- name
SKILL.md
स्किल फ़ाइल पब्लिशर की रिपॉज़िटरी में ही रहती है।
कॉपी की गई कमांड टर्मिनल में पेस्ट करें। यह इस SKILL.md को उस एजेंट में इंस्टॉल करती है।
npx skills add ericrisco/rsc-harness --skill agent-safety -a cursor -yकॉपी की गई कमांड टर्मिनल में पेस्ट करें। यह इस SKILL.md को उस एजेंट में इंस्टॉल करती है।
npx skills add ericrisco/rsc-harness --skill agent-safety -a claude-code -yकॉपी की गई कमांड टर्मिनल में पेस्ट करें। यह इस SKILL.md को उस एजेंट में इंस्टॉल करती है।
npx skills add ericrisco/rsc-harness --skill agent-safety -a codex -yकॉपी की गई कमांड टर्मिनल में पेस्ट करें। यह इस SKILL.md को उस एजेंट में इंस्टॉल करती है।
npx skills add ericrisco/rsc-harness --skill agent-safety -a grok -yकॉपी किया गया संदेश Grok Bot चैट में भेजें। Bot यह SKILL.md GitHub से लाता है और उसे उन स्किल में जोड़ देता है जो आपके सभी Bot साझा करते हैं।
Install this skill: https://github.com/ericrisco/rsc-harness/tree/HEAD/skills/agent-safetyपब्लिशर से
You are the security review for an agent's agency, not for its code. The loop works,
tools are wired, memory persists — your job is to make that autonomy bounded. If you
want to review ordinary endpoints, auth, or secrets handling, that is
../security-audit/SKILL.md — this skill is the Agentic Top 10, the risks that exist only
because a model has tools and autonomy. If the loop or tools do not exist yet, that is
../building-agents/SKILL.md. You arrive after both.
references/threat-model.md carries the OWASP Agentic Top 10 2026 risks mapped to the
controls below, the pre-ship guardrail checklist, and the incident-triage flow for "the
agent did X" — open it when you are reviewing before ship or reconstructing an incident.
Agent security splits into four layers — Model · Harness · Tools · Environment. The model provider owns only the Model layer (alignment, refusals). Everything else is yours: the Harness (loop, memory, context assembly), the Tools (what the agent can do), and the Environment (creds, network, blast radius). Do not outsource a layer you own to "the model is aligned."
Three excesses cause almost every agentic incident. Cut all three:
The operating principle is least agency: autonomy is earned per task, not defaulted.
Give every tool a profile: read / write / exec / send, the exact resources it may touch, and an allowlist (never a wildcard). Block destructive flags and secret paths at the tool boundary, not in the prompt — the prompt is advisory, the boundary is enforced.
# Bad: one wildcard tool = unbounded blast radius, runs anything the loop emits
def run_shell(cmd: str) -> str:
return subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True).stdout
# Good: narrow tool, allowlisted root, denied patterns, no shell
ALLOWED_ROOT = pathlib.Path("/srv/agent/workspace").resolve()
DENY = ("*.key", "*.pem", "*secret*", "*.env", "id_rsa*")
def read_file(path: str) -> str:
p = (ALLOWED_ROOT / path).resolve()
if not p.is_relative_to(ALLOWED_ROOT): # no traversal out of scope
raise PermissionError("path outside workspace")
if any(p.match(g) for g in DENY): # never read secrets
raise PermissionError("denied pattern")
return p.read_text()
Treat all external data as untrusted: user messages, retrieved documents, API responses, emails, web pages, other agents' output. Sanitize and delimit before it enters context, and never let external text reach a privileged tool unmediated.
# Bad: retrieved chunk flows straight into a privileged action
chunk = retriever.search(q)[0].text # attacker-controlled doc
agent.call_tool("send_email", to=extract_to(chunk), body=chunk)
# Good: external content is quarantined data; the action is schema-validated + gated
chunk = retriever.search(q)[0].text
ctx = f"<retrieved untrusted>\n{chunk}\n</retrieved untrusted>" # delimited, labeled
proposal = agent.draft("send_email", context=ctx) # model proposes
args = SendEmail.model_validate(proposal.args) # schema or reject
if args.to_domain not in ALLOWED_DOMAINS: # exfil guard
raise PermissionError("recipient outside allowlist")
require_human_approval("send_email", args) # irreversible → HITL
Do not approve every action — reported ~93% of permission prompts get approved without being read, so blanket prompting trains a rubber stamp. Gate by risk class, keyed on reversibility × blast radius. Bind each approval to the exact parameters with a short-lived token so the approved action cannot be swapped after the click.
A looping or hijacked agent must hit a wall on its own. Set hard caps, fail closed:
Log every tool call (arguments redacted) and alert on repeated approval-bypass attempts.
Use when bounding an LLM agent that already runs — scoping its task domain, gating tools to least privilege, defending against prompt injection in untrusted web/email/RAG text, requiring human approva
---name: agent-safetydescription: Use when bounding an LLM agent that already runs — scoping its task domain, gating tools to least privilege…---# skills/agent-safety/SKILL.mdओवरव्यू
Use when bounding an LLM agent that already runs — scoping its task domain, gating tools to least privilege, defending against prompt injection in untrusted web/email/RAG text, requiring human approval on irreversible actions, capping runtime and cost, or triaging what it already did. NOT building the loop, tools, or RAG (that is `building-agents`).
FAQ
पब्लिशर से skills/agent-safety/SKILL.md डाउनलोड करें, या पाथ कॉपी करके रिपॉज़िटरी खोलें। PlugMCP स्किल को सूचीबद्ध करता है, फ़ाइल होस्ट नहीं करता।
पब्लिशर इसे https://github.com/ericrisco/rsc-harness पर रखता है।
Claude, Cursor, Codex और Grok Build वह SKILL.md पढ़ सकते हैं जिसे आप पब्लिशर की रिपॉज़िटरी से जोड़ते हैं। जब आप चैट में स्किल के GitHub फ़ोल्डर का लिंक भेजते हैं, तो Grok Bot उसे इंस्टॉल कर देता है।