DATABASE_URL — Full connection string (preferred). Supports sslmode in the URL.
PG_HOST — Database host (fallback when DATABASE_URL is not set).
PG_PORT — Database port.
PG_USER — Database user.
PG_PASSWORD — Database password.
PG_DATABASE — Database name.
PG_ALLOW_WRITE — When true, execute performs writes and reads are sent directly. Off (default) is read-only: execute refuses writes and each read runs in a READ ONLY transaction.
PG_SSLMODE — TLS mode. require/allow/prefer encrypt without verifying the certificate; verify-ca/verify-full verify it (supply a CA via PG_SSL_CA). Unlike libpq, allow/prefer do not fall back to plaintext, so a server without TLS needs disable.
PG_SSL_CA — Path to a CA certificate file. Setting it by itself implies verify-full.
PG_ENABLE_RUNTIME_CONNECT — Register the connect_db tool (runtime credential switching).
PG_MAX_RESULT_BYTES — Byte budget for a query result sent to the model. Whole rows are kept while they fit; over the budget returnedRows < rowCount and truncated is true.
PG_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT — Statement timeout in milliseconds, applied to every session.
PG_CONNECT_TIMEOUT — Timeout in milliseconds for a single connect attempt (raise it for slow links or SSH tunnels).
PG_SSH_HOST — SSH bastion host. Setting it enables tunneling: the server reaches the database only through an SSH tunnel to this host. Needs the ssh2 optional dependency.
PG_SSH_PORT — SSH bastion port.
PG_SSH_USER — SSH username.
PG_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY — Path to a private key file. If unset, auth falls back like ssh: a running agent (SSH_AUTH_SOCK), then a default key (~/.ssh/id_ed25519, id_rsa, id_ecdsa).
PG_SSH_PASSPHRASE — Passphrase for the private key, if encrypted.
PG_SSH_AGENT — true to use the ambient agent (SSH_AUTH_SOCK), or an explicit socket path / Windows named pipe.
PG_SSH_PASSWORD — SSH login password. Opt-in; a key or agent takes precedence. Prefer keys, a bastion often disables password auth.
PG_SSH_FINGERPRINT — Pinned host-key fingerprint (SHA256:...). Host-key verification is mandatory and set only this way: without it the tunnel refuses to connect. Get it with ssh-keygen -lF host.
PG_SSH_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL — SSH keepalive interval in ms; the tunnel drops after 3 unanswered keepalives, and the next call reconnects.
Claude Code tidak punya tautan instal untuk perintah lokal. Salin perintah di bawah dan jalankan di terminal.
With PG_ALLOW_WRITE set to "false" the server has read-only access to the
database. This is the default; set it to "true" only if the model must write.
The same JSON works in any MCP client that speaks stdio: VS Code, Cursor, Claude Code, Codex, Windsurf.
Alternatively, set the individual PG_* variables; they are used when
DATABASE_URL is not set:
Postgres in Docker: if the database runs in a container with a published
port, connect to localhost:<published-port> as usual. If the MCP server
itself runs inside a container and the database runs on your host machine,
use host.docker.internal instead of localhost:
Execute a read-only SQL statement. Accepts SELECT, WITH ... SELECT,
EXPLAIN, and SHOW. One statement per call - multi-statement input is rejected
by the extended query protocol. In read-only mode (the default) the statement runs
as BEGIN READ ONLY, the query, and ROLLBACK - three commands, roughly two
network round trips with pipelining - so the database itself refuses any write.
With PG_ALLOW_WRITE=true the statement is sent directly, without that wrapper, so a
write run through query would execute - use execute for writes.
Supports PostgreSQL-style $1, $2 prepared-statement parameters; values are bound
by the driver and never spliced into the SQL text.
use_mcp_tool({
server_name: "postgres",
tool_name: "query",
arguments: {
sql: "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1",
params: [1]
}
});
Returns compact JSON: {"rows": [...], "rowCount": n, "returnedRows": n, "truncated": false}.
When the serialized rows exceed PG_MAX_RESULT_BYTES, only the rows that fit are returned
(returnedRows < rowCount), truncated is true, and a hint suggests adding LIMIT/WHERE
or selecting fewer columns.
List tables in the connected database. Accepts an optional schema parameter
(defaults to 'public').
// List tables in the 'public' schema (default)
use_mcp_tool({
server_name: "postgres",
tool_name: "list_tables",
arguments: {}
});
// List tables in a specific schema
use_mcp_tool({
server_name: "postgres",
tool_name: "list_tables",
arguments: {
schema: "my_schema"
}
});
4. describe_table
Get the structure of a specific table (columns, types, nullability, defaults,
primary keys). Accepts an optional schema parameter (defaults to 'public').
Execute an INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, or DDL statement. Always registered, but
in read-only mode (the default) it refuses with an error naming PG_ALLOW_WRITE
and changes nothing - the statement never reaches the database. With
PG_ALLOW_WRITE=true it runs: same $1, $2 parameter handling as query, one
complete statement per call, and the connecting role governs what it may do.
Returns {"rowCount": n, "command": "INSERT"}.
Connect to a different PostgreSQL database at runtime using provided
credentials. Not registered by default - prefer configuring credentials
through the environment so they never pass through model-visible arguments.
Session limits (statement_timeout, idle_in_transaction_session_timeout) are
re-applied after every reconnect; read-only reads enforce read-only in their own
BEGIN READ ONLY transaction.
Full connection string (preferred). Supports ?sslmode= in the URL.
PG_HOST
-
Database host (fallback when DATABASE_URL is not set)
PG_PORT
5432
Database port
PG_USER
-
Database user
PG_PASSWORD
-
Database password
PG_DATABASE
-
Database name
PG_ALLOW_WRITE
false
When true, execute performs writes and reads are sent directly. Off (default) is read-only: execute refuses writes and each read runs in a READ ONLY transaction
PG_SSLMODE
-
disable | allow | prefer | require | verify-ca | verify-full. require/allow/prefer encrypt without verifying the certificate; verify-ca/verify-full verify (supply a CA via PG_SSL_CA). Unrecognized values fail at startup. Limitation: unlike libpq, allow/prefer do not fall back to plaintext (node-postgres has no opportunistic SSL), so a server without TLS needs disable.
PG_SSL_CA
-
Path to a CA certificate file. Setting it by itself implies verify-full
PG_ENABLE_RUNTIME_CONNECT
false
Register the connect_db tool (runtime credential switching)
PG_MAX_RESULT_BYTES
32768
Byte budget for a query result sent to the model. Whole rows are kept while they fit; over the budget returnedRows < rowCount and truncated: true (if not even the first row fits, returnedRows is 0 with a hint). ~32 KiB ≈ 8k tokens; lower it for strict clients, raise it if your client allows more.
PG_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT
30000
Statement timeout in milliseconds, applied to every session
PG_CONNECT_TIMEOUT
10000
Timeout in milliseconds for a single connect attempt (raise it for slow links or SSH tunnels)
To reach a database only accessible through a bastion, see SSH tunneling (adds PG_SSH_* variables).
Features
Read-only by default; writes are an explicit opt-in (PG_ALLOW_WRITE=true)
Read-only enforced by the engine (BEGIN READ ONLY), never by client-side SQL parsing
Data access behind a small typed interface; the pg driver never leaks past it
DATABASE_URL support with SSL (sslmode=disable|allow|prefer|require|verify-ca|verify-full, custom CA)
Prepared-statement parameters: $1-style placeholders, bound by the driver
Result size cap (byte budget) with an explicit truncated flag instead of flooding the model's context
Session statement timeout plus a client deadline; transaction poolers may not preserve session settings
Errors returned as readable tool results with SQLSTATE-based hints, so the model can self-correct
Survives dropped connections - reconnects lazily instead of crashing
Optional SSH tunneling (PG_SSH_*) with mandatory host-key verification, loaded only when configured
MCP tool annotations (read-only / destructive hints) per spec 2025-11-25
Multi-schema support for database operations
Security
Full details, including the threat model and disclosure process, are in
SECURITY.md. The short version:
A least-privilege database role is the real boundary. The MCP works with
existing credentials; creating or changing roles is not required. A dedicated
role is what actually guarantees writes are impossible.
On PostgreSQL 14+, the following is a starting point:
CREATE ROLE mcp_readonly LOGIN PASSWORD 'change-me';
GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE your_database TO mcp_readonly;
GRANT pg_read_all_data TO mcp_readonly; -- adds read privileges
ALTER ROLE mcp_readonly SET default_transaction_read_only = on; -- read-only by default
(On PostgreSQL 13 or older, grant SELECT explicitly instead of
pg_read_all_data - see SECURITY.md.) The server warns on
stderr if you connect as a superuser. Read grants do not revoke existing
privileges, and defaults remain mutable; available functions, ownership and
inherited privileges also matter.
The engine enforces read-only. There is no client-side SQL parsing. In
read-only mode every read runs in a rolled-back BEGIN READ ONLY transaction,
so PostgreSQL itself - which alone knows what a function, view, or rule does -
refuses any write with SQLSTATE 25006 and reverts any session change the
statement made. The extended protocol rejects multi-command strings.
Honest framing: the read-only transaction is defense-in-depth on top of the
role, not a replacement for it. Read-only mode stops a confused or prompt-injected
model from writing to your database; it does not stop prompt injection carried in
the row data a query returns. Don't point this server at production - use a replica,
a snapshot, or a tightly scoped role. See SECURITY.md.
SSH tunneling
Set PG_SSH_HOST (plus auth and host-key verification) to reach a database that is only accessible
through a bastion (an SSH jump host). The connection string / PG_* fields then describe the
database as seen from the bastion:
SSH bastion host. Setting it enables tunneling: the server reaches the database only through an SSH tunnel to this host (see below). Optional feature; needs the ssh2 optional dependency.
PG_SSH_PORT
22
SSH bastion port
PG_SSH_USER
-
SSH username
PG_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY
-
Path to a private key file. If unset, auth falls back like ssh: a running agent (SSH_AUTH_SOCK), then a default key (~/.ssh/id_ed25519, id_rsa, id_ecdsa)
PG_SSH_PASSPHRASE
-
Passphrase for the private key, if encrypted
PG_SSH_AGENT
-
true to use the ambient agent (SSH_AUTH_SOCK), or an explicit socket path / Windows named pipe (\\.\pipe\openssh-ssh-agent)
PG_SSH_PASSWORD
-
SSH login password. Opt-in; a key or agent takes precedence. Prefer keys - a bastion often disables password auth.
PG_SSH_FINGERPRINT
-
Pinned host-key fingerprint (SHA256:...). Host-key verification is mandatory and set only this way: without it the tunnel refuses to connect (fail-closed). Get it with ssh-keygen -lF host (reads your known_hosts) or ssh-keyscan host | ssh-keygen -lf - (see the trust note below)
PG_SSH_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL
15000
SSH keepalive interval in ms; the tunnel drops after 3 unanswered keepalives, and the next call reconnects
SSH changes only the transport. Read-only enforcement, the result size cap, timeouts, and
connect_db behave exactly as on a direct connection, and no extra SQL is sent per query.
Host-key verification is mandatory via a pinned PG_SSH_FINGERPRINT - the tunnel will not
connect without it, so a man-in-the-middle bastion is refused. Get the fingerprint over a channel
you trust, most trustworthy first:
on the bastion itself, or from its admin: ssh-keygen -lf /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
(no network involved);
from your existing ~/.ssh/known_hosts, if you already reach the host over ssh:
ssh-keygen -lF bastion.example.com;
fetched from the host: ssh-keyscan bastion.example.com | ssh-keygen -lf - (trust this only
when run from a network position you trust - it accepts whatever the host returns).
TLS validates the real database hostname. With verify-full, the certificate is checked against
the database's own hostname (e.g. db.internal), not the loopback the tunnel binds locally, and
rejectUnauthorized is pinned on so an inherited NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 cannot disable it.
ssh2 is an optional dependency, loaded only when PG_SSH_HOST is set, so a direct connection
never initializes it. npm installs optional dependencies by default; run
npm install --omit=optional to skip it entirely (a direct connection does not need it).
A tunneled connection that fails reports a stable SSH_* code - see Error Handling.
Error Handling
SQL and connection failures are returned as tool results (isError: true)
with a message, the SQLSTATE code, and a hint. PostgreSQL's own server hint is
used when present; otherwise these fallbacks apply:
code
meaning
first thing to check
28P01
authentication failed
PG_USER / PG_PASSWORD
3D000
database does not exist
PG_DATABASE
42P01
relation not found
call list_tables
42703
column not found
call describe_table
57014
the query was canceled (a timeout or a cancel request)
if timing out, add a LIMIT / simplify it, or raise PG_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT
25006
the transaction is read-only
source may be a read-only role, a replica, a server default, or (for query) the read-only wrapper; execute writes need PG_ALLOW_WRITE=true
ECONNREFUSED / ENOTFOUND
cannot reach or resolve the database host
PG_HOST / PG_PORT / DATABASE_URL
Over an SSH tunnel, a failure carries a stable code (and, where
the cause is determinate, a hint naming the setting to fix), so the failing phase is unambiguous:
code
meaning
first thing to check
SSH_CONFIG_INVALID
invalid SSH config, incl. a malformed PG_SSH_FINGERPRINT
the PG_SSH_* values
SSH_KEY_INVALID
key unreadable, unparseable, a public key, or encrypted without the right passphrase (an encrypted key with the correct PG_SSH_PASSPHRASE works)
PG_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY, PG_SSH_PASSPHRASE
SSH_CONNECT_FAILED
the bastion is unreachable, or SSH setup failed for an unclassified reason
PG_SSH_HOST, PG_SSH_PORT, reachability
SSH_TIMEOUT
the bastion did not respond in time
network/firewall, PG_CONNECT_TIMEOUT
SSH_AUTH_FAILED
the bastion rejected authentication
PG_SSH_USER and the key/agent/password in use
SSH_HOST_KEY_MISMATCH
host key does not match PG_SSH_FINGERPRINT (stale value or MITM)
re-fetch the fingerprint
SSH_FORWARD_FAILED
tunnel is up, but the bastion could not reach the database
the DB host and port as seen from the bastion
SSH_CONNECTION_LOST
an established tunnel dropped mid-session
transient; the next call reconnects
A genuine PostgreSQL error through a healthy tunnel keeps its own code (e.g. 28P01 for wrong
database credentials), not an SSH code.
Migrating from 0.1.x
Not needed for new installs. Two behavior changes since 0.1.x:
Read-only by default. The execute tool is always visible but refuses
writes (with an error naming the flag) unless PG_ALLOW_WRITE=true, and every
read runs inside an engine-enforced READ ONLY transaction. If your workflow
writes to the database, set "PG_ALLOW_WRITE": "true" to restore 0.1.x behavior.
connect_db is disabled by default. Runtime connection switching (passing
credentials through tool arguments) requires PG_ENABLE_RUNTIME_CONNECT=true;
otherwise connection details come only from the environment.
Tool names, parameter names, and PG_* variables are unchanged. Result payloads
are now structured compact JSON for every tool (e.g. query returns
{rows, rowCount, returnedRows, truncated} instead of a bare row array) - see
CHANGELOG.md for the exact shapes before updating anything that
parses tool output.
Belum ada daftar tool. Server remote mendapatkannya setelah pemeriksaan kesehatan pertama.
FAQ
Pertanyaan
Bagaimana cara menginstal PostgreSQL?
Salin konfigurasi stdio untuk Cursor, Claude Desktop, Claude Code, atau VS Code di halaman ini. Konfigurasi ini memakai instalasi dari penerbit, bukan proxy PlugMCP.