- name
SKILL.md
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Install this skill: https://github.com/trailofbits/skills/tree/HEAD/plugins/building-secure-contracts/skills/cairo-vulnerability-scannerDari penerbit
Systematically scan Cairo smart contracts on StarkNet for platform-specific security vulnerabilities related to arithmetic, cross-layer messaging, and cryptographic operations. This skill encodes 6 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Cairo/StarkNet ecosystem.
.cairo// Cairo contract indicators
#[contract]
mod MyContract {
use starknet::ContractAddress;
#[storage]
struct Storage {
balance: LegacyMap<ContractAddress, felt252>,
}
#[external(v0)]
fn transfer(ref self: ContractState, to: ContractAddress, amount: felt252) {
// Contract logic
}
#[l1_handler]
fn handle_deposit(ref self: ContractState, from_address: felt252, amount: u256) {
// L1 message handler
}
}
// Common patterns
felt252, u128, u256
ContractAddress, EthAddress
#[external(v0)], #[l1_handler], #[constructor]
get_caller_address(), get_contract_address()
send_message_to_l1_syscall
src/contract.cairo - Main contract implementationsrc/lib.cairo - Library modulestests/ - Contract testsScarb.toml - Cairo project configurationcargo install --git https://github.com/crytic/caracal --profile release --force (a Rust tool — not on PyPI)caracal detect src/When invoked, I will:
When vulnerabilities are found, you'll get a report like this:
=== CAIRO/STARKNET VULNERABILITY SCAN RESULTS ===
I check for 6 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Cairo/Starknet. For detailed detection patterns, code examples, mitigations, and testing strategies, see VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md.
felt252 wraps silently; use u128/u256For complete vulnerability patterns with code examples, see VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md.
src/*.cairo)# Find felt252 usage in arithmetic
rg "felt252" src/ | rg "[-+*/]"
# Find balance/amount storage using felt252
rg "felt252" src/ | rg "balance|amount|total|supply"
# Should prefer u128, u256 instead
For each #[l1_handler] function:
from_address parameterFor signature-based functions:
If contract includes bridge functionality:
# Run Caracal detectors
caracal detect src/
# Specific detectors
caracal detect src/ --detectors unchecked-felt252-arithmetic
caracal detect src/ --detectors unchecked-l1-handler-from
caracal detect src/ --detectors missing-nonce-validation
Report on every pattern in §6, whether or not it turned anything up. Emit this table above the findings, with all 6 rows present:
Each verdict is one of:
found — cite file:line and write the finding up in full below.clear — the pattern applies to this contract and the contract handles it. Name the function, trait, or
check you searched for, so a reader can repeat the search.n/a — the pattern cannot apply here. Give the reason in one clause ("no L1 handlers in this contract").
Not having looked is not n/a.A table with fewer than 6 rows is an incomplete scan and must be reported as one. A row whose Verdict cell is empty is incomplete in the same way: row 1 above is filled in to show the shape, and every row is filled in the same way before the report is done. Six clear verdicts is a
result a reader can act on. A report that covers two patterns and says nothing about the other four reads
exactly like a clean contract, and that is the failure this table exists to prevent.
## [CRITICAL] Unchecked from_address in L1 Handler
**Location**: `src/bridge.cairo:145-155` (handle_deposit function)
**Description**:
The `handle_deposit` L1 handler function does not validate the `from_address` parameter. Any L1 contract can send messages to this function and mint tokens for arbitrary users, bypassing the intended L1 bridge access controls.
**Vulnerable Code**:
```rust
// bridge.cairo, line 145
#[l1_handler]
fn handle_deposit(
ref self: ContractState,
from_address: felt252, // Not validated!
user: ContractAddress,
amount: u256
) {
let current_balance = self.balances.read(user);
self.balances.write(user, current_balance + amount);
}
```
**Attack Scenario**:
1. Attacker deploys malicious L1 contract
2. Malicious contract calls `starknetCore.sendMessageToL2(l2Contract, selector, [attacker_address, 1000000])`
3. L2 handler processes message without checking sender
4. Attacker receives 1,000,000 tokens without depositing any funds
5. Protocol suffers infinite mint vulnerability
**Recommendation**:
Validate `from_address` against authorized L1 bridge:
```rust
#[l1_handler]
fn handle_deposit(
ref self: ContractState,
from_address: felt252,
user: ContractAddress,
amount: u256
) {
// Validate L1 sender
let authorized_l1_bridge = self.l1_bridge_address.read();
assert(from_address == authorized_l1_bridge, 'Unauthorized L1 sender');
let current_balance = self.balances.read(user);
self.balances.write(user, current_balance + amount);
}
```
**References**:
- building-secure-contracts/not-so-smart-contracts/cairo/unchecked_l1_handler_from
- Caracal detector: `unchecked-l1-handler-from`
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_felt252_overflow() {
// Test arithmetic edge cases
}
#[test]
#[should_panic]
fn test_unauthorized_l1_handler() {
// Wrong from_address should fail
}
#[test]
fn test_signature_replay_protection() {
// Same signature twice should fail
}
}
// Test full L1-L2 flow
#[test]
fn test_deposit_withdraw_roundtrip() {
// 1. Deposit on L1
// 2. Wait for L2 processing
// 3. Verify L2 balance
// 4. Withdraw to L1
// 5. Verify L1 balance restored
}
# .github/workflows/security.yml
- name: Run Caracal
run: |
# Rebuilds from source each run; cache ~/.cargo or pin a release binary instead.
cargo install --git https://github.com/crytic/caracal --profile release --force
caracal detect src/ --fail-on high,critical
building-secure-contracts/not-so-smart-contracts/cairo/Before completing Cairo/StarkNet audit:
Arithmetic Safety (HIGH):
L1 Handler Security (CRITICAL):
#[l1_handler] functions validate from_addressL1-L2 Messaging (HIGH):
Signature Security (HIGH):
Tool Usage:
found, clear or n/a with a reasonn/a costs one
clause and makes the judgment reviewable. Silence records nothing, and a reader cannot tell it apart from
not having checked.felt252 does not behave
like the sized integer types, and the boundary between them is where pattern 4 lives.from_address is the canonical StarkNet bridge bug.Scans Cairo/StarkNet smart contracts for 6 critical vulnerabilities including felt252 arithmetic overflow, L1-L2 messaging issues, address conversion problems, and signature replay. Use when auditing
---name: cairo-vulnerability-scannerdescription: Scans Cairo/StarkNet smart contracts for 6 critical vulnerabilities including felt252 arithmetic overflow…---# plugins/building-secure-contracts/skills/cairo-vulnerability-scanner/SKILL.mdRingkasan umum
Scans Cairo/StarkNet smart contracts for 6 critical vulnerabilities including felt252 arithmetic overflow, L1-L2 messaging issues, address conversion problems, and signature replay. Use when auditing StarkNet projects.
FAQ
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