With PG_ALLOW_WRITE set to "false" the server has read-only access to the
database. This is the default; set it to "true" only if the model must write.
The same JSON works in any MCP client that speaks stdio: VS Code, Cursor, Claude Code, Codex, Windsurf.
Alternatively, set the individual PG_* variables; they are used when
DATABASE_URL is not set:
Postgres in Docker: if the database runs in a container with a published
port, connect to localhost:<published-port> as usual. If the MCP server
itself runs inside a container and the database runs on your host machine,
use host.docker.internal instead of localhost:
Execute a read-only SQL statement. Accepts SELECT, WITH ... SELECT,
EXPLAIN, and SHOW. One statement per call - multi-statement input is rejected
by the extended query protocol. In read-only mode (the default) the statement runs
as BEGIN READ ONLY, the query, and ROLLBACK - three commands, roughly two
network round trips with pipelining - so the database itself refuses any write.
With PG_ALLOW_WRITE=true the statement is sent directly, without that wrapper, so a
write run through query would execute - use execute for writes.
Supports PostgreSQL-style $1, $2 prepared-statement parameters; values are bound
by the driver and never spliced into the SQL text.
use_mcp_tool({
server_name: "postgres",
tool_name: "query",
arguments: {
sql: "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1",
params: [1]
}
});
Returns compact JSON: {"rows": [...], "rowCount": n, "returnedRows": n, "truncated": false}.
When the serialized rows exceed PG_MAX_RESULT_BYTES, only the rows that fit are returned
(returnedRows < rowCount), truncated is true, and a hint suggests adding LIMIT/WHERE
or selecting fewer columns.
List tables in the connected database. Accepts an optional schema parameter
(defaults to 'public').
// List tables in the 'public' schema (default)
use_mcp_tool({
server_name: "postgres",
tool_name: "list_tables",
arguments: {}
});
// List tables in a specific schema
use_mcp_tool({
server_name: "postgres",
tool_name: "list_tables",
arguments: {
schema: "my_schema"
}
});
4. describe_table
Get the structure of a specific table (columns, types, nullability, defaults,
primary keys). Accepts an optional schema parameter (defaults to 'public').
Execute an INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, or DDL statement. Always registered, but
in read-only mode (the default) it refuses with an error naming PG_ALLOW_WRITE
and changes nothing - the statement never reaches the database. With
PG_ALLOW_WRITE=true it runs: same $1, $2 parameter handling as query, one
complete statement per call, and the connecting role governs what it may do.
Returns {"rowCount": n, "command": "INSERT"}.
Connect to a different PostgreSQL database at runtime using provided
credentials. Not registered by default - prefer configuring credentials
through the environment so they never pass through model-visible arguments.
Session limits (statement_timeout, idle_in_transaction_session_timeout) are
re-applied after every reconnect; read-only reads enforce read-only in their own
BEGIN READ ONLY transaction.
Full connection string (preferred). Supports ?sslmode= in the URL.
PG_HOST
-
Database host (fallback when DATABASE_URL is not set)
PG_PORT
5432
Database port
PG_USER
-
Database user
PG_PASSWORD
-
Database password
PG_DATABASE
-
Database name
PG_ALLOW_WRITE
false
When true, execute performs writes and reads are sent directly. Off (default) is read-only: execute refuses writes and each read runs in a READ ONLY transaction
PG_SSLMODE
-
disable | allow | prefer | require | verify-ca | verify-full. require/allow/prefer encrypt without verifying the certificate; verify-ca/verify-full verify (supply a CA via PG_SSL_CA). Unrecognized values fail at startup. Limitation: unlike libpq, allow/prefer do not fall back to plaintext (node-postgres has no opportunistic SSL), so a server without TLS needs disable.
PG_SSL_CA
-
Path to a CA certificate file. Setting it by itself implies verify-full
PG_ENABLE_RUNTIME_CONNECT
false
Register the connect_db tool (runtime credential switching)
PG_MAX_RESULT_BYTES
32768
Byte budget for a query result sent to the model. Whole rows are kept while they fit; over the budget returnedRows < rowCount and truncated: true (if not even the first row fits, returnedRows is 0 with a hint). ~32 KiB ≈ 8k tokens; lower it for strict clients, raise it if your client allows more.
PG_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT
30000
Statement timeout in milliseconds, applied to every session
PG_CONNECT_TIMEOUT
10000
Timeout in milliseconds for a single connect attempt (raise it for slow links or SSH tunnels)
To reach a database only accessible through a bastion, see SSH tunneling (adds PG_SSH_* variables).
Features
Read-only by default; writes are an explicit opt-in (PG_ALLOW_WRITE=true)
Read-only enforced by the engine (BEGIN READ ONLY), never by client-side SQL parsing
Data access behind a small typed interface; the pg driver never leaks past it
DATABASE_URL support with SSL (sslmode=disable|allow|prefer|require|verify-ca|verify-full, custom CA)
Prepared-statement parameters: $1-style placeholders, bound by the driver
Result size cap (byte budget) with an explicit truncated flag instead of flooding the model's context
Session statement timeout plus a client deadline; transaction poolers may not preserve session settings
Errors returned as readable tool results with SQLSTATE-based hints, so the model can self-correct
Survives dropped connections - reconnects lazily instead of crashing
Optional SSH tunneling (PG_SSH_*) with mandatory host-key verification, loaded only when configured
MCP tool annotations (read-only / destructive hints) per spec 2025-11-25
Multi-schema support for database operations
Security
Full details, including the threat model and disclosure process, are in
SECURITY.md. The short version:
A least-privilege database role is the real boundary. The MCP works with
existing credentials; creating or changing roles is not required. A dedicated
role is what actually guarantees writes are impossible.
On PostgreSQL 14+, the following is a starting point:
CREATE ROLE mcp_readonly LOGIN PASSWORD 'change-me';
GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE your_database TO mcp_readonly;
GRANT pg_read_all_data TO mcp_readonly; -- adds read privileges
ALTER ROLE mcp_readonly SET default_transaction_read_only = on; -- read-only by default
(On PostgreSQL 13 or older, grant SELECT explicitly instead of
pg_read_all_data - see SECURITY.md.) The server warns on
stderr if you connect as a superuser. Read grants do not revoke existing
privileges, and defaults remain mutable; available functions, ownership and
inherited privileges also matter.
The engine enforces read-only. There is no client-side SQL parsing. In
read-only mode every read runs in a rolled-back BEGIN READ ONLY transaction,
so PostgreSQL itself - which alone knows what a function, view, or rule does -
refuses any write with SQLSTATE 25006 and reverts any session change the
statement made. The extended protocol rejects multi-command strings.
Honest framing: the read-only transaction is defense-in-depth on top of the
role, not a replacement for it. Read-only mode stops a confused or prompt-injected
model from writing to your database; it does not stop prompt injection carried in
the row data a query returns. Don't point this server at production - use a replica,
a snapshot, or a tightly scoped role. See SECURITY.md.
SSH tunneling
Set PG_SSH_HOST (plus auth and host-key verification) to reach a database that is only accessible
through a bastion (an SSH jump host). The connection string / PG_* fields then describe the
database as seen from the bastion:
SSH bastion host. Setting it enables tunneling: the server reaches the database only through an SSH tunnel to this host (see below). Optional feature; needs the ssh2 optional dependency.
PG_SSH_PORT
22
SSH bastion port
PG_SSH_USER
-
SSH username
PG_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY
-
Path to a private key file. If unset, auth falls back like ssh: a running agent (SSH_AUTH_SOCK), then a default key (~/.ssh/id_ed25519, id_rsa, id_ecdsa)
PG_SSH_PASSPHRASE
-
Passphrase for the private key, if encrypted
PG_SSH_AGENT
-
true to use the ambient agent (SSH_AUTH_SOCK), or an explicit socket path / Windows named pipe (\\.\pipe\openssh-ssh-agent)
PG_SSH_PASSWORD
-
SSH login password. Opt-in; a key or agent takes precedence. Prefer keys - a bastion often disables password auth.
PG_SSH_FINGERPRINT
-
Pinned host-key fingerprint (SHA256:...). Host-key verification is mandatory and set only this way: without it the tunnel refuses to connect (fail-closed). Get it with ssh-keygen -lF host (reads your known_hosts) or ssh-keyscan host | ssh-keygen -lf - (see the trust note below)
PG_SSH_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL
15000
SSH keepalive interval in ms; the tunnel drops after 3 unanswered keepalives, and the next call reconnects
SSH changes only the transport. Read-only enforcement, the result size cap, timeouts, and
connect_db behave exactly as on a direct connection, and no extra SQL is sent per query.
Host-key verification is mandatory via a pinned PG_SSH_FINGERPRINT - the tunnel will not
connect without it, so a man-in-the-middle bastion is refused. Get the fingerprint over a channel
you trust, most trustworthy first:
on the bastion itself, or from its admin: ssh-keygen -lf /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
(no network involved);
from your existing ~/.ssh/known_hosts, if you already reach the host over ssh:
ssh-keygen -lF bastion.example.com;
fetched from the host: ssh-keyscan bastion.example.com | ssh-keygen -lf - (trust this only
when run from a network position you trust - it accepts whatever the host returns).
TLS validates the real database hostname. With verify-full, the certificate is checked against
the database's own hostname (e.g. db.internal), not the loopback the tunnel binds locally, and
rejectUnauthorized is pinned on so an inherited NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 cannot disable it.
ssh2 is an optional dependency, loaded only when PG_SSH_HOST is set, so a direct connection
never initializes it. npm installs optional dependencies by default; run
npm install --omit=optional to skip it entirely (a direct connection does not need it).
A tunneled connection that fails reports a stable SSH_* code - see Error Handling.
Error Handling
SQL and connection failures are returned as tool results (isError: true)
with a message, the SQLSTATE code, and a hint. PostgreSQL's own server hint is
used when present; otherwise these fallbacks apply:
code
meaning
first thing to check
28P01
authentication failed
PG_USER / PG_PASSWORD
3D000
database does not exist
PG_DATABASE
42P01
relation not found
call list_tables
42703
column not found
call describe_table
57014
the query was canceled (a timeout or a cancel request)
if timing out, add a LIMIT / simplify it, or raise PG_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT
25006
the transaction is read-only
source may be a read-only role, a replica, a server default, or (for query) the read-only wrapper; execute writes need PG_ALLOW_WRITE=true
ECONNREFUSED / ENOTFOUND
cannot reach or resolve the database host
PG_HOST / PG_PORT / DATABASE_URL
Over an SSH tunnel, a failure carries a stable code (and, where
the cause is determinate, a hint naming the setting to fix), so the failing phase is unambiguous:
code
meaning
first thing to check
SSH_CONFIG_INVALID
invalid SSH config, incl. a malformed PG_SSH_FINGERPRINT
the PG_SSH_* values
SSH_KEY_INVALID
key unreadable, unparseable, a public key, or encrypted without the right passphrase (an encrypted key with the correct PG_SSH_PASSPHRASE works)
PG_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY, PG_SSH_PASSPHRASE
SSH_CONNECT_FAILED
the bastion is unreachable, or SSH setup failed for an unclassified reason
PG_SSH_HOST, PG_SSH_PORT, reachability
SSH_TIMEOUT
the bastion did not respond in time
network/firewall, PG_CONNECT_TIMEOUT
SSH_AUTH_FAILED
the bastion rejected authentication
PG_SSH_USER and the key/agent/password in use
SSH_HOST_KEY_MISMATCH
host key does not match PG_SSH_FINGERPRINT (stale value or MITM)
re-fetch the fingerprint
SSH_FORWARD_FAILED
tunnel is up, but the bastion could not reach the database
the DB host and port as seen from the bastion
SSH_CONNECTION_LOST
an established tunnel dropped mid-session
transient; the next call reconnects
A genuine PostgreSQL error through a healthy tunnel keeps its own code (e.g. 28P01 for wrong
database credentials), not an SSH code.
Migrating from 0.1.x
Not needed for new installs. Two behavior changes since 0.1.x:
Read-only by default. The execute tool is always visible but refuses
writes (with an error naming the flag) unless PG_ALLOW_WRITE=true, and every
read runs inside an engine-enforced READ ONLY transaction. If your workflow
writes to the database, set "PG_ALLOW_WRITE": "true" to restore 0.1.x behavior.
connect_db is disabled by default. Runtime connection switching (passing
credentials through tool arguments) requires PG_ENABLE_RUNTIME_CONNECT=true;
otherwise connection details come only from the environment.
Tool names, parameter names, and PG_* variables are unchanged. Result payloads
are now structured compact JSON for every tool (e.g. query returns
{rows, rowCount, returnedRows, truncated} instead of a bare row array) - see
CHANGELOG.md for the exact shapes before updating anything that
parses tool output.