WARDENPOINT_BASE_URL — Origin of your WardenPoint installation, without a trailing slash and without /api/v1 — e.g. https://wardenpoint.com. The server reads the API description from it at startup, so the tools always match the version you actually run.
WARDENPOINT_API_TOKEN — A company API key from Dashboard → Integrations → API keys. Abilities are chosen when you issue it; read-only is a good place to start. Not needed for --list-tools.
WARDENPOINT_TIMEOUT_MS — Per-request timeout in milliseconds. Defaults to 30000.
WARDENPOINT_ALLOW_INSECURE_TLS — Set to 1 to skip certificate verification. Development stands only — never against production.
Claude Code에는 로컬 명령용 설치 링크가 없습니다. 아래 명령을 복사해 터미널에서 실행합니다.
An MCP server that lets an agent configure a
WardenPoint account — recipients, contacts, groups,
notification rules, escalation policies, on-call schedules, alert-source
integrations, routing rules and telephony — without anyone opening the
dashboard.
It speaks stdio and exposes .
Configure on-call alerting from an AI agent: recipients, groups, escalation policies, schedules.
That is the whole installation. Your MCP client starts the server on demand;
nothing runs between sessions.
The one rule this server exists to keep
There is no second copy of the contract here.
Every tool — its name, its text, its arguments, their descriptions, their enums
and bounds, the responses it can answer with — is read at startup from the
OpenAPI description served by the installation you are configuring
(GET {WARDENPOINT_BASE_URL}/docs). Nothing about the API is restated in this
package.
That is deliberate, and it is why the tools cannot quietly drift:
an endpoint added to your installation appears as a tool the next time the
server starts — no package upgrade involved;
a description reworded upstream rewords the agent's instructions with it;
an operation nobody described is invisible to the agent, which is the correct
failure and the reason --spec-report exists.
A description bundled inside this package would describe whatever was current
when the package was published, while the agent talks to whatever you actually
run. There is no offline fallback for the same reason: every tool here is an
HTTP call to that installation, so if it cannot be reached, a complete tool list
would be a list of things that cannot be done.
Requirements
Node 20 or newer. No build step, no native modules.
Environment
Variable
Required
Meaning
WARDENPOINT_BASE_URL
yes
Origin of the installation — no trailing slash, no /api/v1 suffix. The description carries full paths.
WARDENPOINT_API_TOKEN
to call
A company API key from Dashboard → Integrations → API keys. Sent as X-API-Key. Not needed for --list-tools or --spec-report.
WARDENPOINT_ALLOW_INSECURE_TLS
no
1 disables certificate verification. Development stands only — never against production.
WARDENPOINT_TIMEOUT_MS
no
Per-request timeout, default 30000.
WARDENPOINT_TOOLS
no
Comma-separated patterns limiting which tools are offered, e.g. recipients,groups or v1_schedules_*. Unset means all of them.
WARDENPOINT_OPENAPI_PATH
no
Read the description from a local file instead of the installation. For developing against a description that is not deployed yet.
The token is read from the environment at every start and is never written
anywhere by this package.
What the key is allowed to do
Abilities are chosen when you issue the key, and a 403 names the one that was
missing:
config.read — read the whole configuration. A good place to start: the
agent can explain an account somebody else built and change nothing.
config.write — create, update, delete.
notifications.send / notifications.read — fire alerts and inspect them.
No ability can read a secret. There is no such ability in the vocabulary, so
it cannot be granted by mistake. The API reports whether a credential is set and
whether it verified — never its value.
What the tool list costs
Every tool definition is sent to the model before the person says anything, so
it is spent whether or not the conversation ever touches WardenPoint. The full
set of 89 tools is roughly 64k tokens — on a 200k context window, a third
of it.
The server prints the figure at startup so it is not an invisible cost:
wardenpoint-mcp-server: 89 tools (~63k tokens of context; narrow it with WARDENPOINT_TOOLS) from …
If a session only ever touches part of the product, say so:
That drops the same run to a handful of tools and a few thousand tokens.
Patterns match tool names (v1_recipients_store), and * works. Leave it
unset and you get everything, which is the safe default: a tool that quietly
disappeared looks like a missing product capability.
Running
npx -y @wardenpoint/mcp-server --list-tools # every tool, with its arguments
npx -y @wardenpoint/mcp-server --spec-report # gaps in the description itself
Both talk to WARDENPOINT_BASE_URL to fetch the description; neither needs a
token. Without arguments the process speaks MCP over stdio and is meant to be
started by a client, not by hand.
Two credentials, and why they are not interchangeable
API key (WARDENPOINT_API_TOKEN) — who you are. Every configuration tool
uses it.
Integration secret — proves a specific alert-source webhook is genuine.
Two tools accept it as an argument; it is not read from the environment and
not stored here.
What this server deliberately cannot do
Two steps in setting up an account need a human at a screen, and both stay that
way on purpose:
Scanning a Telegram QR code.
Typing a provider secret.
For each, the agent asks the installation to issue a one-time link, shows it to
the person, and polls for the result. The person opens that link in the
dashboard, behind their own login, and types the value themselves. Ask an agent
to relay a secret through the conversation and it will refuse — that is what the
link exists to avoid.
Errors reach the agent intact
The API spends real effort explaining refusals — which ability was missing,
which field failed validation, why a send queued nothing. This server passes the
body through whole, on success and failure alike, because an agent repairs
itself from that text and nothing else.