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Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode answer (redt
The skill file stays in the publisher's repository.
Paste the copied command in a terminal. It installs this SKILL.md into that agent.
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-dispatch -a cursor -y
Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode answer (redteam or wapt + blackbox|greybox) and needs to load the appropriate skills and print the taxonomy. Not for direct user invocation.
Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode answer (redteam or wapt + blackbox|greybox) and needs to load the appropriate skills and print the taxonomy. Not for direct user invocation.
skill-set loader for /hunt. one concept (which skills to load), one place.
every skill loaded below operates under one frame, and it holds for the whole session:
/hunt. testing stays inside it. an out-of-scope host ends the run — it does not
widen it.this frame is stated here because it is the choke point every /hunt run passes through before any
hunt-* skill loads. it is not a prompt and needs no answer.
invocation contract:
hunt-dispatch mode=redteam
hunt-dispatch mode=wapt box=blackbox
hunt-dispatch mode=wapt box=greybox
run this for every host before probing a single path. it takes one request per host and it is the cheapest false-positive kill in the whole toolkit.
many modern estates (SPA / Next.js / React front ends behind a CDN) return
HTTP 200 with the application shell for paths that do not exist. a status code
therefore proves nothing. without a recorded control, /.well-known/security.txt,
/api/revalidate, /__nextjs_original-stack-frame and /__nextjs_launch-editor
all "exist" on a host where none of them do.
for H in $HOSTS; do
# two independent bogus paths — if they agree, that IS the soft-404 signature
for P in /zzz-nope-12345 /qqq-other-98765; do
printf "%-34s %-20s " "$H" "$P"
curl -sk -m 12 -o /tmp/b -w "%{http_code} %{size_download} " "https://$H$P"
shasum /tmp/b | cut -c1-12
done
done
record per host: status, byte length, body hash. that triple is the control.
the rule: no path is "found" until its response differs from the control. a 200 that matches the control hash is a soft 404. a 404 whose body differs from the control may be a real handler. compare bodies, never status codes alone.
re-derive the baseline per host — it differs across an estate. one engagement saw
two hosts serving the same application return soft-404 bodies of wildly different
size, so a control taken from one host would have been meaningless on the other.
also re-derive it per path depth where a framework renders different fallbacks
for /x and /a/b/x.
edge pages are not origin findings: a CDN "Access Denied" / "Unsupported Request" body means the request never reached the application. classify it as edge behaviour and move on.
fingerprint every live host, not just the apex. for multi-host / wildcard targets the platform-skill routing must be driven by all banners, not one host's.
use -L (follow redirects) — identity-provider and CDN signals
(login.microsoftonline.com, okta, auth0, CDN banners) routinely sit
behind a 30x, so a no-redirect curl -sI silently misses those matches. pull
both headers and the landing-page HTML (__NEXT_DATA__, VIEWSTATE,
laravel_session, Ignition, framework markers live in the body, not headers).
HOSTS="$TARGET"
if [ -f "recon/$TARGET/live-hosts.txt" ]; then
HOSTS=$(cat "recon/$TARGET/live-hosts.txt")
fi
for H in $HOSTS; do
echo "=== $H ==="
# -L follow redirects, -D - dump headers, -o body; cap body to keep context small
curl -sSL -m 12 -D - -o /tmp/fp_body "https://$H" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r'
# surface body-only platform markers
grep -aoE '__NEXT_DATA__|/_next/|VIEWSTATE|rO0[AB]|laravel_session|Ignition|Telescope|Whitelabel|/actuator|application/grpc|socket\.io|swagger|\.js\.map' \
/tmp/fp_body | sort -u
done
rm -f /tmp/fp_body
if live-hosts.txt is absent, the loop still runs once against $TARGET. record
which signal came from which host — a platform skill matched on host B does not
imply host A runs that stack.
look for the following signals → platform skill mapping:
okta.com | auth0.com | pingidentity → okta-attack
login.microsoftonline.com | outlook | sts → m365-entra-attack
pulse | fortinet | ivanti | citrix → enterprise-vpn-attack
vsphere | vcenter | :9443 → vmware-vcenter-attack
amazonaws | azure | googleapis | gcp → cloud-iam-deep
github.com/<org>/ → supply-chain-attack-recon
.apk | play.google.com → apk-redteam-pipeline
MongoDB | mongoose | CouchDB | Redis → hunt-nosqli
?page= | ?file= | ?path= | php wrapper → hunt-lfi
rO0A | VIEWSTATE | rememberMe cookie → hunt-deserialization
Access-Control-Allow-Origin header → hunt-cors
/forgot-password | /reset | X-Forwarded → hunt-host-header
?redirect= | ?next= | ?return= | ?url= → hunt-open-redirect
OTP | /verify | /2fa | no-rate-limit → hunt-brute-force
Set-Cookie session | PHPSESSID → hunt-session
Active Directory | LDAP | OpenLDAP | ADFS → hunt-ldap
__NEXT_DATA__ | /_next/ | buildId → hunt-nextjs
X-Powered-By: Express | Node.js | .js stack → hunt-nodejs
postMessage | dangerouslySetInnerHTML → hunt-dom
WebSocket | ws:// | socket.io → hunt-websocket
gRPC | :50051 | application/grpc → hunt-grpc
laravel_session | Ignition | Telescope → hunt-laravel
X-Application-Context | Whitelabel | /actuator → hunt-springboot
:6443 | :10250 | :2379 | kubectl → hunt-k8s
.github/workflows | Jenkins | GitLab CI → hunt-cicd
.js.map | swagger.json | /.env → hunt-source-leak
HSTS missing | SPF | DMARC | AXFR → hunt-tls-network
real targets almost always return multiple signals at once — e.g. a single host
can show Cloudflare (CDN) + login.microsoftonline.com (redirect) + __NEXT_DATA__
(Next.js front end) + amazonaws (origin) simultaneously. loading every match
blindly can pull 20-plus skills and blow the context window, drowning the
high-signal skill in noise. apply this precedence and cap:
priority order (load highest tiers first, stop at the cap):
tier 1 identity / SSO fabric okta-attack, m365-entra-attack
(own the auth boundary — highest blast radius if compromised)
tier 2 perimeter appliances enterprise-vpn-attack, vmware-vcenter-attack
(pre-auth RCE / direct internal foothold)
tier 3 cloud / IAM cloud-iam-deep, hunt-cloud-misconfig
(credential → lateral movement)
tier 4 app framework / stack hunt-nextjs, hunt-nodejs, hunt-laravel,
hunt-springboot, hunt-aspnet, hunt-sharepoint
tier 5 protocol / class signals hunt-nosqli, hunt-lfi, hunt-deserialization,
hunt-cors, hunt-host-header, hunt-open-redirect, hunt-grpc,
hunt-websocket, hunt-dom, hunt-k8s, hunt-cicd, hunt-source-leak,
hunt-tls-network, hunt-ldap, hunt-brute-force, hunt-session
load budget: cap platform-skill loads at 8. if more than 8 match, keep the
highest-tier 8 and drop the rest; print the dropped ones under
deferred: in the taxonomy block so they can be loaded on demand later.
de-dup rules (avoid loading two skills for the same evidence):
hunt-cache-poison / hunt-http-smuggling, which the mode set already carries.amazonaws / azure / googleapis in a header/origin → cloud-iam-deep.
the same string found as a leaked key/JSON in a JS bundle or APK → still
cloud-iam-deep, but flag it as a live-credential lead (higher priority, tier 3
becomes tier 1 for that host).__NEXT_DATA__, laravel_session) and a generic class
signal (?redirect=, Access-Control-Allow-Origin) on the same host → load the
framework skill (tier 4) and keep the class skill only if budget remains;
the WAPT/redteam mode set already loads the common class skills unconditionally.invoke each skill in order via the Skill tool.
always-on (load first):
redteam-mindset
mid-engagement-ir-detection
platform (load second, conditional on fingerprint matches from step 1):
okta-attack
m365-entra-attack
enterprise-vpn-attack
vmware-vcenter-attack
cloud-iam-deep
supply-chain-attack-recon
apk-redteam-pipeline
high-impact hunt-* set (load third):
hunt-rce
hunt-sqli
hunt-ssrf
hunt-ato
hunt-auth-bypass
hunt-saml
hunt-oauth
hunt-mfa-bypass
hunt-file-upload
hunt-http-smuggling
hunt-cloud-misconfig
hunt-sharepoint
hunt-aspnet
report format: redteam-report-template (subject / observations / description / impact / recommendation / poc).
always-on:
bb-methodology
security-arsenal
triage-validation
full hunt-* set (all OWASP-relevant):
hunt-xss hunt-sqli hunt-ssrf hunt-idor
hunt-csrf hunt-xxe hunt-rce hunt-graphql
hunt-oauth hunt-saml hunt-mfa-bypass hunt-auth-bypass
hunt-ato hunt-file-upload hunt-business-logic hunt-race-condition
hunt-llm-ai hunt-api-misconfig hunt-ssti hunt-cache-poison
hunt-http-smuggling hunt-subdomain hunt-cloud-misconfig hunt-misc
hunt-aspnet hunt-sharepoint hunt-ntlm-info
hunt-lfi hunt-nosqli hunt-deserialization
hunt-cors hunt-host-header hunt-open-redirect
hunt-brute-force hunt-session hunt-ldap
hunt-nextjs hunt-nodejs hunt-dom
hunt-websocket hunt-grpc hunt-laravel
hunt-springboot hunt-k8s hunt-cicd
hunt-source-leak hunt-tls-network
report format: report-writing (bugcrowd-reporting if the target is on bugcrowd).
box=greybox: creds already captured by /hunt, available in session memory.
do not fan out across the authenticated hunt-* set until the creds are
validated. /hunt only prompts for and stores creds (commands/hunt.md) — it
does not confirm they work. firing every authenticated test with dead, MFA-gated,
or wrong-role creds wastes the whole run and produces false "no auth surface"
conclusions. run a single low-cost auth preflight first:
# session-cookie creds: one authenticated GET against an identity echo endpoint
curl -sS -m 12 -b "$SESSION_COOKIE" "https://$TARGET/api/me" -w '\n%{http_code}\n'
# 200 + your username/email → live session, role visible in body
# 401/403 → dead or insufficient — STOP, re-auth
# bearer/JWT creds: same probe with Authorization
curl -sS -m 12 -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"https://$TARGET/api/me" -w '\n%{http_code}\n'
# raw user/pass: drive the real login flow once, capture Set-Cookie, then echo
# watch for an MFA / step-up challenge in the response — if present, the creds
# alone do not yield an authenticated session (see memory: operator-capability)
confirm three things from the preflight, and record them for the hunt-* skills:
/api/me (or equivalent) body shows the expected
role/tenant/scopes. IDOR and authz tests need a known baseline identity; a
silently-admin or silently-readonly cred skews every authz finding.if the preflight fails, do not silently continue as blackbox — surface "greybox creds did not validate (HTTP {code} / MFA challenge)" so the operator can re-supply. only after a clean preflight: apply the validated session to every authenticated test.
emit a deterministic block. plain text, lowercase, colon-delimited, no decoration.
loaded for red team: {N} skills
mindset: redteam-mindset
platform: {fingerprint-matched skills (<=8, tier order), or "none detected"}
deferred: {platform skills past the 8-cap, or omit line if none}
auth: hunt-ato, hunt-auth-bypass, hunt-saml, hunt-oauth, hunt-mfa-bypass
inj: hunt-rce, hunt-sqli, hunt-ssrf, hunt-file-upload
infra: hunt-http-smuggling, hunt-cloud-misconfig
stack: hunt-sharepoint, hunt-aspnet
ir: mid-engagement-ir-detection
loaded for wapt ({blackbox|greybox}): {N} skills
inj: hunt-xss, hunt-sqli, hunt-ssrf, hunt-rce, hunt-xxe, hunt-ssti, hunt-file-upload
authz: hunt-idor, hunt-auth-bypass, hunt-ato
auth: hunt-oauth, hunt-saml, hunt-mfa-bypass
api: hunt-graphql, hunt-api-misconfig
logic: hunt-business-logic, hunt-race-condition
infra: hunt-http-smuggling, hunt-cache-poison
recon: hunt-subdomain
cloud: hunt-cloud-misconfig
ai: hunt-llm-ai
stack: hunt-aspnet, hunt-sharepoint, hunt-ntlm-info
misc: hunt-misc, hunt-csrf
reporting: bb-methodology, security-arsenal, triage-validation
if any part of the hunt is delegated to subagents, scope does not inherit implicitly. every subagent prompt must carry:
refund, settle, payout, transfer, adjust,
disburse, create, update, delete, rotate, reset, send, initiate,
generate, process. only then allow read-shaped names. order matters —
a path like refund/batch/status matches the read-shaped keyword "status"
but is a refund route; an allow-list applied first would probe it.{} to an endpoint whose name starts with generate* and creating a
real record on production.lesson from an authorized engagement: a subagent was told READ-ONLY and still
(a) created a live record on production because it expected {} to return a
validation error, and (b) wrote an object to a cloud bucket that was never on the
authorized list — one the parent prompt had named only for a DNS check. both were
disclosed in the deliverable. the fix is structural: pass scope as data, deny
by verb before allowing by verb, and treat every discovered host as out of scope
until told otherwise.
after taxonomy print, hand control back to /hunt for step 3 (sibling delegation) and step 4 (active testing). do not run probes here — this skill only loads context.
never echo back, log, or persist:
/hunt, never written to disk)bb-methodology — When PART 0 mode confirmation completes. Workflow primitive: bb-methodology confirms engagement type (red team vs WAPT vs bug bounty); the answer feeds directly into this skill's mode=redteam / mode=wapt invocation.redteam-mindset + mid-engagement-ir-detection — When mode=redteam is loaded. Workflow primitive: these are the always-on skills loaded first by step 2 of the redteam flow before any platform skill or hunt-* skill.okta-attack / m365-entra-attack / enterprise-vpn-attack / vmware-vcenter-attack / cloud-iam-deep / supply-chain-attack-recon / apk-redteam-pipeline — When fingerprint signals match. Workflow primitive: step 1's curl fingerprint scan against recon/<target>/live-hosts.txt maps banner / domain signals to one or more of these platform skills.hunt-rce / hunt-sqli / hunt-ssrf / hunt-ato / *all other hunt- skills** — When the mode-specific skill set is being printed. Workflow primitive: this skill is the loader; it names the hunt-* skills but does not run probes — actual hunting happens after step 4 returns control to /hunt`.report-writing vs redteam-report-template — When the taxonomy print specifies the report format. Workflow primitive: mode=wapt ends with report-writing as the deliverable format; mode=redteam ends with redteam-report-template instead.