Power your agent
Yayıncının kendi komutu. PlugMCP uç noktası değildir.
Host a copy with our keys and logs.
npx -y [email protected]Claude Code'un yerel komutlar için kurulum bağlantısı yok. Aşağıdaki komutu kopyalayın ve bir terminalde çalıştırın.
claude mcp add airlock-mcp -- npx -y airlock-mcp@0.2.0Bir terminalde çalıştırın.
{ "mcpServers": { "airlock-mcp": { "command": "npx", "args": [ "-y", "[email protected]" ] } }}claude_desktop_config.json
Uzak URL mi, yoksa makinenizde bir komut mu? İki kurulum arasındaki fark
PlugMCP’de çalıştır
A new server you create. It is not this listing's official endpoint. Use the publisher install when you want their URL and their credentials.
BaşlatYayıncıdan
Identity & policy enforcement for AI agents — an open protocol that answers one question before any agent tool call runs: Cryptographic identity (Ed25519, W3C DID), deterministic policy decisions, and a signed, hash-chained receipt for every allow and every deny. Built on OAuth 2.1, with delegation chains and tamper-evident audit trails.
Model Context Protocol server exposing Airlock gateway tools (stdio)
Works with Claude (Anthropic SDK integration included), OpenAI, LangChain, or your own agents — one identity & policy layer across all of them.
Registry: hosted registry in private beta — airlock.ing/registry
private_key_jwt authentication (Ed25519)pip install airlock-protocol[llm])See CHANGELOG.md for the full release history.
AI agents now take real actions — they call tools, move data, run commands, execute transactions. A prompt injection or a misbehaving model turns a helpful agent into a confused deputy: a legitimate operation performed by the wrong agent, and no content guardrail will catch it. Guardrails filter content; they cannot distinguish an authorized tool call from an unauthorized one. There is no standard mechanism for verifying agent identity and enforcing authorization before the action runs.
Airlock is an access-control layer that sits between the agent and its tools. Every tool call is checked — deterministically, whatever model is driving:
Agent ──tool call──> Airlock ──allowed──> Tool executes
│
├── Identify who is this agent? (Ed25519 / OAuth 2.1, verified not asserted)
├── Decide does policy allow it? (deterministic — same answer, any model)
├── Enforce allow or deny — before the tool ever runs
└── Receipt signed, hash-chained record of every decision
The receipt chain is tamper-evident (Ed25519 signatures + SHA-256 hash chain) — it's the artifact you hand an auditor. OAuth 2.1 provides identity; Airlock adds trust scoring, delegation with scope narrowing (RFC 8693), and the enforcement + audit layer on top.
+------------------------------------------+
| Agentic Airlock |
| |
Agent A ----------> | [Gateway] ---> EventBus |
(OAuth token or | | | |
Ed25519 handshake) | | ACK/NACK v |
| | [Orchestrator] |
| | | |
| | +-----+------+ |
| | v v |
| | ReputationStore OAuth Server |
| | | | |
| | trust score token + claims |
| | v |
| | TrustVerdict (VERIFIED / |
| | REJECTED / DEFERRED) |
| | | |
| | v |
| | Attestation + Compliance Audit |
+-----+------------------------------------+
pip install airlock-protocol
# Verify an agent in 7 lines
python -c "
from airlock import AirlockClient
client = AirlockClient() # defaults to api.airlock.ing
result = client.verify('did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK')
print(f'Verified: {result.verified}, Score: {result.trust_score}')
"
# Verify an agent from the command line
airlock verify did:key:z6Mk...
# Start a local gateway for development
airlock serve
# Scaffold a new Airlock-protected project
airlock init
# Clone and run locally
git clone https://github.com/airlock-protocol/airlock.git
cd airlock
pip install -e ".[dev]"
python demo/run_demo.py # 3-agent demo, no external services needed
python -m pytest tests/ -v # 1,087 tests
from airlock import AirlockClient
# Default — routes through central Airlock registry (api.airlock.ing)
client = AirlockClient()
result = client.verify("did:key:z6Mk...")
if result.verified:
print(f"Trusted: {result.agent_name}, Score: {result.trust_score}")
# Self-hosted — point to your own gateway
client = AirlockClient(gateway_url="http://localhost:8000")
# Async support
result = await client.averify("did:key:z6Mk...")
airlock-client)The npm workspace under sdks/typescript exposes the same REST operations via fetch (Node 18+). See sdks/typescript/README.md. Published PyPI name remains airlock-protocol (Python); the TS package is airlock-client on npm when released.
airlock-mcp)integrations/airlock-mcp is a stdio Model Context Protocol server that surfaces gateway tools (health, resolve, session, reputation, etc.) to MCP hosts. Build from repo root: npm install && npm run build:mcp.
When you publish: see RELEASING.md (PyPI OIDC, npm NPM_TOKEN, workflows).
.env.example to .env, set AIRLOCK_GATEWAY_SEED_HEX, then docker compose up --build.New agents start at a neutral score of 0.50.
Agents with 10+ interactions have a decay floor of 0.60 — established agents never drop back to fully unknown.
Scores decay toward neutral (0.50) over time:
decayed = 0.5 + (score - 0.5) * 2^(-elapsed_days / half_life)
Decay half-life is tier-specific (see table above). An agent that stops interacting gradually becomes "unknown" rather than "suspect."
airlock-protocol/
├── airlock/
│ ├── config.py # Pydantic settings (env vars with AIRLOCK_ prefix)
│ ├── pow.py # Proof-of-Work (SHA-256 Hashcash / Argon2id)
│ ├── trust_jwt.py # HS256 trust tokens for verified outcomes
│ ├── compliance/
│ │ ├── inventory.py # Agent inventory registry
│ │ ├── risk_classifier.py # Risk classification engine
│ │ ├── report_generator.py # Compliance report generation
│ │ ├── incident.py # Incident tracking with hash-chain integrity
│ │ ├── bias_detector.py # Bias detection for verification patterns
│ │ ├── regulatory_mapper.py # Regulatory framework principle mapping
│ │ └── schemas.py # Compliance Pydantic models
│ ├── crypto/
│ │ ├── keys.py # Ed25519 KeyPair + did:key encoding/decoding
│ │ ├── signing.py # sign_model / verify_model + canonicalization
│ │ └── vc.py # W3C Verifiable Credential issue + validate
│ ├── engine/
│ │ ├── event_bus.py # Typed async EventBus (asyncio.Queue backed)
│ │ ├── orchestrator.py # LangGraph verification state machine
│ │ └── state.py # SessionManager with TTL expiry
│ ├── gateway/
│ │ ├── app.py # FastAPI application factory + lifespan
│ │ ├── handlers.py # Request handlers (dual-mode auth + event publish)
│ │ ├── routes.py # Core protocol routes
│ │ ├── oauth_routes.py # OAuth 2.1 endpoints
│ │ ├── compliance_routes.py # Compliance endpoints
│ │ ├── revocation.py # DID revocation store (sync + async + Redis)
│ │ └── rate_limit.py # Per-IP + per-DID throttling
│ ├── oauth/
│ │ ├── server.py # OAuth 2.1 authorization server
│ │ ├── grants/ # Client credentials + token exchange
│ │ ├── token_generator.py # EdDSA JWT generation with trust claims
│ │ ├── token_validator.py # JWT validation + delegation depth check
│ │ ├── introspection.py # RFC 7662 token introspection
│ │ ├── discovery.py # OIDC discovery + JWKS
│ │ ├── dependencies.py # FastAPI Depends helpers
│ │ ├── registration.py # RFC 7591 dynamic client registration
│ │ ├── models.py # OAuth Pydantic models
│ │ ├── scopes.py # Scope definitions + validation
│ │ └── store.py # Client + token persistence
│ ├── reputation/
│ │ ├── scoring.py # Tiered decay + verdict delta + floor protection
│ │ └── store.py # LanceDB-backed TrustScore persistence
│ ├── rotation/ # Key rotation with pre-rotation commitments
│ ├── schemas/ # Pydantic models (identity, events, verdict, etc.)
│ ├── sdk/
│ │ ├── client.py # AirlockClient (async httpx wrapper)
│ │ └── middleware.py # AirlockMiddleware (protect decorator)
│ └── semantic/
│ ├── challenge.py # LLM-backed challenge (optional, disabled by default)
│ └── fingerprint.py # SimHash + SHA-256 bot detection
├── integrations/
│ └── airlock-mcp/ # MCP stdio server (gateway tools)
├── sdks/
│ └── typescript/ # npm package `airlock-client` (HTTP + types)
├── examples/ # Agent scenarios + demos
└── tests/ # 1,087 tests (unit, integration, property-based, security)
All settings use the AIRLOCK_ prefix:
See LICENSE for details.
Shivdeep Singh (@shivdeep1) — airlock.ing
Model Context Protocol server exposing Airlock gateway tools (stdio)
{ "mcpServers": { "airlock-mcp": { "command": "npx", "args": [ "-y", "[email protected]" ] } }}Araçlar
Henüz araç listesi yok. Uzak sunucular ilk sağlık kontrolünden sonra bir liste alır.
SSS
Bu sayfadan Cursor, Claude Desktop, Claude Code veya VS Code için stdio yapılandırmasını kopyalayın. PlugMCP proxy'sini değil, yayıncının kurulumunu kullanır.
Bu kayıtta gerekli bir ortam değişkeni listelenmiyor.
Airlock yerel olarak stdio üzerinden çalışır.
Son kontrol: 2026-11-14. Model Context Protocol server exposing Airlock gateway tools (stdio)