Governed AI-ops for redis + rabbitmq. queue-aiops is for the team running
their own cache and message broker — a redis that "suddenly eats memory", a
rabbitmq whose queues quietly grow until publishers block — without an
enterprise observability suite. It gives an AI agent (or a human at the CLI) a
governed toolset over both: transparent root-cause analyses for memory
pressure, latency, queue backlog, and connection churn, plus the handful of
writes an operator actually needs (config set, client kill, purge/delete
queue, policies) — every call audited, budgeted, risk-tiered, and undo-recorded
by the built-in governance harness.
Disclaimer: Community-maintained open-source project, not affiliated
with, endorsed by, or sponsored by the Redis or RabbitMQ projects or their
respective owners. Redis and RabbitMQ are trademarks of their respective owners.
Verification: behaviour is covered by a mock-based test suite; not yet validated
against live brokers. Both redis and rabbitmq are free/self-hostable (one lab container
or package install each), so a lab check is easy — queue-aiops doctor is the fastest
live probe, and docs/VERIFICATION.md is the checklist.
Quick start
As a Claude Code plugin
One install gives an agent both the skill and the MCP server:
The MCP server is fetched with uv and pinned to the
package version this plugin declares, so an audit row can be traced back to the
code that wrote it. Credentials are still configured with queue-aiops init — see below.
As an OpenClaw plugin
The same bundle is published on ClawHub, where one
install delivers the skill and its MCP server together:
openclaw plugins install clawhub:@zw008/queue-aiops
openclaw skills info queue-aiops # expect: Visible to model: yes
Restart the OpenClaw gateway afterwards so it loads the plugin. The MCP server is
fetched with uv, pinned to this exact release, so
uvx has to be on PATH — without it the skill still installs but reports
Visible to model: no. Credentials are configured exactly as below.
As a CLI or standalone MCP server
uv tool install queue-aiops
queue-aiops init # wizard: pick platform (redis/rabbitmq), host/port, encrypted secret
queue-aiops doctor # config + secret + connectivity check (PING / /api/overview)
queue-aiops overview # one-shot health summary for the default target
It delivers broker operations — reads and writes — accurately and efficiently,
and records every one of them. It does not decide whether a write is allowed
to happen. That is the agent's judgement, or the permission of the account you
connect it with: give the Redis connection an ACL user restricted to read
commands, or the RabbitMQ management user only the monitoring tag, and the
writes fail at the broker — the place that actually owns the permission.
So there is no read-only switch, no policy file, no approval gate to configure.
The one thing the tool guarantees is that nothing is silent: every call, over
MCP and over the CLI alike, lands an audit row in ~/.queue-aiops/audit.db,
and reversible writes still capture their before-state and record an inverse.
Each tool declares a risk_level, kept in agreement with its [READ]/[WRITE]
documentation tag by a test, and carried into the audit row as a descriptive
tier — so a reviewer can see at a glance that a row was a high-risk delete. It
is a label, not a gate.
Running a smaller / local model? See
agent-guardrails.md — it lists
the guardrails this tool now enforces for you (so you don't spend prompt budget
restating them) and gives a ready-made system prompt for what's left.
Support scope
Platform
Protocol
Coverage
redis (5.x–7.x wire protocol via redis Python client)
The four RCAs are transparent heuristics that report their numbers — thresholds
are named constants, every finding carries its evidence, never a black-box
verdict. Big-key sampling walks at most 10,000 keys with SCAN and sizes at most
200 with MEMORY USAGE — never KEYS * — and reports its coverage.
Governance
Every MCP tool — and every CLI write, which routes through the same governed
functions — runs through the bundled @governed_tool harness
(queue_aiops.governance — no external dependency). It records; it does not
authorize whether a write may happen (see above):
Audit — every call lands in ~/.queue-aiops/audit.db (relocatable via
QUEUE_AIOPS_HOME), secret-redacted. The CLI writes the same row the MCP path
does — there is no unaudited entry point.
Budget / runaway guard — a safety backstop, not an authorization gate:
call/time ceilings (QUEUE_MAX_TOOL_CALLS, QUEUE_MAX_TOOL_SECONDS) + a
runaway-loop breaker stop a stuck agent from burning unbounded calls/time.
Risk tier — a descriptive label on the audit row derived from risk_level;
it gates nothing. QUEUE_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY / QUEUE_AUDIT_RATIONALE are
optional annotations recorded on the row (who/why), never required and never
blocking.
Undo — reversible writes capture the real before-state first:
redis_config_set records the prior value from CONFIG GET;
set_policy/delete_policy record the prior policy; delete_queue records
the queue's definition and its undo re-declares it (the messages are not
restored — the descriptor says so). Irreversible writes (purge_queue,
redis_kill_client) record priorState only.
Dry-run + double-confirm — every write takes dry_run=True (MCP) /
--dry-run (CLI); CLI writes double-confirm and execute through the same
governed twins, so they land in the audit log too. purge_queue and
delete_queue are risk=high with dry-run + double confirmation at the CLI.
Credentials live encrypted in ~/.queue-aiops/secrets.enc (Fernet +
scrypt master password; QUEUE_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD for non-interactive
use). Redis passwords are optional — an auth-less lab instance is a
supported target.
env-block caveat: MCP clients launch the server with a minimal
environment — your shell profile is not sourced. Anything the server needs
(QUEUE_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD, a relocated QUEUE_AIOPS_HOME, and any
optional QUEUE_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY/QUEUE_AUDIT_RATIONALE audit annotations)
must be set in the env block above, not just in your terminal.
Live-verified against Redis 7.4.9 and RabbitMQ 3.13.7 (2026-07-19/20).
Connectivity, every Redis read (cross-checked against redis-cli ground truth), all
four analyses, and the full governance loop (real redis_config_set → audit row →
undo restoring the prior value) were exercised against a real server. That run found
and fixed a real defect: integer quantities — key counts, client counts, byte totals —
were rendered as floats (202.0 keys), which equality assertions cannot catch.
The RabbitMQ group is now verified end-to-end too — reads cross-checked against
rabbitmqadmin, and set_policy → undo_apply closing on the live broker. Redis
cluster/sentinel topologies and AUTH/TLS connections remain unverified.
docs/VERIFICATION.md records exactly what was checked and what
is still open. queue-aiops doctor is the fastest live check.
Contributing
缺功能提 issue/PR 欢迎留言 — missing a read you need (streams/consumer groups,
quorum-queue specifics, shovel/federation status), another broker platform, or
a threshold that doesn't fit your fleet? Open an issue or PR at
github.com/AIops-tools/Queue-AIops
— platform registry entries are additive and small.