Power your agent
คำสั่งของผู้เผยแพร่เอง ไม่ใช่เอนด์พอยต์ของ PlugMCP
Host a copy with our keys and logs.
npx -y @attested-intelligence/[email protected]Claude Code ไม่มีลิงก์ติดตั้งสำหรับคำสั่งแบบโลคัล ให้คัดลอกคำสั่งด้านล่างแล้วรันในเทอร์มินัล
claude mcp add attested-intelligence-aga-mcp-server -- npx -y @attested-intelligence/aga-mcp-server@3.6.6รันในเทอร์มินัล
{ "mcpServers": { "attested-intelligence-aga-mcp-server": { "command": "npx", "args": [ "-y", "@attested-intelligence/[email protected]" ] } }}claude_desktop_config.json
URL แบบรีโมตหรือคำสั่งบนเครื่องของคุณ? การติดตั้งสองแบบต่างกันอย่างไร
รันบน PlugMCP
A new server you create. It is not this listing's official endpoint. Use the publisher install when you want their URL and their credentials.
เปิดจากผู้เผยแพร่
Verifiable decision records for AI agents: each recorded tool-call decision is a signed, hash-chained receipt, exported in evidence bundles a reviewer can verify offline against the published format. Verification establishes the integrity of the receipts present, not that every action was recorded.
Signed decision records for agent vendors facing customer evidence reviews. Public reference gateway and static verifier; pre-pilot, with documented limits.
Status: published reference implementation, before independent pilot validation. Version 3.6.6 reuses one Merkle tree during export and retains the 3.6.5 transport, policy and trust-input hardening; deployment limits remain explicit below. The gateway emits classical Ed25519-SHA256-JCS bundles. The published
@attested-intelligence/[email protected]CLI checks that classical profile; on a v2/hybrid bundle it reports FAILED because it does not implement that profile. The package also exposes an ML-DSA-65 + Ed25519 composite as a library profile, andaga-proxy verifycan check it. Reference verifiers have their own unsupported-profile behavior. These are different components, not one interchangeable verifier. Build provenance concerns the published build; it is not runtime correctness or an external security audit.
Runtime status. Since 3.5.0, a measurement requested after the active artifact's TTL expires moves it to TERMINATE;
delegate_to_subagentalso refuses after expiry. Nothing checks the TTL on a schedule, and the exported bundle does not record that transition. Do not downgrade to deprecated 3.3.3 as the evaluation path. Since 3.6.0,aga-proxyhonorsAGA_GATEWAY_KEY/AGA_GATEWAY_KEY_FILE; through 3.6.4 the stdio upstream could inherit those variables. Version 3.6.5 uses an explicit environment without implicit gateway-key inheritance. Read the known issues andTHREAT_BOUNDARY.mdbefore any runtime evaluation.
A Python companion SDK (aga-governance) is documented in the Python SDK section below.
Version 3.6.5 hardens the reference proxy: loopback by default, an explicit --host option, immutable validated policy snapshots, per-proxy rate limits, request ownership and stdio ID remapping, fatal UTF-8 framing, bounded transport work and disconnect cancellation. Protocol JSON refuses repeated decoded member names. The stdio child receives a small explicit environment without implicit gateway-key variables. The read-only control channel rejects a foreign Host or any browser Origin. The embedded verifier now fails a supplied malformed expected key; only omission selects integrity-only verification.
Version 3.6.6 constructs all export proofs from shared tree levels instead of rebuilding the tree for each receipt. The signed format and checkpoint are unchanged. Proof output still grows with the number of receipts and tree depth. Historical issue 9 below records the earlier quadratic implementation and its measured delays.
These controls do not provide authenticated clients, a filesystem sandbox, privileged key custody or complete MCP session/notification/server-request support. Export remains synchronous and the ledger remains volatile. A PERMITTED receipt records a policy decision, not confirmed execution. Use synthetic inputs in disposable isolation. DEPLOYMENT.md and THREAT_BOUNDARY.md give the current behavior; the thirteen cases below retain their historical observations through 3.6.4. Other verifier implementations retain their separately documented behavior.
Obtain the repository or the website's static sample kit while online. Once the verifier, sample and expected public key are local, the verification command itself needs no network or callback to us. Repository cloning and package installation require network access unless their inputs are already cached:
git clone https://github.com/attestedintelligence/aga-mcp-server
cd aga-mcp-server
# A canonical SEP bundle verifies; a one-byte-tampered copy is rejected.
node aga-receipt-spec/verify/verify-sep.mjs fixtures/valid_minimal.json # OVERALL: VERIFIED (integrity only; no key pinned)
node aga-receipt-spec/verify/verify-sep.mjs fixtures/tampered.json # OVERALL: FAILED
The published @attested-intelligence/aga-verify CLI agrees on the tested classical corpus as the harness supplies it. npm run conformance:cross-stack (first: npm run build && npm --prefix independent-verifier run build) proves that six v1 verifier configurations, spanning three independent toolchains (JavaScript, Go, and Python, including a pure-stdlib, no-third-party-crypto path), agree on the 54 object-level cases. The five file-parsing verifiers also agree on the 7 raw-byte/file-parse cases (61 total). The in-server engine is library-only, receiving parsed objects rather than raw file bytes, so it does not run the file-parse cases; six configurations do not agree on all 61 and this no longer claims they do. npm run conformance:cross-stack-v2 proves two genuinely independent-language oracles (@noble/JS and CIRCL/Go) agree on the v2 composite corpus. For a source-and-build reproduction (build the package yourself, reproduce the published tarball byte-for-byte, re-run every gate), see the REVIEWER_GUIDE.md (a command-by-command self-service path), REPRODUCIBILITY.md, and the step-by-step SKEPTICAL_AUDITOR.md. Check build provenance for the exact version: registry signatures and SLSA build attestations are different. The documentation-only 3.6.3 release has registry signatures but no SLSA build attestation. See REPRODUCIBILITY.md for the version-specific record.
This is built for teams shipping agentic-AI products into financial services and insurance, at the moment a customer's vendor-risk, model-risk, or internal-audit review asks what your agent did and how anyone would know.
Covered tool calls routed through aga-proxy are evaluated against its configured policy. Each recorded decision (PERMITTED or DENIED) takes the form of a signed, hash-linked governance receipt; known issue 7 below describes calls refused without a receipt. aga-proxy also signs the SHA-256 of its policy's canonical JSON into every receipt; see KNOWN_LIMITATIONS.md for what that field binds. Receipts are collected into evidence bundles that anyone holding the published format and the public key can verify offline, with no callback to us.
Signed decisions. Independent verification. Explicit limits.
Scope: a verified bundle proves the integrity of the receipts present: each is authentic, correctly ordered, Merkle-included, and (when a key is pinned) provenance-bound. It does not prove non-omission (that every action the agent took was logged); completeness is bounded by the tamper-evidence of the interception point, which is outside the bundle. See KNOWN_LIMITATIONS.md for the full honest boundary, and THREAT_BOUNDARY.md for the per-field detail.
Runtime examples identify reference runtime 3.6.6. They are not a production recommendation. Review all known issues and use approved isolation with synthetic inputs before starting a gateway. For a first check, use the static sample and verifier above. Do not start these examples on a workstation containing production credentials or customer data.
# Runtime example only, after the isolation and known-issue review.
npx -y @attested-intelligence/[email protected]
Add to that environment's Claude Desktop MCP config (claude_desktop_config.json):
{
"mcpServers": {
"aga": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@attested-intelligence/[email protected]"]
}
}
}
Claude can then seal artifacts, measure integrity, generate evidence bundles, and verify them offline through natural language.
By default the gateway signs with an ephemeral key that rotates on every restart. That is fine for a first look, but evidence-bundle provenance cannot be pinned across restarts (and the server warns about it on stderr). Set one stable 64-hex Ed25519 seed so provenance stays pinnable:
Since 3.6.0 this applies to both binaries.
aga-proxyreads the same two variables through the same resolver and prints the active public key at startup so you can pin it out of band;--ephemeralmakes a throwaway key a stated choice. In 3.5.0 and earlieraga-proxyignored both variables silently; a key you set had no effect and no warning was printed, so evidence from such a proxy is integrity-verifiable but not provenance-pinnable across restarts. SeeDEPLOYMENT.md, Key custody and verification.
# generate a seed once (32 random bytes, hex)
node -e "console.log(require('node:crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('hex'))"
Provide it via AGA_GATEWAY_KEY, or AGA_GATEWAY_KEY_FILE (a path to the seed). In Claude Desktop, add an env block:
{
"mcpServers": {
"aga": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@attested-intelligence/[email protected]"],
"env": { "AGA_GATEWAY_KEY": "<your-64-hex-seed>" }
}
}
}
Keep the seed secret and out of version control; see DEPLOYMENT.md for key handling. A seed in an agent client's environment is not a separate trust domain, and through 3.6.4 the stdio upstream could inherit the key-related variables (historical issue 3). Environment filtering in 3.6.5 does not separate filesystem or host privileges. Same-key restarts do not preserve the in-memory ledger: export and verify before stopping.
measure_behavioris detective-only by default: it observes tool-usage patterns and records a signed, provable drift finding, but does not block. Enforcement (drift → quarantine) is opt-in viaenforce=trueand off by default. Hard governance decisions (PERMITTED/DENIED) are made by the portal/PEP, not the behavioral monitor.
The MCP tool exports a canonical SEP bundle. Acquire the pinned verifier while online, then run the local verifier with a nonempty expected key obtained through a separate trusted channel. The npx command below may contact npm to obtain the package; it is not an air-gapped acquisition command. The downloadable sample kit provides a dependency-free local alternative after download, using Node.js:
# Published verifier CLI. Obtain and authenticate the expected key outside the bundle before running.
npx -y @attested-intelligence/[email protected] evidence-bundle.json --pubkey <gateway-public-key>
# Or, from a clone of this repo, the zero-dependency reference verifier (Node 18+) checks its supported profile; parser/pin behavior can differ:
node aga-receipt-spec/verify/verify-sep.mjs evidence-bundle.json --pubkey <gateway-public-key>
The published @attested-intelligence/aga-verify CLI is the shipped path (the older forgeable 1.0.0 is deprecated); the reference verify-sep.mjs provides another implementation from a repo clone; verdict agreement is scoped to tested cases, not all input bytes. Without --pubkey you get an integrity-only result (issuerVerified=false); supply a nonempty expected key from a separate trusted channel to authenticate that signing key; the mapping to an organization depends on that channel. Version 2.2.3 refuses missing or malformed supplied keys, repeated or unknown options and ambiguous file/sample selection with a usage error, exit 2. Versions through 2.2.2 treated a trailing --pubkey as absent. The 2.2.3 library API refuses malformed supplied expected keys; runtime 3.6.5 separately adopts fail-closed malformed expected-key handling in its embedded verifier. See THREAT_BOUNDARY.md, Known residual risks. A hosted browser verifier is linked under Links.
The reference §6 algorithm is implemented in three languages: JavaScript (aga-receipt-spec/verify/verify-sep.mjs), Go (verify.go, stdlib crypto/ed25519), and Python (verify.py, pure-stdlib RFC-8032 Ed25519). A cross-stack harness (npm run conformance:cross-stack; first: npm run build && npm --prefix independent-verifier run build) proves all three, plus the in-server engine and aga-verify, agree on the published canonical cases as the harness feeds them (object cases are re-serialized; raw-byte cases are separate). Outside that corpus, the implementations differ, including some parser and pin semantics. The v2 composite profile (ML-DSA-65+Ed25519-SHA256-JCS) is held to the same bar by a second harness (npm run conformance:cross-stack-v2): a @noble/JavaScript engine and a CIRCL/Go oracle, two genuinely independent toolchains, render identical verdicts on the pinned v2 corpus, and the reference v1 verifier (verify-sep.mjs/verify.py/verify.go) returns UNSUPPORTED_PROFILE (exit 3) on a v2 bundle, signalling "profile not implemented" rather than a misleading "invalid". (The published aga-verify CLI does not implement this profile trichotomy: on a v2 bundle it returns FAILED (exit 1). Use exit 3 as the unsupported-profile signal only with the reference verifiers.)
The JS reference verifier and the Python SDK (aga-governance) decompose the same seven-check verification differently. Overall verdicts and exit codes agree on all 61 conformance-corpus cases as the cross-stack harness feeds them (object-level cases re-serialized, so float spellings arrive as integers; measured on aga-governance 0.3.2 on 2026-09-25) and on the 10 cells re-proven 2026-07-01 (pristine and tampered bundles with unpinned, correct and wrong keys). On the literal file bytes of the corpus's float-spelled leaf_index case (0.0), aga-governance 0.3.2 reports FAILED where the JS reference, aga-verify, Go and Python reference verifiers report VERIFIED; see https://attestedintelligence.com/spec. The sub-check that reports a given tamper can differ:
Known decomposition difference: the JS reference recomputes every Merkle leaf from full receipt content, so a receipt-signature tamper also fails merkle_and_bijection; the Python verifier surfaces the same tamper in receipt_signatures_valid, chain_integrity_valid, and bundle_consistent while its merkle_proofs_valid can remain true. Neither is looser: the bundle fails in both stacks, exit 1. A --pubkey KEY that is not 64 lowercase hex characters is a usage error (exit 2) in the JS reference, aga-verify and the Python SDK, and a 64-hex pin that is not a valid curve point is honored, fails to match, and fails the bundle (exit 1). In the September 25 measurements, --pubkey=KEY was ignored by the JS reference, aga-verify through 2.2.2, verify.go and v2/verify-v2.go, and by verify.py when it follows the bundle path (integrity only, exit 0), and read by the Python SDK. Other verifiers differ as well. Through runtime 3.6.4, the in-server engine (the package's ./verify export, which verify_bundle_offline calls) treats a pin that is not a well-formed key for the bundle's profile (for a v1 bundle, a small-order point or a non-canonical encoding) as no pin, and returns VERIFIED with pinned: false. v2/verify-v2.go does the same and prints integrity only; no key pinned (exit 0). A 64-hex value that is not a curve point counts as well-formed, so both take it as a pin and the bundle fails. The Go and Python reference verifiers in aga-receipt-spec/verify/ treat a pin that is not 64 lowercase hex the same way and print integrity only; no key pinned (exit 0). Read pinned before taking a VERIFIED as provenance; in CI, pass the key after a space and check that the output says provenance verified. A --pubkey given with no value is also treated as no pin (exit 0, integrity only) by aga-verify through 2.2.2, verify-sep.mjs, verify.py, verify.go and v2/verify-v2.go, and is a usage error in the Python SDK. Other differences concern the bundle rather than the pin, and https://attestedintelligence.com/security lists the ones measured, including which algorithm labels each verifier leaves unchecked; outside the conformance corpus the verifiers differ in both directions. Two examples, where the failing side fails closed: a proof leaf_index spelled as an integral float (1.0) reports FAILED in aga-governance 0.3.2 and VERIFIED in the others, and object keys outside the Basic Multilingual Plane (possible only in a non-string field value, which no shipped producer emits) sort differently in verify.py, verify.go, v2/verify-v2.go and aga-governance than in the JavaScript verifiers, so such a bundle reports VERIFIED in JavaScript and FAILED in Go and Python. These parser and cross-language differences remain. Standalone verifier 2.2.3 separately fixes expected-key handling: equals-form options are refused rather than ignored, missing values are usage errors, and malformed supplied API keys fail verification.
AI Agent AGA Proxy Verifier
| | |
|-- tools/call ----------->| |
| [Evaluate Policy] |
| [Sign Receipt] |
| [Chain to Previous] |
|<-- PERMITTED/DENIED -----| |
| | |
| [Export Bundle] |
| |--------- evidence.json ----->|
| | [Verify Signatures]
| | [Verify Chain + Order]
| | [Verify Merkle Tree]
| | [Verify Signed Checkpoint]
| | [PASS / FAIL]
Run AGA as a proxy in front of an MCP server that it starts as a stdio child process (the default stdio transport), or one it reaches with a plain JSON-RPC POST (--upstream-url; no Streamable HTTP session or SSE handling). The proxy's agent port speaks newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0 over raw TCP, not stdio or Streamable HTTP. A stdio MCP client needs a relay you provide (a few lines that pipe stdin to the port and the port to stdout); none ships. A scripted client can speak that framing directly. Every tools/call request with a non-empty string tool name and arguments the proxy can canonicalize is evaluated against the policy and produces a signed receipt, except the calls that known issue 7 below describes as refused without one. Other methods that are not benign are forwarded with a signed passthrough receipt and are not policy-evaluated, and benign protocol methods (initialize, initialized, ping, tools/list, prompts/list, resources/list, resources/templates/list, logging/setLevel, completion/complete and notifications/*) produce no receipt (THREAT_BOUNDARY.md, Known residual risks). Read the known issues below before you expose the port.
# Start the proxy (the `aga-proxy` bin) in front of an upstream MCP server.
# stdio upstream = the default stdio transport (the upstream is a child process, not network-reachable).
npx -p @attested-intelligence/[email protected] aga-proxy start \
--upstream "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmp/test" --profile permissive
permissive records each tools/call it evaluates (known issue 7 describes the exceptions) and denies nothing on policy
grounds. standard and restrictive allow only generic example tool names, so they deny every tool this example server
exposes; to permit some of your server's tools and deny the rest, pass a --policy file that names them.
The proxy records receipts in its own process and keeps the SEP ledger in memory. To make that live ledger reachable from a separate shell, aga-proxy start opens a loopback-only control channel: an HTTP listener bound to 127.0.0.1 (never a routable interface), on its own port (default 18801, override with --control-port), distinct from the agent-facing proxy port (18800). It exposes only read routes (/export, /status, /receipts); nothing on it mutates policy or state. It does not check a request's Host or Origin header, so a web page in a browser on the same host can read its responses through DNS rebinding unless the browser blocks it (known issue 12). The proxy writes the chosen control port to ~/.aga-proxy/control.json alongside proxy.pid.
A separate aga-proxy export invocation reads that file and fetches the same signed bundle the running proxy would emit:
# Terminal A: start the proxy in front of an upstream MCP server
npx -p @attested-intelligence/[email protected] aga-proxy start \
--upstream "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmp/test" --profile permissive
# (First, drive at least one tools/call through the proxy from your MCP client; an empty
# ledger has no receipts to checkpoint, and the export reports there is nothing to export.)
# Terminal B: export the live ledger from a different shell, then verify it offline
npx -p @attested-intelligence/[email protected] aga-proxy export -o evidence.json
npx -y @attested-intelligence/[email protected] evidence.json --pubkey <gateway-public-key>
Export and verify before you stop the proxy: aga-proxy stop ends the process without exporting, and the in-memory chain
goes with it (known issue 9 covers export time and bounding the chain).
If no proxy is running, aga-proxy export prints no running proxy found; start it first, or export from within the session and exits non-zero; it never emits an empty or placeholder bundle. Within the MCP server session you can also call the generate_evidence_bundle tool and save the returned JSON.
In-memory ledger: the exported bundle is the durable cryptographic record, but the live in-process chain does not survive a proxy restart. This flow makes the live ledger reachable from another process; it does not add cross-restart persistence, which needs the persistent (SQLite) backend and remains roadmap (see KNOWN_LIMITATIONS.md).
The proxy intercepts tools/call requests, evaluates them against the loaded policy (a JSON file or a built-in profile; the SHA-256 of its canonical JSON is signed into every receipt), and generates a signed SEP receipt for every decision (except the calls that known issue 7 below describes as refused without one). Permitted calls are forwarded to the downstream server; denied calls return an MCP error and never reach it. Each recorded decision is hash-linked and checkpoint-bound into a tamper-evident bundle. (Methods other than tools/call aren't policy-evaluated, but non-benign ones are recorded as signed passthrough receipts for auditability, and a library caller can pass a method denylist (denyMethods) to reject them; the aga-proxy CLI has no flag for it; see THREAT_BOUNDARY.md, Known residual risks.)
Three built-in policy profiles:
audit_only: denies nothing on policy grounds and records each tools/call it evaluates (default); the fail-closed refusals below and known issue 7 still applyfilesystem_read, shell_execute, web_search and others) with rate limits, and substring denials on two of them; every other tool is denied, so a real server's tools need a --policy fileBecause the default (permissive) is audit-only, starting with an audit_only policy prints a loud stderr banner stating that every call is permitted and recorded and no call is denied in that mode. No call is denied on policy grounds, but the proxy still refuses, fail-closed, a tools/call with no tool name or with arguments it cannot canonicalize (nested past 100 levels, for example), and signs a DENIED receipt for each; a name of 0, false, null or an empty string counts as no name. Policy denial needs --profile standard or restrictive, or a --policy file in allowlist or denylist mode. In denylist mode a policy denies each tool it lists as an object whose allowed value is missing or falsy (false, 0, null or an empty string); any other allowed value allows the tool, including the string "false", and so does a listed entry that is itself false, 0, null or an empty string rather than an object. In 3.6.0 through 3.6.2 it also denies an unlisted tool named like a built-in object property, such as constructor. It applies the rate limits of the listed tools it allows; path and pattern rules apply in allowlist mode only and check only top-level string arguments (known issue 10). A --policy file in audit_only mode permits every call; one with any other mode, or none, denies every tools/call, and in 3.6.0 through 3.6.2 one in allowlist or denylist mode whose constraints member is missing or null refuses, with no receipt and no response, every tools/call that has a tool name and arguments the proxy can canonicalize (known issue 7). An unrecognized --profile value is a hard error (exit 2 listing the valid names), never a silent fallback to permissive.
aga-receipt-spec/verify/verify-sep.mjs)y ≥ p rejected), receipts.length > 0, proof count = receipt countprevious_receipt_hash = leaf of the preceding receipt; non-decreasing timestamps0..N-1 bijectionmerkle_root, leaf_count, and chain head (this makes the no-prefix construction truncation-safe)public_key == expected key; otherwise integrity-only is reportedA demo gateway is deployed on Cloudflare Workers (a separate deployment that may track its own version; treat it as a convenience mirror, and always verify what it returns offline against a pinned key, not as the canonical artifact):
# Check status
curl https://aga-mcp-gateway.attested-intelligence.workers.dev/health
# Download a static demonstration bundle (not a live export)
curl https://attestedintelligence.com/sample-bundle.json -o evidence-bundle.json
# Static sample only. Use the separately published sample pin, not a key read from this file.
Status, checked against PyPI on 2026-09-28. The current release is
aga-governance0.3.2. Version 0.3.1 fixed the depth-bomb crash; 0.3.0 was yanked for that crash. Both 0.2.6 files are now yanked as well, but that does not repair installed copies. Use the reviewed current version when evaluating untrusted bundles and retain its documented parser and verdict limitations. The JavaScript reference verifier andaga-verifydo not have that Python depth-bomb crash.
pip install "aga-governance==0.3.2"
from aga import AgentSession
with AgentSession(gateway_id="my-gateway") as session:
session.record_tool_call(
tool_name="search_web",
decision="PERMITTED",
reason="tool in allowlist",
request_id="req-1",
)
bundle = session.export_bundle()
result = session.verify()
assert result["overall_valid"]
Automated tests across TypeScript and Python, plus a conformance corpus:
npm run test:conformance (valid → VERIFIED, negatives → FAILED)aga-governance PyPI package (install + smoke-checked here; its full pytest suite runs from the source tree). The smoke check imports the package and prints its version. It does not exercise the verifier.npm test # TypeScript tests (vitest)
npm run test:conformance # SEP conformance corpus
pip install "aga-governance==0.3.2" && python -c "import aga; print(aga.__version__)" # Python SDK smoke check
Receipt-format determinism is reproducible here: npm test runs the cross-language vectors, and npm run conformance:cross-stack (first: npm run build && npm --prefix independent-verifier run build) shows the six v1 verifier configurations (across three independent toolchains: JS, Go, Python) agree on the 54 object-level cases of the canonical 61-case corpus. The remaining 7 are raw-byte/file-parse cases run by the five file-parsing verifiers, since the in-server engine never receives raw bytes. npm run conformance:cross-stack-v2 shows the two independent-language v2 oracles agree on the composite corpus.
src/
sep/ # Canonical SEP evidence engine: single source of truth (canon, merkle, receipt, checkpoint, bundle, verify)
core/ # Governance primitives (portal, artifact, attestation, disclosure, delegation, behavioral) + internal continuity-chain profile
crypto/ # Internal continuity-chain crypto: Ed25519 (node:crypto), SHA-256/blake2b, salt
proxy/ # MCP governance proxy (transparent interception + policy evaluation; emits SEP bundles)
middleware/ # Governance PEP wrapper (records a signed PERMITTED/DENIED receipt per governed call)
independent-verifier/ # @attested-intelligence/aga-verify: standalone SEP verifier, zero AGA imports
scenarios/ # Demo scenarios (SCADA, autonomous vehicle, AI agent) that emit SEP bundles
tests/ # Historical 3.6.0 CI: 428 tests; reviewed 2026-09-21
3.6.1 and 3.6.2 change only the documentation and the version number; the runtime is 3.6.0's. Items 1 to 4 were reproduced on 2026-09-23 on @attested-intelligence/aga-mcp-server 3.6.0 installed from npm, and
concern the aga-proxy gateway. Item 5, added 2026-09-25, concerns the verifiers and was reproduced on 2026-09-25
on the current releases. Item 6, also added 2026-09-25, concerns aga-proxy with an HTTP upstream and was
reproduced on 2026-09-25 on 3.6.2. Item 7, also added 2026-09-25, concerns tools/call messages that aga-proxy refuses
without a receipt and was reproduced on 2026-09-25 on 3.6.2 (its oversized-message case was added and reproduced on
2026-09-26). Items 8 to 12, added 2026-09-26, concern non-ASCII text,
the cost of exporting evidence, what policy constraints check, oversized tool results and the control channel; each
was reproduced on 2026-09-26 on 3.6.2, as were the memory and Windows port cases added to item 1 that day. The same
list is kept at https://attestedintelligence.com/security.
AGA_GATEWAY_KEY (with or without --ephemeral) or
AGA_GATEWAY_KEY_FILE, the stdio upstream inherits that variable (the seed, or the file's
path), so the upstream sits inside the key's trust domain. Workaround, measured on 3.6.0: run
without either variable. The upstream then sees neither, but the proxy signs with a per-process
key that cannot be pinned across restarts.--upstream-url mode forwards raw JSON-RPC over HTTP POST with only a content-type header. It does not
implement the MCP Streamable HTTP transport (the Accept header, the request metadata headers and event-stream
handling), so a spec-conformant HTTP MCP server rejects its requests. Workaround: bridge to the server over stdio."decision": "PERMITTED" can be placed ahead of the signed "decision": "DENIED", or a forged checkpoint
leaf_count ahead of the signed one. The published verifiers (aga-verify 2.2.2, aga-governance 0.3.2, the verifier in
this package, and the reference verifiers in aga-receipt-spec/verify/) and the site's /verify page read the last
occurrence, and when it holds the genuine value they report VERIFIED, with provenance when the key is pinned. They do
not reject the file, so a tool or a person reading the first occurrence can see a value that was never signed.
Measured on the public sample bundle, pinned to the sample key: with the repeated name inserted in a receipt, in the
checkpoint or in the envelope, aga-verify 2.2.2, aga-governance 0.3.2, the verifier in this package and /verify report
VERIFIED, and a real change of the checkpoint value fails. Workaround: treat the verifier's parsed output as the
record's content, and reject or flag files with repeated field names before displaying them. A strict rejection of
repeated field names is planned for the reviewed release."method" member when aga-proxy has an HTTP upstream (--upstream-url). With
tools/call first and another method last, aga-proxy reads the last copy, so it never checks the tool call against
the policy, and it forwards every method other than tools/call to the HTTP upstream as the exact bytes it
received. An upstream whose JSON parser keeps the first copy of a repeated name then runs the tool call, even one
the policy denies. The bundle holds no receipt for that call: nothing at all when the last method is one the proxy
passes through without a receipt (such as ping, initialize, a list method or a notification), and otherwise only
a passthrough receipt that names the last method. An upstream that keeps the last copy handles the message as the
method the proxy read. The stdio upstream, the default, is not affected: the proxy re-serializes each message
before writing it, so the upstream receives one method. Measured on 3.6.2 from npm on 2026-09-25, with the
restrictive profile and with the default permissive profile. Workaround: keep the stdio default, or have the HTTP
upstream reject any message that repeats a member name. A strict rejection of repeated member names in the proxy
is planned for the reviewed release.tools/call it refuses. It signs a tools/call's receipt before it forwards the
call, so with a stdio upstream a call it cannot record never reaches the tool (for an HTTP upstream, see item 6), but
such a call leaves no receipt. These cases were measured on 3.6.2 from npm on 2026-09-25, each with no receipt and no
response to the client: a tools/call whose tool name is a non-zero number, an array or an object (a name of 0, false,
null or an empty string counts as no name and gets a DENIED receipt and an error); one whose tool name or string id
holds an unpaired surrogate (the JSON escape \ud800, for example); under a --policy file in allowlist or
denylist mode whose constraints member is missing or null, every tools/call with a tool name and arguments the
proxy can canonicalize; and, under an allowlist file, a call it would otherwise permit that carries a string path when that
tool's path_prefix is neither a string nor false, 0 or null. The proxy starts with such a policy file, and it reports
each refusal listed above only on its own stderr. A message sent as a JSON-RPC batch array or without
"jsonrpc": "2.0" is refused differently: the client gets an error, and there is no receipt. A message of 8,388,608
characters or more (UTF-16 code units, about 8.4 million), not counting the newline that ends it but counting a carriage
return before that newline, also gets an error and no receipt, and the proxy then closes
the connection, dropping any reply still due on it. The limit counts input not yet split into messages, so a message
just under the limit can be refused the same way when the read that completes it also carries enough input after it to pass the limit; whether that happens depends on where the reads fall. On 3.6.2, when a 100-character
message, a message 58 characters under the limit and a 100,000-character message were sent in one write, the first
was answered, the second got the error and the connection closed; sent without the 100,000-character message, or
without the 100-character one, every message was forwarded. These are
the cases measured, not a proof that no other input does the same. Workaround: give every policy file a constraints
object whose path_prefix values are strings, and have the client time out a call that gets no reply. A DENIED
receipt and an error for a malformed tool name, and a check of the policy file at startup, are planned for the
reviewed release.\uXXXX escapes, so every byte the proxy reads from the agent is ASCII, and have a stdio upstream do the same; a
forced split of the escaped message then arrived intact. A fix is planned for the reviewed release.GET /export: 2.8 seconds at 1,000 receipts and 17.4 seconds at 2,500, with
a tools/call sent during the export waiting as long; at 4,000 receipts an export took 43.8 seconds, and a call
forwarded just before it, which the upstream answered in 2 seconds, got the timeout error. At 1,000 to 4,000
receipts a compact bundle took about 1.7 to 1.9 KB per receipt, rising with the count. An audit the same day measured 88 to 113 seconds at 5,000 receipts.
Verification time grows close to linearly. Workaround: each export covers every receipt since the proxy started and
does not shorten the chain, so bound the chain by restarting the proxy on a schedule: pause the agents, export and
verify, then restart. A restart begins a new chain that is not linked to the last one and resets the rate-limit counts;
with a per-process key (--ephemeral, or neither AGA_GATEWAY_KEY nor AGA_GATEWAY_KEY_FILE set) it also begins a
new signing key, printed at startup, that cannot be pinned across restarts (item 3). Export outside busy periods, and
export and verify before any stop, because the live chain is kept in memory and a stop loses receipts not yet
exported. A fix
that leaves the bundle's bytes unchanged is planned for the reviewed release.path_prefix is checked only when the value under the
checked key (path, or the keys a rule lists in path_keys) is a string, so the same path sent inside an array or an
object is not checked. denied_patterns match case-sensitively and only in top-level string arguments, so an
uppercased command, or one inside an array or a nested object, is not matched. A constraint key the proxy does not
recognise, such as a misspelling, is ignored without a warning, and a value of the wrong JSON type is not rejected:
allowed: "false", a string, allows the tool; in denylist mode a tool listed as false, null or 0 instead of an
object is allowed; and a non-empty path_keys string instead of an array makes the check read each character as a key
name, so the intended key goes unchecked. Rate limits count per tool name across the whole
proxy, shared by every client, and in allowlist mode the limit is checked before the path and pattern rules, so a
call those rules deny still uses up a slot. Measured on 3.6.2 from npm on 2026-09-26 with allowlist and denylist policy files: a
path_prefix of /home denied "/etc/passwd" and forwarded ["/etc/passwd"]; a denied pattern of rm -rf denied
rm -rf / and forwarded RM -RF / and the same command inside an array; a rule spelled denied_pattern denied
nothing; allowed: "false" forwarded the call in both modes; a denylist entry of false forwarded the call;
path_keys: "path" forwarded /etc/passwd past a /home prefix; and, under a limit of 2 a minute, two calls denied by a
/home prefix left a third call, to a path under /home, denied for the rate limit, while after one such denial that
call was forwarded. Workaround: treat path and pattern rules as a convenience rather than a boundary, restrict paths in the
upstream server itself, and check a policy file's keys against the constraint names in dist/proxy/types.d.ts.
Checks that fail closed on these inputs, and a check of the policy file at startup, are planned for the reviewed
release.aga-proxy export can fetch the live bundle (routes /export, /status and
/receipts). Measured on 3.6.2 from npm on 2026-09-26: GET /receipts and
GET /export sent with the Host and Origin of another site returned 200, and both carried a denied call's argument
path in its denial reason. A web page open in a browser on the same host can therefore read the live receipts and
the evidence bundle through DNS rebinding, unless the browser blocks a public site's requests to the loopback
address; any local user on the host can read them as well. A page can also start an export with a plain
GET /export without rebinding, unless the browser blocks it, and each export holds up governed calls while it
runs (item 9). The CLI has no option meant to turn the channel off; a --control-port of 70000, or any number
above 65535, leaves it unstarted while governance runs, but then no command can export the running
proxy's receipts. Workaround: do not browse the web on the host while the proxy runs, or run the proxy on a host
where no one does, and on a host shared with other users treat the live receipts as readable by all of them.
A Host and Origin check is planned for the reviewed release.--upstream-url) response whose JSON line, as the proxy serializes it, is 8,388,608
characters or more (UTF-16 code units, counting JSON escaping but not the newline) closes the agent's connection.
The proxy writes the whole line to the agent's socket in one call. A Linux kernel with its default socket buffers
takes only part of a write that size; the rest goes out as the client reads, but the whole line counts as waiting
until it has all gone, so the proxy's guard against a client that does not read its responses sees more than
8,388,608 characters waiting, the newline included, and destroys the socket. The call already has a PERMITTED
receipt and the upstream has run the tool; the agent's connection closes part-way through the reply with no error
message, so an agent that reconnects and retries can run the tool twice; every other call in flight on that
connection is lost with it; and the proxy reports nothing. Measured on 3.6.2 from npm on 2026-09-26 on a Linux 6.18
host with Node 24 and the default socket buffers (net.ipv4.tcp_wmem 4096 16384 4194304): result lines of
4,000,000, 8,000,000, 8,388,606 and 8,388,607 characters were returned, and lines of 8,388,608, 8,388,609,
9,000,000, 10,000,000, 12,000,000, 16,000,000, 20,000,000 and 32,000,000 characters closed the connection after 3.1
to 5.0 MB of the reply had arrived; a client that read nothing for 4 seconds got a 4,000,000-character result and
lost a 9,000,000-character one after 2.7 MB. On Windows 11 the same proxy returned a 20,000,000-character result, and a
9,000,000-character one to a client that read nothing for 4 seconds, because that kernel took each write whole. A
stdio upstream's response of this size is dropped instead (item 11). Workaround: keep tool results well under the bound,
for example by reading large files in parts. An error returned at once is planned for the reviewed release.No fixed version is named until one is published.
See SECURITY.md for vulnerability reporting.
See CONTRIBUTING.md for development setup and guidelines.
MIT. The aga-receipt-spec/ directory carries its own
Apache-2.0 license (see aga-receipt-spec/LICENSE).
Attested Intelligence Holdings LLC
Signed decision records for agent vendors facing customer evidence reviews. Public reference gateway and static verifier; pre-pilot, with documented limits.
{ "mcpServers": { "attested-intelligence-aga-mcp-server": { "command": "npx", "args": [ "-y", "@attested-intelligence/[email protected]" ] } }}เครื่องมือ
ยังไม่มีรายการเครื่องมือ เซิร์ฟเวอร์แบบรีโมตจะได้รายการหลังการตรวจสอบสถานะครั้งแรก
FAQ
คัดลอกคอนฟิก stdio สำหรับ Cursor, Claude Desktop, Claude Code หรือ VS Code ได้ในหน้านี้ คอนฟิกนี้ใช้การติดตั้งของผู้เผยแพร่ ไม่ใช่พร็อกซีของ PlugMCP
ระเบียนนี้ไม่ได้ระบุตัวแปรสภาพแวดล้อมที่จำเป็น
@attested Intelligence/aga ทำงานแบบโลคัลผ่าน stdio
ตรวจสอบล่าสุดเมื่อ 2026-10-28 Signed decision records for agent vendors facing customer evidence reviews. Public reference gateway and static verifier; pre-pilot, with documented limits.