- name
SKILL.md
技能文件保留在发布者的仓库中。
在终端中粘贴复制的命令。它会把这个 SKILL.md 安装到对应的智能体中。
npx skills add tobihagemann/turbo --skill create-threat-model -a cursor -y在终端中粘贴复制的命令。它会把这个 SKILL.md 安装到对应的智能体中。
npx skills add tobihagemann/turbo --skill create-threat-model -a claude-code -y在终端中粘贴复制的命令。它会把这个 SKILL.md 安装到对应的智能体中。
npx skills add tobihagemann/turbo --skill create-threat-model -a codex -y在终端中粘贴复制的命令。它会把这个 SKILL.md 安装到对应的智能体中。
npx skills add tobihagemann/turbo --skill create-threat-model -a grok -y在 Grok Bot 聊天中发送复制的消息。Bot 会从 GitHub 获取这个 SKILL.md,并添加到你所有 Bot 共享的技能中。
Install this skill: https://github.com/tobihagemann/turbo/tree/HEAD/claude/skills/create-threat-model来自发布者
Analyze the current codebase and produce a structured threat model at .turbo/threat-model.md.
The threat model describes the current state of the codebase: what it protects, where trust boundaries are, how it can be attacked, what defenses exist, and how severe each risk is. It is descriptive, not prescriptive. Do not include remediation recommendations.
Optional: $ARGUMENTS may specify scope (directories, modules, or focus areas). When scope is provided, limit reconnaissance and code discovery to the specified directories or modules. Still produce all four sections, but title the overview to reflect the narrowed scope and note what is excluded.
Build a mental model of the system before analyzing threats.
SECURITY.md, audit reports, threat models, or changelog entries mentioning CVEs.Search the codebase for code that handles security-sensitive operations. Do not read every file. Use targeted searches.
Categories to search for:
For each flow found, note the relevant files and trace data from input to processing to output.
Read references/analysis-guide.md for detailed guidance by application type and platform.
Write to .turbo/threat-model.md (create .turbo/ if needed). The document has exactly four sections. Adapt depth to the codebase: a small CLI tool needs less detail than a multi-component crypto system.
Write 1-2 paragraphs covering:
For codebases with unique security properties (zero-knowledge design, client-side crypto, opportunistic encryption), call them out explicitly.
Assets: What has value to an attacker. Be specific: name data types, key material, tokens, metadata. Group naturally (user data, secrets, integrity artifacts).
Trust boundaries: Where trust levels change. Each boundary gets a bold name, a colon, 1-2 sentences explaining what crosses it, and a parenthetical code reference. Typical boundaries: untrusted storage/network, local OS/filesystem, IPC, admin configuration, identity provider, database.
Inputs by control tier:
Assumptions: Explicit statements about what must be true for the security model to hold. Include environmental assumptions (OS isolation, entropy sources), dependency assumptions (crypto library correctness), and operational assumptions (caller protects passwords). 2-4 bullets.
Organize into subsections by attack surface area (not by STRIDE category or component). Each subsection follows this structure:
### [3.N] [Surface Name]
**Surface**: What is exposed and where (1-2 sentences with file references).
**Entry points and sinks**
- `path:line` (untrusted input) → `path:line` (dangerous operation): what enters and what it reaches. When a surface has no code-level entry point, or nothing dangerous behind it, say so here.
**Hot files**
- `path` (1-3 files whose logic concentrates this surface, beyond the lines cited above)
**Mitigations**
- What the code already does to defend this surface (observations, not recommendations).
**Attacker stories**
- Concrete scenario: "[Attacker type] does [action] to [goal]: [consequence and severity context]."
Decomposition heuristic: One surface per distinct trust boundary crossing or distinct attacker capability. If two areas share the same entry points AND mitigations, merge them. If a single surface needs more than 3-4 unrelated risk/mitigation pairs, split it. Typical range: 4-9 surfaces.
For each surface, document:
path:line, plus the Hot files a reviewer must read end-to-end. When a surface has no code-level entry point or nothing dangerous behind it, say so rather than listing an empty fieldEnd section 3 with: A brief note on vulnerability classes that are less relevant for this application type, explaining why (e.g., "Web-specific issues like XSS and CSRF do not apply because this is a local library without network endpoints").
Group findings into four tiers. Each tier has 2-4 items, each a single sentence describing the impact (not the attack vector).
Close with a calibration paragraph explaining how the application's deployment model and trust boundaries influence severity. For the attacker-position-vs-impact matrix and application-type adjustments, consult references/analysis-guide.md.
Before presenting the output, validate:
path:line in that surface's entry points or sinks.Fix any gaps, then present the threat model to the user.
## for the four top-level sections (numbered 1-4), ### for attack surface subsections, and **bold** for sub-headings within subsections.Write .turbo/threat-model.md: assets, trust boundaries, attack surfaces, severity. Use when the user asks to \"create a threat model\", \"analyze the attack surface\", or \"identify security risks\".
---name: create-threat-modeldescription: Write .turbo/threat-model.md: assets, trust boundaries, attack surfaces, severity. Use when the user asks to…---# claude/skills/create-threat-model/SKILL.md常见问题
从发布者处下载 claude/skills/create-threat-model/SKILL.md,或复制路径后打开仓库。PlugMCP 只收录该技能,不托管文件。
发布者将它存放在 https://github.com/tobihagemann/turbo。
Claude、Cursor、Codex 和 Grok Build 可以读取你从发布者仓库添加的 SKILL.md。在聊天中发送技能的 GitHub 文件夹链接,Grok Bot 就会安装它。