Meraki MCP Server
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that provides AI assistants with structured access to the Cisco Meraki Dashboard β organizations, networks, devices, clients, wireless, switching, and appliance operations.
Note: This project is maintained by Wyre Technology.
Quick Start
Claude Code (CLI):
claude mcp add meraki-mcp \
-e MERAKI_API_KEY=your-api-key \
-e MERAKI_ORG_ID=your-org-id \
-- npx -y github:WYRE-AI/meraki-mcp
See Installation for Docker and from-source methods.
Features
- π MCP Protocol Compliance: Full support for MCP tools over stdio and HTTP transports
- π Network Coverage: Tools spanning organizations, networks, devices, clients, wireless, switching, and appliance (MX) operations
- π Flattened Navigation:
meraki_navigateandmeraki_statusare stateless discovery aids β every tool is callable at any time - π Safety by Default: Read-only mode is ON by default; writes are gated and destructive actions require explicit confirmation
- πΌοΈ Interactive Device Card (MCP Apps):
meraki_devices_getrenders as a read-only interactive card in MCP Apps hosts (SEP-1865) β neutral by default, brandable viawindow.__BRAND__injection orMCP_BRAND_*env vars - π§° Long-Tail Escape Hatch:
meraki_raw_requestreaches any Meraki v1 endpoint not covered by a curated tool - π³ Docker Ready: Containerized deployment with HTTP transport and health checks
- π Structured Logging: Configurable log levels
Installation
Option 1: Docker
The image listens on 0.0.0.0 inside the container and sets AUTH_MODE=gateway. Publish the port on loopback and pass the service-to-service secret. In gateway mode the API key arrives on each request as X-Meraki-Api-Key.
docker run -d \
-e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" \
-p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
ghcr.io/wyre-ai/meraki-mcp:latest
Option 2: From Source
git clone https://github.com/WYRE-AI/meraki-mcp.git
cd meraki-mcp
npm ci
npm run build
Configuration
| Variable | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|
MERAKI_API_KEY | Meraki Dashboard API key | β |
MERAKI_ORG_ID | Default organization ID (optional) | β |
MERAKI_BASE_URL | Override the Meraki API base URL (optional) | β |
READ_ONLY_MODE | Safety switch β blocks all writes when true | true |
MCP_TRANSPORT | Transport mode (stdio or http) | stdio |
MCP_HTTP_HOST | Bind address when a secret is configured. Unset binds 127.0.0.1. The container image sets 0.0.0.0. | 127.0.0.1 |
MCP_HTTP_PORT | HTTP server port | 8080 |
AUTH_MODE | env reads MERAKI_* from the environment. gateway requires X-Meraki-Api-Key on each /mcp request. The image and Compose set gateway. | env |
CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET | Service-to-service secret. Required to start HTTP. Empty and known placeholder values are refused. Never commit a real value. | β |
MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV | Set to 1 for local HTTP without CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET. Logs a warning, skips X-Gateway-S2S, and listens on 127.0.0.1 only. | β |
LOG_LEVEL | Log level (debug, info, warn, error) | info |
The legacy
READ_ONLYvariable is also honored;READ_ONLY_MODEtakes precedence.
HTTP authentication
MCP_TRANSPORT=http requires CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET. Startup logs an error and exits non-zero when that variable is empty or a known placeholder (changeme, change-me, placeholder, secret, example, replace-me, s2s-secret, your-secret, your-s2s-secret, replace-with-a-real-secret). The process never writes the secret to logs. MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV=1 starts without a secret, logs a warning, skips X-Gateway-S2S, and listens on 127.0.0.1 only β a wider MCP_HTTP_HOST such as 0.0.0.0 is ignored and the override is logged. A placeholder secret is still refused when that flag is set.
When MCP_HTTP_HOST is unset, the server binds 127.0.0.1. A configured secret honors MCP_HTTP_HOST, including 0.0.0.0.
With a secret set, every /mcp request must include X-Gateway-S2S. The value is t=<unix seconds>,v1=<hex>. v1 is HMAC-SHA256 of the ASCII string t=<unix seconds>, keyed with CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET, encoded as lowercase hex. Timestamps more than 300 seconds from the server clock are rejected. A missing or invalid header returns 401.
AUTH_MODE=gateway also requires X-Meraki-Api-Key on each /mcp request. X-Meraki-Org-Id is optional. Those headers are the credential source for that request. A missing API key returns 401.
/health stays unauthenticated and does not read vendor credentials. The stdio transport does not use CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET.
Example X-Gateway-S2S value (illustrative; mint it with the real secret):
t=1710000000,v1=<hmac-sha256 hex of "t=1710000000">
Safety Model
This server defaults to read-only. Write operations (updates, reboots, deletions) are blocked unless you explicitly set READ_ONLY_MODE=false.
- Read tools (
*_list,*_get) are always available. - High-impact writes (e.g.
meraki_networks_update,meraki_clients_update_policy) are gated by read-only mode. - Confirmation-gated tools additionally require a
confirm_destructive_action: trueargument, even onceREAD_ONLY_MODE=false. The confirmation flag is never forwarded to the Meraki API. Two groups qualify:- Irreversible β
meraki_networks_delete,meraki_devices_remove. - High blast radius β
meraki_appliance_firewall_l3_update,meraki_switch_ports_update,meraki_wireless_ssids_update,meraki_devices_reboot. These are reversible in principle, but each is applied over the same network link the change can break, so an operator can lose the connectivity needed to undo it.meraki_appliance_firewall_l3_updatealso replaces the rule set β any rule not in the payload is deleted β andmeraki_wireless_ssids_updatedrops every client on the SSID when the PSK or auth mode changes.
- Irreversible β
- Confirmation is not an escape hatch from read-only mode: while
READ_ONLY_MODEis on, a confirmed call is still blocked. - The
meraki_raw_requestescape hatch classifies the call by HTTP method:GETis a read;POST/PUT/DELETEare writes;DELETEis destructive.
Domains
All tools are returned upfront. Use meraki_navigate to explore a domain's tools, or meraki_status to check connectivity and the configured organization.
| Domain | Tools |
|---|---|
| organizations | meraki_organizations_list, meraki_organizations_get, meraki_organizations_inventory_list |
| networks | meraki_networks_list, meraki_networks_get, meraki_networks_update β , meraki_networks_delete β β |
| devices | meraki_devices_list, meraki_devices_get, meraki_devices_reboot β β , meraki_devices_remove β β |
| clients | meraki_clients_list, meraki_clients_get, meraki_clients_get_policy, meraki_clients_update_policy β |
| wireless | meraki_wireless_ssids_list, meraki_wireless_ssids_update β β , meraki_wireless_rf_profiles_list |
| switch | meraki_switch_ports_list, meraki_switch_ports_update β β , meraki_switch_port_statuses_list |
| appliance | meraki_appliance_firewall_l3_get, meraki_appliance_firewall_l3_update β β , meraki_appliance_vpn_status_get |
| (long tail) | meraki_raw_request β β (on DELETE) |
β = high-impact write, gated by read-only mode Β· β β = additionally requires confirm_destructive_action: true
Docker Deployment
Copy .env.example to .env and set CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET (openssl rand -hex 32). Leave the example file's secret empty.
Compose publishes 127.0.0.1:8080:8080, refuses to start when CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET is unset, and runs AUTH_MODE=gateway. That service has no MERAKI_API_KEY, MERAKI_ORG_ID, or env_file, so a project .env cannot inject static vendor credentials. Compose interpolates CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET from the environment.
CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" docker compose up
Single-tenant HTTP (AUTH_MODE=env) still requires the S2S secret, then uses MERAKI_API_KEY from the environment:
docker run -d \
-e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" \
-e AUTH_MODE=env \
-e MERAKI_API_KEY=your-key \
-e MERAKI_ORG_ID=your-org-id \
-p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
ghcr.io/wyre-ai/meraki-mcp:latest
Development
npm ci
npm run build # Build the project
npm run start # Run over stdio
# HTTP refuses to start until CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET is set
CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" npm run start:http
# Local HTTP only, without a service-to-service secret (always binds 127.0.0.1)
MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV=1 npm run start:http
npm run test # Run tests
Testing
npm test
The test suite covers the safety contract: read-only enforcement, destructive confirmation, and that confirm_destructive_action is never forwarded to the SDK.
License
Apache 2.0 β Copyright WYRE Technology