The browser layer for an always-on box. Many logged-in identities, running
unattended, all at once — on real Chrome, with stealth on by default, and with a
security model for letting an AI near the credentials.
One daemon, N persistent Chrome sessions, a vb CLI and an MCP server.
Self-hosted, free, Apache-2.0.
Many accounts on one box, running unattended, against sites that fight automation
vibatchium
That last row is the whole wedge. Supervised agents hand control back to you at
every login wall and CAPTCHA; a library leaves the fleet — sessions, budgets,
crash recovery, credentials — for you to build. vibatchium is that fleet layer.
How it compares
As of 2026-10-06, from each project's own README, source and release notes
(the MCP-cost row is our own measurement¹). Rows where we lose are included on
purpose.
Agent can use a secret but not read it (origin-bound fill, read-back refused, TOTP)
yes
—
—
vault, origin check
--secrets redaction
Prompt-injection scanning of page content
yes
—
—
boundary markers (opt-in), no scanning
—
Browserless HTTP on the session's own cookies, Chrome TLS fingerprint · keyless web search
yes
—
—
—
—
Browser
stock Chrome
own Chromium build
stock Chromium
Chrome for Testing default
stock Chrome
Stealth layer
CDP-level (Patchright)
engine-level (87 C++ patches)
CDP-level ("6-layer"), no Runtime.enable
none in core; via cloud providers
none
Published stealth score
not yet
30/30 on its own detector list
68/80 Stealth Bench V1 (self-run)
—
—
MCP startup cost in Claude Code¹
~2.7k tokens (87 tools, 5 always loaded)
n/a
~3.4k tokens (5 tools)
not measured
not measured
Platforms
Linux (macOS: CI probe, unsupported)
Linux · macOS · Windows
Linux · macOS · Windows
all
all
¹ bytes/4 of tools/list plus server instructions, measured over stdio. Clients without tool search load every tool: vb mcp --caps min is 12 tools, ~3.8k tokens. bladebro's own README says ~1.9k.
Where the others are genuinely better: CloakBrowser's engine-level patches
go deeper than any CDP-level layer can — and vb start --browser-binary will
drive a Chromium build you bring. bladebro has a stealth benchmark number and we
don't; until we do, read our stealth claims as measured on scoreboards, below,
not on production walls. Both run on more operating systems.
What only vibatchium does
1. A fleet of logged-in identities on one box. Each session is its own
Chrome and profile, with its own proxy, timezone and GPU node, and — opt-in
with vb persona set — its own screen and window, because by default every
headless session on one machine reports the same 800×600 screen. vb fleet-check measures how alike your sessions still look. They run in parallel
on one daemon that keeps them alive: a crashed renderer is relaunched on the
same profile, parked sessions have their renderers stopped and thawed on the
next call, leases stop two agents clobbering one session, and goals give a task
a step/spend/time budget that survives a daemon restart.
vb --session alice start && vb --session alice go https://x.com # log in once, stays logged in
vb --session bob start && vb --session bob go https://x.com
vb --session alice act "open notifications" & vb --session bob extract & wait
vb fleet-check --sessions alice,bob # how twinned are they?
2. Credentials an agent can use but never see. The vault fills a password
or a live TOTP code into the page without the value reaching the model's
context, a screenshot or a log — and only into the site it belongs to. Over
MCP, a prompt-injected agent can't type your GitHub password into a lookalike
page, can't read it back with value or eval while it sits in the field, and
can't edit the vault or pull a code. An agent with a shell is the operator —
the CLI has deliberate escape hatches — so give agents MCP, not Bash, if that
boundary matters to you.
printf %s "$GH_PASSWORD" | vb secret set github.com password --stdin
printf %s "$GH_TOTP_SEED" | vb secret set github.com totp-seed --stdin
vb --session work fill @e7 --use-secret github.com:password
vb --session work fill @e9 --use-secret github.com:totp
vb wait-email-code github.com # operator CLI: polls IMAP and prints the code; refused over MCP
3. Page text is treated as untrusted. Every session scans the page text it
returns for instructions aimed at the agent and flags them by default; wrap
fences them off and redact removes them. Caller-supplied file paths are
confined too, so an injected agent can't upload ~/.ssh or write into
.git/hooks.
4. A browserless lane on the same identity.vb fetch reuses a session's
cookies and proxy with Chrome's TLS fingerprint and client hints — JSON
endpoints behind your login at curl speed, and it tells you when it can't match
the browser. vb search finds URLs with no API key and no per-session budget.
Status: alpha, active development. 2,027 tests green in CI (Linux,
Python 3.11–3.14). Coding agents: read AGENTS.md first — the
one-call recipes and the traps worth skipping.
Detector scores quoted below (bot.sannysoft, CreepJS, Cloudflare cold-launch) are manual observations, not CI-asserted — no test in the suite gates on them, and they are only as current as the last hand-run. The generated block under Measured scores is the one to trust.
On a uv venv (no pip), add an extra with
uv pip install --python <venv>/bin/python curl_cffi. Bleeding edge from
master: pipx install 'git+https://github.com/trueoriginlabs/vibatchium#egg=vibatchium[all]'.
Install as a skill / plugin
vb setup wires up the agents on this machine. To pull just the agent skill
into any agent skills.sh supports (Claude Code, Codex,
Cursor, Gemini CLI, Copilot, …), or to install skill + MCP server as one Claude
Code plugin:
Both still need the vb CLI on PATH (pipx install 'vibatchium[all]') — the
skill drives it and the plugin's MCP server isvb mcp. On Claude Code, pick
the plugin orvb setup, not both, or you register the server twice. The
skill file is generated from vibatchium/setup_cmd.py; edit there and run
python scripts/sync_skill.py.
Quick start
vb explore https://example.com # one call: text-first, auto-closes
vb research --target https://example.com \ # parallel fan-out, N intents
--intent "pricing model" --intent "customers" --intent "tech stack"
Real Chrome vs fake Chrome
A wave of "headless browser for AI agents" tools rebuild the browser from scratch
(Rust + V8, no Blink/Skia) to hit tiny memory and sub-100ms page loads. The catch
is structural: with no rendering engine, they can't produce a real device's
fingerprint — they synthesize one. And synthetic fingerprints don't hold still.
vibatchium drives real Google Chrome, so its fingerprints are real — and, more
to the point, stable. The single test that separates the two is fingerprint
stability across navigations. Run the same canvas + WebGL probe on two pages in
one session:
vibatchium (real Chrome)
synthesized-fingerprint engines
canvas hash, page A → page B
identical
reseeded per navigation
WebGL readPixels
real, deterministic pixels
often Math.random()
WebGL renderer
a real ANGLE renderer¹
stub / zeros
¹ Chrome's own software renderer (SwiftShader) by default — still a coherent, deterministic Chrome value, not a stub. A hardware-GPU string (e.g. ANGLE (Intel …)) needs the opt-in --gpu flag.
A real device returns the same fingerprint every page load; a fingerprint keyed
off Date.now() does not — and that inconsistency is exactly what lie-detection
fingerprinters (CreepJS and friends) flag. Measured: vibatchium's canvas hash and
WebGL readback are byte-identical across navigations, and CreepJS reported 0 %
stealth-tampering (no synthetic-environment signatures) when last run by hand.
That figure is not regression-tested — treat it as an observation, not a guarantee.
This is not a claim of invisibility. The moat is fingerprint authenticity,
not hiding that a browser is automated — vibatchium still reads as headless on the
headless-specific tells (see Honest limits), and real-GPU WebGL
(--gpu) is opt-in. But real, consistent fingerprints pass the consistency tier
that synthetic ones fail by construction — and that tier is what stands between
you and a login wall.
Multi-session in 10 lines
vb session new work
vb --session work start
vb --session work go https://github.com # log in by hand once
vb session new banking
vb --session banking start
vb --session banking go https://bank.example.com
vb --session work click @e3 & # truly parallel —
vb --session banking fill @e5 hi & # separate Chromes, no cookie bleed
wait
vb session list
Active-session resolution: --session FLAG → $VIBATCHIUM_SESSION env → ~/.config/vibatchium/active-session → default. Cap via VIBATCHIUM_MAX_SESSIONS=8 (default 8).
Multi-agent: shared sessions vs a private daemon
On one shared daemon, sessions are isolated in state (separate Chromes and
profiles, no cookie bleed) but not automatically in fingerprint — on one box
they report the same screen and, without --gpu --node, the same software GPU
unless you set a vb persona; vb fleet-check measures it. They also share the
host: the session count budget, the
memory, and the blast radius of an OOM or a daemon bounce. Two models, pick per
trust level:
Cooperating agents (your own fleet): the shared daemon is right — just give
each concurrent agent a unique --session name so stateful flows don't
collide on default. vb session lease coordinates a shared name.
A private blast radius: a per-agent daemon on its own socket + HOME
— separate profiles/config/state, its own session budget, zero contact with
the shared daemon. vb daemon start --isolated prints the XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/
HOME to export for subsequent calls; vb mcp --isolated runs the MCP server
on its own private daemon directly. vb daemon reap cleans up abandoned ones.
(Same UID = same trust domain — this bounds blast radius, not a security
boundary between distrusting tenants; for that, separate UIDs/containers.)
Resource governance. The session cap bounds process count, not bytes. On a
shared box, set VIBATCHIUM_SESSION_RAM_FLOOR_MB to refuse a new launch when free
memory is low (a portable admission belt). For a hard ceiling, run the daemon
under a cgroup — systemd-run --user --scope -p MemoryMax=4G vb daemon start puts
the daemon and all its Chromes in one cgroup sharing the limit: an aggregate
daemon-wide cap (not per-renderer), and a breach OOM-kills inside the scope, which
can include the daemon. It's the only non-racy memory bound, so size it for the
whole fan-out.
Idle CPU. Parked sessions can't burn cores either: the daemon SIGSTOPs a
launched session's renderer processes after VIBATCHIUM_IDLE_FREEZE_AFTER seconds
with no verb (default 90) and thaws them on the next call, so an idle WebGL /
animation page drops to zero CPU without a teardown (default on;
VIBATCHIUM_IDLE_FREEZE=0 disables).
Freezing rather than closing is a deliberate trade, and it cuts both ways.
playwright-mcp's --idle-timeout (v0.0.81, 1 h default for headless) closes
an idle browser: that reclaims its memory, and its persistent profile keeps the
cookies, but the open tabs and in-page state are gone, and the next call pays a
cold launch. A frozen session keeps its resident memory and resumes on the next
verb with its tabs, page state and login intact — which is the behaviour a
long-lived authenticated session mid-flow needs. Memory is bounded by the other two levers above,
the RAM floor and the cgroup, rather than by teardown.
Stealth tiers — what clears what
Stealth is a ladder, not a boolean. Pick the lowest tier that clears your target
(higher tiers cost more setup / a visible browser / a manual login). vibatchium
does not claim cold-launch defeat of behavioral walls — those need a real
human-driven session, and attach-mode is the honest answer.
Architecture caveat. Every tier below was measured on x86-64 Linux.
Patchright has a known open arm64 / Apple-Silicon detection gap, so these
results should not be assumed to carry to an ARM host. If you run there,
measure before you rely on it.
Tier
How
Clears
Doesn't clear
Standard (default)
headless cold launch, real channel=chrome, de-Headless'd UA
aggressive Turnstile, DataDome/Kasada, anything behind a login
Hardened
retry --headed; vb humanize on + humanize ambient on (pointer activity between actions); vb persona set (a per-identity screen); --backend nodriver (pip install vibatchium[nodriver], AGPL) for the hardest Cloudflare gates
aggressive Cloudflare/Turnstile, GPU/screen tells that headless leaves
vb attach to a Chrome you launched and logged into
DataDome / Kasada / HUMAN behavioral walls, and any authenticated session — your real fingerprint + cookies
nothing here is automated cold; it needs the human login first
Measured scores
vb evals run --update-readme writes measured numbers into the block below, so
what we publish is generated rather than asserted. It is empty until someone
runs it — an empty block is honest; a number with no run behind it is not.
Run on x86-64 Linux, 25 Aug 2026, Chrome 150, --gpu (real render node).
Pass --gpu yourself: headless Chrome falls back to SwiftShader when the GPU
path doesn't take, and software GL is itself a detection signal, so numbers
measured without it are a floor rather than what a GPU-backed deployment gets.
Target
Backend
Humanize
GPU
Score
Status
Time
sannysoft
patchright
off
real
100
OK
17.78s
creepjs
patchright
off
real
44
OK
7.88s
brotector
patchright
off
real
10
OK
7.13s
sannysoft
nodriver
off
real
100
OK
19.85s
creepjs
nodriver
off
real
44
OK
9.72s
brotector
nodriver
off
real
10
OK
7.73s
Read these honestly — two of the three are bad.
sannysoft 100 is the floor everyone in this category clears; it is not a
differentiator.
creepjs 44 is mediocre. CreepJS is an adversarial lie-detector: it
cross-checks main-thread against worker-thread claims and grades confidence,
so a middling score means our environment is coherent but not indistinguishable.
brotector 10 is poor, and we know exactly why. The signal firing is
UA_Override / HighEntropyValues.empty, and our own de-Headless fix causes
it. Measured on Chrome 150, headless, same profile, with and without the
--user-agent flag we set to strip HeadlessChrome:
architecture
bitness
uaFullVersion
UA string
without the flag
x86
64
150.0.7871.114
says HeadlessChrome
with the flag
empty
empty
empty
says Chrome
Passing an explicit UA makes Chrome stop deriving high-entropy client hints,
so we trade a UA-string tell for a UA-CH-emptiness tell. It is not fixed: the
obvious repair (Emulation.setUserAgentOverride with userAgentMetadata) is
target-scoped and would reintroduce a main-vs-worker mismatch that is a
stronger tell than either leak alone. Publishing this rather than dropping
the target is the point — a suite that only reports its wins is marketing.
nodriver scores identically to patchright on all three. The escalation
tier buys nothing measurable on static scoreboards; its case rests on the
automation-protocol axis these targets don't probe. An earlier run had
nodriver slightly ahead on creepjs (50 vs 44) — but that run silently
denied it the GPU while patchright got a real one, so it was scoring from
behind. Once both arms get a real renderer the difference disappears.
Worth knowing before reaching for the tier: upstream has not published since
nodriver 0.50.3 (2026-05-13), so what the >=0.50.0,<1.0 pin resolves to
is now several months old. The rung still works; it is no longer moving.
What these do and don't cover. These are fingerprint scoreboards —
the static axis. Through 2026 the major anti-bot vendors moved to
session-lifetime behavioural scoring, which none of these targets
measure, and which we have not measured against any commercial vendor.
Treat a good score here as evidence about environment coherence only.
For the behavioural axis itself, vb oracle run is a self-hosted probe: it drives a
page with humanize off then on and grades trajectory curvature, dwell, keystroke
cadence and scroll dynamics against a human-plausible band (vb oracle record
captures a real-operator baseline; literature defaults until you do). It measures
our model of human rather than a named vendor — but it turns "we humanize" into a
measured on/off delta, and it's honest about the one axis synthetic input can't
reach: CDP input emits no raw-pointer / coalesced events, which only attach-mode
against real hardware closes.
Escalation ladder when a wall trips: headless → --headed → humanize on →
--backend nodriver → attach-mode after a manual login. Patchright's CDP-layer
patches apply in all tiers, including attach (connect_over_cdp).
The fetch verb is an orthogonal fast-path, not a tier: once you're past a
wall in the browser, vb fetch reuses that session's cookies+proxy to hit
JSON/API endpoints at TLS-fingerprint-correct speed — but it runs no JS, so it
can't clear a JS challenge itself.
Captures — 2× screenshots of states you had to click to reach
vb --session shots start --scale 2 # devicePixelRatio 2 (1–4, persisted; --scale 1 clears)
vb --session shots go https://example.com
vb --session shots click @e3 # open the modal…
vb --session shots screenshot -o card.png # …then capture it at 2560×1600
# (2× the 1280×800 pin; vb viewport W H to resize)
The default session captures one image pixel per CSS pixel, so a crop meant for a
retina asset lands at half the resolution it needs. chrome --force-device-scale-factor=2 --screenshot is faithful but can't click, so it can
never capture a modal, a hover, or a logged-in view. --scale does both.
It's a capture posture, not a browsing one. Chromium only takes
deviceScaleFactor at context creation and Playwright refuses it alongside
no_viewport, so a scaled session pins a viewport and emulates device metrics —
screen == viewport, and start says so with screen_coherent: false. Don't
point a scaled session at a Cloudflare/DataDome wall; browse on a normal one and
scale a separate session for the picture. Cold start only (scale_pending on a
live session), Patchright only (scale_ignored on nodriver), and
max_screenshot_px is denominated in device pixels — at 2× a tall page
truncates at half the CSS height. Details in AGENTS.md, under Retina / 2× captures.
Search — find the URL, not just read it
Reading a walled page is only half a research loop; the other half is discovery,
and search engines are anti-bot walled like everything else. vb search runs the
SERP over the same curl_cffi lane — no browser, no session, no API key, and no
per-session call budget to run out of mid-run.
Engines are tried as a ladder (ddg → ddg-lite → bing) until one answers,
because reachability moves: the endpoint serving results now may rate-limit
(HTTP 202) on the next call. --json returns an attempts array naming every
engine that declined and why, and a reason separating all engines are walled
from the web has nothing — different problems, different fixes, and the CLI
exits non-zero only for the first.
It never reuses session cookies (a SERP needs no login, and attaching one
deanonymises the request), which is why it gets its own search cap instead of
riding on fetch. No date filter is exposed on purpose: DuckDuckGo's mislabels
article dates badly enough to corrupt a timeline. Engines rate-limit per IP — see
proxies, below.
Proxies — per-request egress on both stealth lanes
Egress is the axis most people get wrong, so it gets stated precisely rather than
implied. Both curl_cffi lanes take --proxy scheme://[user:pass@]host:port:
vb fetch --no-cookies https://api.example/v1 --proxy http://user:pass@gw:12323
vb search "site reliability postmortem" -n 20 --proxy http://user:pass@gw:12323
vb --session work proxy set http://user:pass@gw:12323 # or per-session, for the browser
Measured, not asserted — same box, same command, only --proxy differing:
egress IP
direct
115.70.50.70
--proxy (authenticated gateway)
212.69.0.85
Four things worth knowing:
Unset means direct, and that is enforced. The daemon hands libcurl an
explicit empty proxy, which is the only value that stops it reading
HTTP(S)_PROXY / ALL_PROXY out of the environment it was spawned with. A
long-lived daemon inherits whatever shell first started it, so without this a
stray HTTPS_PROXY would silently reroute every request while the response
claimed direct egress. (It did, until 0.19.0 — see the changelog.)
It matters most for search. Engines rate-limit per IP, so a wide
research fan-out from one address is the fastest way to push every query onto
the last rung of the engine ladder. The response reports proxied: true|false
so you can tell which IP a thin result set came from.
The proxy address is SSRF-guarded like the target URL, with
--allow-internal to opt in to a proxy on your own LAN. An unguarded proxy
reaches internal services and returns their response bodies, not just
connection errors.
A bad proxy is an error, never a fallback. Silently egressing from the host
IP when you asked for a specific one is worse than failing, because the whole
point of asking was that the host IP must not be used. Proxy URLs are redacted
from the verb log; responses carry the boolean, never the URL.
With a browser session, vb proxy set also wires the WebRTC leak guard — a
tunnelled HTTP request still leaks the real IP via STUN without it.
Attach mode — the practical Cloudflare workaround
For DataDome / Kasada / hardened auth that walls cold-launch automation:
google-chrome --remote-debugging-port=9222 \
--disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled \
--user-data-dir=/tmp/cdp-profile &
# log into the walled site by hand
vb attach http://localhost:9222
vb go https://target.example.com # now reads as your real browser
Patchright's CDP-layer stealth still applies over connect_over_cdp — attach mode gets the same protocol-level patches as cold launch, plus your real-browser fingerprint and any cookies from the manual login.
Launch flags are yours on this tier. On cold launch the backend supplies
--disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled for you. Attach connects to a
Chrome that is already running, so nothing vibatchium does can add a launch
flag after the fact — if you started Chrome without it, that tell is present
for the whole session. Include it in the command above.
--remote-debugging-port is an open door. It grants full browser control
to any process on the machine, and a page you visit can probe localhost to
discover it. Use it on a machine you trust, and close Chrome when you're done.
Security model
vibatchium is built to drive real logins from an untrusted agent loop, so the
threat model is "a credential must never reach the model, a screenshot, or a log":
Encrypted vault. Passwords and TOTP secrets live in an XSalsa20-Poly1305
vault keyed from the OS keyring or VIBATCHIUM_SECRETS_KEY. A resolved secret
never appears in logs, HAR captures, the observe cache, or any agent-visible
response field (grep-tested in CI).
Secrets are never rendered in the clear.fill --use-secret masks the field
in the page (-webkit-text-security), applied before the value is written, so
every path that turns the viewport into bytes — the screenshot verb, the 5 fps
live-view stream, and VLM vision_* calls that ship the frame to a model —
captures dots, not the value. The mask fails closed (no write if it can't be
confirmed), covers password fields so a show-password toggle can't unmask, and
the accessibility snapshot returned by map / diff_map strips masked values so
the secret can't leak into the model's context as text either.
Secrets are origin-bound.fill --use-secret github.com:password only writes
into a document on that site — https, github.com or a subdomain, judged by the
frame that owns the field (so an iframe can't borrow the top page's origin) —
or into the entry's explicit origins list. Anywhere else it refuses before
the secret is resolved, so a prompt-injected agent can't type your password
into a lookalike page. Framed login pages, about:blank frames and pages the
agent already ran eval in are refused too; while the secret sits in a field,
value / eval are refused so it can't be read back; and the write uses the
field's own value setter, never focus + keyboard, so page script can't
redirect it. If the field is swapped mid-fill, it's cleared and the call
fails. The escape hatches (--allow-cross-origin, two daemon env vars) are
shell-only; MCP refuses them, along with vault edits and secret totp.
Live-view is authenticated. The WebSocket requires a per-server token and
rejects foreign-Origin connections (the CSWSH class), and driving the page is
a separate token from watch-only — a read-only link can be shared without handing
over the keyboard. Binds 127.0.0.1 by default (--insecure-public to override).
Scraped content is marked untrusted. MCP verbs that return page-derived text
carry openWorldHint, so a host can taint the output against prompt injection
instead of treating a scraped page as instructions; pure probes are readOnlyHint
and mutating verbs (stop, secret_delete, storage_restore) are
destructiveHint.
REST shim. Without --caps, the bearer token grants every verb including
eval, secret_*, and file-writing verbs — local-code-equivalent, so always
pass --caps=... in hosted mode. All vibatchium-written files are 0600;
directories 0700.
Honest limits
5+ concurrent sessions = 1-2GB RAM. Each persistent-context Chrome is ~200-400MB. Bump cap with VIBATCHIUM_MAX_SESSIONS=8.
Vision spend cap is process-wide. N fan-out agents share one daily/lifetime budget.
Init scripts don't work on patchright backend.chrome.runtime stays undefined — accepted trade for stealth wins.
Synthetic input has a CDP coordinate signature. Every click/type/hover/scroll rides Playwright over CDP Input.dispatchMouseEvent/dispatchKeyEvent (pageX==screenX, no CoalescedEvents). Patchright patches the JS-context leaks, not the Input domain, and humanize on improves trajectory/timing realism but does not change the per-event signature. Behavioral walls that fingerprint it (DataDome/Kasada/HUMAN) want attach-mode against a real headful Chrome you drive — OS-level synthetic input (CDP-Patches) is headful + active-tab only and doesn't fit a headless, N-parallel daemon.
fetch is a static-fingerprint lane, not a browser. The curl_cffi fetch verb matches Chrome's JA3/HTTP2 but runs no JavaScript — it clears TLS-fingerprint gates, not DataDome/Kasada/Turnstile JS challenges. Fall back to go for those.
Single daemon = single point of failure. No HA built in.
Behavioural detection now targets the humanizer directly. Cloudflare's 2026
bot-detection work names mathematically ideal Bézier cursor paths and superhuman
click precision as tells. humanize improves on nothing-at-all, but it is a
pointer-trajectory model, not a physiological one — and it is off by default,
which on a behaviourally-scored site is the louder of the two states.
One burned profile can taint every account that shares it. Vendors now link
device telemetry across sessions and accounts. Use one profile per account,
never share a profile between identities, and don't reuse a profile that has
already been challenged.
The fetch and search lanes are outside prompt-injection scanning. The
scanner covers page-content verbs (text, html, extract, map, …). SERP
titles and fetched bodies are third-party text going straight into an agent's
context and are not scanned today. Treat them as untrusted input.
Cloudflare's 2026-09-15 default is policy, not detection. For new domains
and free-plan zones, Cloudflare now blocks Training and Agent crawlers by
default on ad-monetized pages. It targets crawlers that declare themselves
(user-agent or Web Bot Auth signature), so it doesn't change what a real
Chrome session looks like — but the fingerprint and behavioural scoring above
is a separate axis that moves independently of anything announced in a blog
post.
Updating
vb update # upgrade + bounce the daemon + refresh the agent skill
vb update --version 0.19.0 # or pin a specific version
vb update detects how vibatchium was installed (pipx, uv tool install,
a pip-less uv venv, or pip with a PEP-668 --break-system-packages fallback),
stops the running daemon so the next command loads the new code, and
rewrites the agent skill / docs blocks so a coding agent is actually told
about the verbs the new version ships (--no-restart / --no-setup opt out).
Manual equivalent:
pipx upgrade vibatchium # or: uv tool upgrade vibatchium / pip install -U vibatchium
vb shutdown # bounce the daemon — it serves old code until you do
vb setup # refresh the agent skill + docs
vb --version # confirm
The daemon-restart step is the one people miss: the long-running daemon keeps
serving the old version until it's bounced. vb update does it for you;
if you upgrade by hand, run vb shutdown (the next vb call auto-respawns the
new version). Optional features upgrade via pipx install 'vibatchium[all]' --force.
Running from a git checkout
git pull updates the source; whether it updates what vb actually runs
depends on the install, and two of the three ways it can fail are silent:
vb --version && git describe --tags # do they agree? if not, the install COPIED
# the source — reinstall editable:
# uv pip install -e '.[all]'
vb status # warns when the daemon predates the source
# ("stale_code") — bounce with `vb shutdown`
A version-string compare cannot catch a checkout: git pull changes the code
without changing __version__. vb status compares the daemon's boot time
against the newest source file instead, and vb update bounces the daemon only
when it is provably behind — so it never drops live sessions for nothing.
New cap buckets need a re-register
The MCP server's --caps list is frozen into your agent's config at first
registration, so a bucket added by a later release (0.19.0 added search) stays
invisible no matter how many times you upgrade. Re-running vb setup reports
the drift but deliberately won't overwrite a --caps you set by hand:
vb setup # reports any cap drift, changes nothing
vb setup --force --caps lean,search # apply it — exposes `vb search` as a tool
Restart the agent session afterwards: the MCP tool list is read once, at start.
Server modes
Mode
Surface
Auth
vb mcp
stdio JSON-RPC; defaults to the lean 87-verb profile (--caps min = 12 tools for clients without tool search; --caps=full/all = 163; --caps=... for a custom bucket set)
n/a (stdio)
vb serve
FastAPI on 127.0.0.1:8000; every verb at POST /v1/<verb>; WebSocket live-view at /v1/stream/<session>
REST capability gating: vb serve --caps=core,nav,input,vision restricts the HTTP surface the same way mcp --caps does. Without it, REST grants local-code-equivalent access (eval + secret_* + file-writing verbs all exposed) — safe for localhost dev, not for hosted/multi-tenant.
Documentation
AGENTS.md — coding-agent contract (Codex / Cursor / Claude Code)
Authorized use
vibatchium is built to drive sessions you own, with your credentials, on
your machine — your accounts, your employer's, or a client's with their
written permission. It is a tool for automating access you already have.
That boundary is not a formality, though the law around it moved in 2026. A US
district court had granted a preliminary injunction against an AI agent that
accessed password-protected pages through the user's own logged-in account,
holding that the user's permission is not the platform's authorization. On
4 August 2026 the Ninth Circuit vacated that injunction and remanded
(Amazon.com Services, LLC v. Perplexity AI, Inc., No. 26-1444, published),
concluding that the operator had not "accessed" the plaintiff's computers under
the CFAA at all — "it was the user who accessed [them], with the help of
[the] AI agent." The California CDAFA claim failed for the same reason.
Read that narrowly. It decides who accessed a computer, not whether evading
a technical block is access "without authorization"; the panel never reached
circumvention. A vacated preliminary injunction on remand is not a merits
ruling, and it leaves contract, terms-of-service, trespass and copyright
theories entirely untouched. What it does support is the shape of the tool:
the browser runs on your machine, under your login, and the reasoning leaned on
exactly that — no operator computer ever touched the other side's servers.
Scraping a site's public pages, evading a wall you have no account behind, or
automating an account whose terms forbid it remain decisions you are making, and
the consequences are yours.
Check the terms of the site you are automating. If you are acting for someone
else, get it in writing.
License
Apache-2.0 core. Every default-install extra is permissive too — the fetch lane's curl_cffi is MIT. The only copyleft option is the opt-in nodriver backend (AGPL-3.0) — consult licensing before integrating it commercially. Nothing GPL/AGPL ships in the base install or [all].