Security analysis platform for Aiken smart contracts on Cardano.
Aikido goes beyond static analysis. It combines a 75-detector suite with SMT verification, transaction simulation, compliance analysis, protocol pattern detection, and grammar-aware fuzzing to find vulnerabilities in Aiken smart contracts before they reach mainnet. Multi-lane analysis cross-correlates evidence across techniques, producing findings with source context, severity ratings, CWE/CWC classifications, and actionable remediation guidance.
Security analysis for Aiken smart contracts on Cardano. 75 vulnerability detectors.
AIKIDO_BINARY
ตรวจสอบล่าสุด
2026-11-08
ดาว
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เครื่องมือ
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อัปไทม์
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Built in Rust. Fast. Zero configuration required.
Why Aikido
Cardano smart contracts are immutable once deployed. A vulnerability in production means lost funds with no recourse. Manual audits are expensive, slow, and bottlenecked. Aikido catches the classes of bugs that auditors find most often - double satisfaction, missing signature checks, unbounded iteration, unsafe datum handling - automatically, in seconds.
The only security tool for Aiken - no alternatives exist in the ecosystem
75 detectors with CWC (Cardano Weakness Classification) and CWE mappings
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AIKIDO v0.3.1 Static Analysis Report
Project: test/simple-treasury v0.1.0
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[CRITICAL] (definite) double-satisfaction - Handler treasury.spend iterates
outputs without own OutputReference - validators/treasury.ak:23
Spend handler accesses tx.outputs but never uses __own_ref to identify
its own input. An attacker can satisfy multiple script inputs with a
single output, draining funds.
22 | validator treasury {
> 23 | spend(
> 24 | datum: Option<TreasuryDatum>,
> 25 | redeemer: TreasuryRedeemer,
Suggestion: Use the OutputReference parameter to correlate outputs
to this specific input.
...
1 critical, 5 high, 7 medium, 0 low, 0 info
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Analysis Architecture
Aikido uses a multi-lane approach where independent analysis techniques cross-validate each other:
graph TB
subgraph Input
A[Aiken Project] --> B[Typed AST]
end
subgraph Analysis Lanes
B --> C[Detector Suite<br/>75 detectors]
B --> D[Compliance<br/>Securify2-style]
B --> E[SMT Verification<br/>Cardano axioms]
B --> F[Tx Simulation<br/>exploit generation]
B --> G[Protocol Detection<br/>DeFi classification]
B --> H[Fuzz Lane<br/>grammar-aware]
end
subgraph Evidence Correlation
C --> I[Evidence Framework]
D --> I
E --> I
F --> I
G --> I
H --> I
end
I --> J[PatternMatch]
J --> K[PathVerified]
K --> L[SmtProven]
L --> M[SimulationConfirmed]
M --> N[Corroborated]
N --> O[Report<br/>9 output formats]
style C fill:#2EFFB5,color:#0a0a0a
style D fill:#2EFFB5,color:#0a0a0a
style E fill:#2EFFB5,color:#0a0a0a
style F fill:#2EFFB5,color:#0a0a0a
style G fill:#2EFFB5,color:#0a0a0a
style H fill:#2EFFB5,color:#0a0a0a
style I fill:#111111,color:#e0e0e0
style O fill:#111111,color:#e0e0e0
Lane Details
Lane
What it does
Detector Suite
Cross-module interprocedural analysis, taint tracking, symbolic execution, delegation-aware suppression, transitive signal merging, datum continuity tracking
Compliance
Securify2-style dual-pattern system: every security property has compliance (safe) and violation (unsafe) patterns. 10 security property variants
SMT Verification
Solver-independent interface with Cardano domain axioms (value conservation, signature semantics, minting policy). Constraint solving for reachability
Expect pattern on non-Option type that may fail at runtime
unconstrained-recursion
CWE-674
Self-recursive handler without clear termination
empty-handler-body
CWE-561
Handler with no meaningful logic
unsafe-list-head
CWE-129
list.head() / list.at() without length guard
missing-datum-field-validation
CWE-20
Spend handler accepts datum fields but never validates them
missing-token-burn
CWE-862
Minting policy with no burn handling
missing-state-update
CWE-665
State machine without datum update
rounding-error-risk
CWE-682
Integer division on financial values
missing-input-credential-check
CWE-862
Input iteration without credential check
duplicate-asset-name-risk
CWE-694
Minting without unique asset name enforcement
fee-calculation-unchecked
CWE-682
Fee or protocol payment without validation
datum-tampering-risk
CWE-20
Datum passed through without field-level validation
missing-protocol-token
CWE-862
State transition without protocol token verification
unbounded-protocol-operations
CWE-400
Both input and output lists iterated without bounds
Detector
Severity
Description
reference-script-injection
Low
Outputs don't constrain reference_script field
unused-validator-parameter
Low
Validator parameter never referenced
fail-only-redeemer-branch
Low
Redeemer branch that always fails
missing-min-ada-check
Info
Script output without minimum ADA check
dead-code-path
Low
Unreachable code paths
redundant-check
Low
Trivially true conditions
shadowed-variable
Info
Handler parameter shadowed by pattern binding
magic-numbers
Info
Unexplained numeric literals
excessive-validator-params
Info
Too many validator parameters
unused-import
Info
Imported module with no function calls
Each detector has detailed documentation with vulnerable examples, safe examples, and remediation guidance. Use aikido --explain <detector-name> or see docs/detectors/.
git clone https://github.com/Bajuzjefe/Aikido-Security-Analysis-Platform.git
cd aikido
cargo build --release # Binary at target/release/aikido
cargo test # Run test suite (1186+ tests)
cargo clippy --all-targets # Lint (zero warnings)
Requires Rust >= 1.88.0.
Vulnerability Coverage
Detectors are derived from real vulnerabilities found in published Cardano smart contract audits: