।
claude mcp add --transport http io.github.baneado98-cloud-pathfinder https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
{ "mcpServers": { "io.github.baneado98-cloud-pathfinder": { "command": "npx", "args": [ "-y", "mcp-remote", "https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp" ] } }}claude_desktop_config.json
रिमोट URL या आपकी मशीन पर कमांड? दोनों इंस्टॉल में क्या अंतर है
PlugMCP पर चलाएँ
A new server you create. It is not this listing's official endpoint. Use the publisher install when you want their URL and their credentials.
लॉन्चAttack-path auditor for Infrastructure-as-Code — Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, CDK, Pulumi, Bicep/ARM.
Not a linter. It parses your IaC into a resource graph, resolves cross-resource (and cross-file) relationships, and searches for the multi-hop chains from the public internet to your crown jewels (data stores, secrets, admin). It returns a BREACHABLE / EXPOSED / HARDENED verdict and the concrete route an attacker would walk.
Example chain it finds:
open security group (SSH 0.0.0.0/0) → EC2 instance-profile role → iam:PassRole privilege escalation to admin → S3 exfiltration
Available as an MCP server (Claude, Cursor, any MCP agent) and a pay-per-call x402 API (autonomous AI agents with a wallet).
Sending your IaC to a third party is sensitive — so here is exactly what happens:
files map or source blob).
Nothing is read from your machine, your cloud account, or your credentials —
cloud-pathfinder never touches a live cloud (see "honest limits" below). There
are no cloud keys to provide because it analyzes the declared templates only.deep: true, behind payment). Only then
are the full chains, file:line evidence and remediation returned. You send the
same IaC either way — nothing extra leaves your machine for the deep tier.Hosted service: https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app — all analysis runs server-side. This npm package is a thin MCP client: it sends the IaC text to the hosted endpoint and renders the verdict. No analysis logic ships to your machine.
audit_iac_attack_paths { files: { "main.tf": "..." } }.https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app.INTERNET node to every data store / secret / admin sink, and resolves IAM
privilege-escalation reachability along each hop — in memory.file:line evidence; the
free tier returns the verdict, score and counts.The npm tarball contains only the HTTP caller — so nothing, free or deep, runs offline. Without the server it degrades to a clear network error.
A linter flags resources one at a time: "this SG is open", "this role is broad". cloud-pathfinder reasons about how those facts connect — work a per-file local tool structurally cannot do:
INTERNET to every data store / secret /
admin sink, returning the full multi-hop chain with per-hop file:line evidence.Formats are auto-detected per file and analyzed together — mix .tf,
CloudFormation .yaml/.json and Kubernetes manifests in one call.
{
"mcpServers": {
"cloud-pathfinder": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "cloud-pathfinder-mcp"] }
}
}
No key needed for the free tier. Restart your client and the
audit_iac_attack_paths + diff_attack_paths tools appear. (Remote server:
https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp.)
audit_iac_attack_paths{
"files": {
"main.tf": "resource \"aws_security_group\" \"web\" { ingress { ... cidr_blocks = [\"0.0.0.0/0\"] } } ...",
"k8s.yaml": "apiVersion: v1\nkind: Service\n..."
}
// or: "source": "<a single IaC blob>", "filename": "main.tf"
}
audit_iac_attack_paths { "files": { "main.tf": "<SG open to 0.0.0.0/0 on 22 +
EC2 with instance-profile role that can s3:* + iam:PassRole>" } }
→ FREE: verdict: BREACHABLE · risk 86/100 · 1 attack path · 1 crown jewel · 3 misconfigs
→ DEEP (deep:true): verdict: BREACHABLE
PATH #1 (internet → admin):
[1] INTERNET → aws_security_group.web (main.tf:4 — ingress 22 from 0.0.0.0/0)
[2] → aws_instance.app (main.tf:19 — attaches sg web)
[3] → aws_iam_role.app_role (main.tf:31 — instance profile)
[4] → iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances (privesc → launch instance as admin role)
[5] → s3:* on aws_s3_bucket.data (main.tf:52 — exfiltration sink)
CHOKE POINT: tighten main.tf:4 ingress → cuts this entire path.
FIX: restrict ingress CIDR; split the role; add a permissions boundary.
The free tier returns the verdict, risk score, and the counts (how many attack paths, crown jewels and misconfigurations). The deep tier returns every full chain with hops, file:line evidence, privilege-escalation reachability and remediation.
diff_attack_paths — the CI/CD gateGive it the IaC before and after a change (a PR's base and head trees) and it
reports exactly what the change did to your attack surface: which internet→crown-jewel
chains it INTRODUCES, which it ELIMINATES, and which it AGGRAVATES — with
an INTRODUCES_BREACH / REDUCES_RISK / NEUTRAL / MIXED verdict.
{
"before": { "files": { "main.tf": "...security group admits 10.0.0.0/16..." } },
"after": { "files": { "main.tf": "...security group admits 0.0.0.0/0..." } }
// deep: true → full introduced/eliminated chains + before→after exploitability + which choke points now matter
}
A per-file linter or a single-state scan cannot answer this: it needs the full graph
POST /diff (free, counts only) / POST /pro/diff (deep).POST /audit
Content-Type: application/json
{ "files": { "main.tf": "resource \"aws_security_group\" ..." } }
Rate-limited to 30 requests/hour/IP. For unlimited/commercial/deep use, call /pro/audit.
Input formats: Terraform / OpenTofu, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, Helm, Kustomize,
Pulumi (TS/JS/Python), Bicep/ARM, and AWS CDK — both the synthesized
cdk.out/*.template.json and the un-synthed CDK program (TypeScript + Python),
so a CI gate runs on the PR diff before cdk synth.
Add ?format=sarif (or { "format": "sarif" }) to /audit, /pro/audit, /diff
or /pro/diff to get SARIF 2.1.0 you can upload to GitHub code scanning —
every attack chain shows up inline on the PR's Security tab.
result with a codeFlow (a step-through walk:
internet → SG → instance role → privesc → S3), anchored to the IaC file:line,
plus security-severity/CVSS so the badge colors correctly.note.# .github/workflows/cloud-pathfinder.yml (sketch)
- run: curl -s -X POST "$CPF/pro/diff?format=sarif" -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" \
--data @payload.json -o cloud-pathfinder.sarif
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
with: { sarif_file: cloud-pathfinder.sarif }
/pro — two ways to pay (dual-pay)The deep /pro/audit returns the full attack chains, per-hop evidence,
privilege-escalation analysis and remediation. Two payment lanes coexist:
POST /pro/audit # 402 (shows BOTH lanes) → pay → result
The premium engine and knowledge base never ship in the npm package — the published client is a thin renderer that calls the hosted analysis service. The free tier is genuinely useful (verdict + counts); the deep chains, evidence and privesc analysis are server-side behind payment.
Heuristic static analysis of declared IaC, not a live cloud assessment. It reasons over what the templates declare (no runtime SCP/permissions-boundary/condition evaluation). Treat findings as prioritized leads, not a guarantee.
IaC attack-path auditor: finds internet-to-crown-jewel chains in Terraform/CFN/K8s.
{ "mcpServers": { "io.github.baneado98-cloud-pathfinder": { "url": "https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp", "headers": {} } }}टूल
अभी टूल सूची नहीं है। रिमोट सर्वर को पहले हेल्थ चेक के बाद सूची मिलती है।
FAQ
इस पेज पर Cursor, Claude Desktop, Claude Code या VS Code के लिए http कॉन्फ़िग कॉपी करें। यह पब्लिशर का इंस्टॉल इस्तेमाल करता है, PlugMCP प्रॉक्सी नहीं।
इस रिकॉर्ड में कोई ज़रूरी एनवायरनमेंट वेरिएबल दर्ज नहीं है।
Cloud Pathfinder तक HTTP से पहुँचा जाता है।
पिछली जाँच 2026-11-08 को हुई। IaC attack-path auditor: finds internet-to-crown-jewel chains in Terraform/CFN/K8s.