- name
SKILL.md
스킬 파일은 게시자의 저장소에 그대로 있습니다.
복사한 명령을 터미널에 붙여넣습니다. 이 SKILL.md가 해당 에이전트에 설치됩니다.
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Install this skill: https://github.com/ericrisco/rsc-harness/tree/HEAD/skills/aws-essentials게시자 제공
Stand up the foundational AWS services a one-app product actually uses — IAM, S3, ECS Fargate, RDS, CloudFront — with the security defaults that prevent the incidents (public buckets, god-mode app roles, long-lived keys, unencrypted databases). Pick the right tier for small (one app, modest traffic, two engineers), provision it correctly, and wire it without foot-guns.
account hardening → IAM (roles + scoped policies) → S3 (private) / RDS (encrypted) / ECS Fargate → CloudFront (OAC) → infra exists, wired, least-privilege
Fargate cold start is ~30–60 s; for spiky/variable small-product load its operational simplicity (no host patching, per-second billing, strong task isolation) wins. EC2 launch type only earns its host-management cost at sustained high utilization. (ECS Managed Instances, Sept 2025, is a newer hybrid — out of scope for a first setup.)
Do this once, before anything else. Each line has a reason; skip none.
../deployment/SKILL.md).us-east-1).Two principal types. IAM users = long-lived humans/keys; avoid them for workloads. Roles
= an identity something assumes to get temporary credentials — this is what ECS tasks, Lambda,
CI, and federated humans use. Default to roles: a temporary credential beats a long-lived AKIA…
key that lives forever in a .env. (IAM governs who may call AWS APIs; access control inside
your app code is ../security-audit/SKILL.md.)
A policy is a JSON document. The four parts that matter:
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject"],
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::acme-uploads/users/*",
"Condition": { "StringEquals": { "aws:SecureTransport": "true" } }
}]
}
Effect (Allow/Deny) · Action (which API calls) · Resource (which ARNs) · Condition
(extra constraints). The whole game is keeping Action and Resource narrow.
The workflow — start broad, then tighten (do not hand-author from zero):
// Bad — one leak owns the account
{ "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "*", "Resource": "*" }
// Good — exactly what this service does, on exactly its resources
{ "Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject"],
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::acme-uploads/users/*" }
An ECS task needs a trust policy (who may assume the role) plus a permission policy (what it may do). Trust policy for a task role:
{ "Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{ "Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": { "Service": "ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com" },
"Action": "sts:AssumeRole" }] }
Policy JSON anatomy, condition keys, Access Analyzer CLI flow, and copy-ready scoped templates
(S3 one-prefix R/W, read one Secrets Manager secret, write CloudWatch logs, ECS trust) →
references/iam-least-privilege.md.
Create a bucket. The defaults are already what you want:
aws s3api create-bucket \
--bucket acme-uploads \
--region eu-west-1 \
--create-bucket-configuration LocationConstraint=eu-west-1
# Since Apr 2023, this bucket is already: Block Public Access ON (all four),
# Object Ownership = bucket-owner-enforced (ACLs disabled), SSE-S3 on every object.
Keep all of that. Do not re-enable ACLs; do not turn off Block Public Access. Grant access two ways instead: a bucket policy (resource-side, e.g. allow one CloudFront distribution) or an IAM identity policy (subject-side, e.g. the task role above). For browser uploads, hand the client a presigned URL so the app never proxies the bytes and the bucket stays private:
aws s3 presign s3://acme-uploads/users/123/avatar.png --expires-in 900
Bad: set bucket to public-read so the <img> tags work
Good: bucket stays private → presigned URLs for direct upload/download,
and CloudFront + OAC for public-read web content (see below)
Run the container on Fargate (rationale in the decision table). The mistake that costs an afternoon every time:
Task role vs execution role — they are different.
- Execution role: lets ECS itself pull the image from ECR and push logs to CloudWatch. Start from the managed
AmazonECSTaskExecutionRolePolicy.- Task role: the identity your application code assumes at runtime to call AWS (read the S3 bucket, read a secret). This is where your scoped least-privilege policy goes. Putting app permissions on the execution role (or vice-versa) is the classic "works in console, 403 at runtime" bug.
Network layout: tasks in private subnets, a load balancer (ALB) in public subnets, egress via
NAT. The DB and tasks never get public IPs. EC2 launch type only if you hit the steady-utilization
or hardware thresholds above. Full task-def + service CLI path lives in ../deployment/SKILL.md
(that skill owns the ship step); this skill owns the roles and networking it runs on.
aws rds create-db-instance \
--db-instance-identifier acme-prod \
--engine postgres \
--db-instance-class db.t4g.small \
--allocated-storage 20 \
--storage-encrypted --kms-key-id <your-rds-cmk> \
--multi-az \
--no-publicly-accessible \
--master-username acme --manage-master-user-password \
--vpc-security-group-ids sg-app-db
Encrypt at create time — you cannot encrypt an existing instance in place. Storage encryption (AES-256 via KMS) must be set at creation; it then covers backups, read replicas, and snapshots. To fix an unencrypted instance you must snapshot → copy-snapshot with encryption → restore (Multi-AZ clusters can't even do that directly). Prefer a customer-managed KMS key dedicated to RDS.
Two more non-negotiables: the DB security group references the app's security group, never
0.0.0.0/0 (a DB open to the internet is a breach, not a convenience); credentials live in
Secrets Manager with managed rotation (--manage-master-user-password above), never in task
env vars. Use --multi-az for production HA. Full recipe (SG wiring, Secrets Manager rotation,
connecting from ECS) → references/rds-cloudfront-recipes.md. Schema, indexes and query tuning
once the instance exists → ../postgresdb/SKILL.md.
To serve S3 content publicly, do not make the bucket public. Put CloudFront in front and grant it via Origin Access Control (OAC) — the modern replacement for the legacy OAI:
us-east-1.Full CLI: create OAC → distribution → S3 bucket policy JSON → invalidations → custom domain →
references/rds-cloudfront-recipes.md.
Use when standing up the core AWS surface a small product needs: hardening a fresh account, a private S3 bucket, encrypted RDS Postgres, ECS Fargate vs EC2, CloudFront + OAC, or scoping an IAM policy
---name: aws-essentialsdescription: Use when standing up the core AWS surface a small product needs: hardening a fresh account, a private S3…---# skills/aws-essentials/SKILL.md개요
Use when standing up the core AWS surface a small product needs: hardening a fresh account, a private S3 bucket, encrypted RDS Postgres, ECS Fargate vs EC2, CloudFront + OAC, or scoping an IAM policy to least privilege. NOT the CI pipeline that ships the container (that is `deployment`), NOT app-code access-control review (that is `security-audit`).
FAQ
게시자에게서 skills/aws-essentials/SKILL.md를 다운로드하거나 경로를 복사해 저장소를 엽니다. PlugMCP는 스킬을 목록에 올릴 뿐 파일을 호스팅하지 않습니다.
게시자가 https://github.com/ericrisco/rsc-harness에서 관리합니다.
Claude, Cursor, Codex, Grok Build는 게시자의 저장소에서 추가한 SKILL.md를 읽을 수 있습니다. Grok Bot은 채팅에서 스킬의 GitHub 폴더 링크를 보내면 설치합니다.