🛡️ Pluto AgentGuard
Your Claude Desktop / Cursor / VS Code MCP config may already let an AI agent call tools with no authentication, or ship a hardcoded API key. Check in 30 seconds.
Power your agent
Install from the publisher. Not a PlugMCP endpoint.
Host a copy with our keys and logs.
No packaged release in the registry yet. Follow the repository README.
Remote URL or a command on your machine? How the two installs differ
Run on PlugMCP
A new server you create. It is not this listing's official endpoint. Use the publisher install when you want their URL and their credentials.
LaunchFrom the publisher
Your Claude Desktop / Cursor / VS Code MCP config may already let an AI agent call tools with no authentication, or ship a hardcoded API key. Check in 30 seconds.
Security scanner and launch gate for AI agents & MCP apps — config scanning, policy coverage, risk modeling, drift detection, CI/SARIF, and launch-readiness evidence
pip install pluto-aguard
# macOS Claude Desktop:
aguard scan ~/Library/Application\ Support/Claude/
# Windows Claude Desktop:
aguard scan %APPDATA%\Claude\
# Cursor / any project with a local mcp.json:
aguard scan .
Real output from scanning a realistic (but fictional) claude_desktop_config.json built entirely from real MCP fields — no invented schema, see examples/claude_desktop_config.json:
🔍 Scanning ...
🟠 HIGH: Hardcoded secret in env var 'GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN' on server 'github' (MCP01:2025)
🟠 HIGH: Insecure HTTP transport on MCP server 'internal-metrics' (MCP07:2025)
🟠 HIGH: No authentication configured for remote MCP server 'internal-metrics' (MCP07:2025)
🟠 HIGH: Hardcoded GitHub Token detected (MCP01:2025)
📊 Risk Score: 44.8/100 ██████████████████████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░
📋 Findings: 4 high
No cloud accounts, no API keys, nothing leaves your machine — it's static analysis of the config file, not a live connection to your MCP servers. False positive? See docs/suppressions.md.
Once you've found a problem, the harder question is "did my fix actually help, and can I prove it to whoever signs off on shipping this agent?" That's what the rest of AgentGuard is for — the two commands below are the part no other MCP scanner does:
git clone https://github.com/arshan846/pluto-aguard.git && cd pluto-aguard
# See the risk score drop *before* you apply a fix
aguard whatif --config ./examples/insecure-agent-config.yaml
# Generate a launch-approval packet: findings + policy coverage + sign-off checklist
aguard evidence ./examples/ --config ./examples/insecure-agent-config.yaml \
--policy ./examples/agent-policy.yaml
Plus policy coverage linting (test), an OWASP-inspired control report (owasp), and drift detection (baseline) — see Commands below, or the interactive demo for all 7 in action.
MCP security scanners are multiplying fast (Snyk agent-scan, Invariant guardrails, AgentSeal) and mostly stop at config detection or runtime analysis. AgentGuard's differentiator is the pair above — quantified risk delta before you change anything, and a packet to hand whoever approves the launch — not the scanning itself, which is table stakes.
We scanned 1,200 real MCP configs from public GitHub repos (1,159 unique projects) using AgentGuard:
What we actually found:
Important context: Capability-related findings (e.g., a server having shell tools) are reported as INFO for awareness only. Per the MCP specification, human-in-the-loop enforcement is strictly a client/host responsibility, not the server's. See full methodology and results.
- name: Agent Security Gate
uses: arshan846/[email protected]
with:
path: '.'
max-risk: '50'
fail-on: 'high'
policy: 'agent-policy.yaml'
attack-pack: 'all'
sarif-output: 'results.sarif'
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
with:
sarif_file: results.sarif
See docs/github-action-usage.md for full options.
aguard scanFinds real issues in any AI project — no MCP configs needed. Detects eval/exec on LLM output, hardcoded secrets (18+ patterns), missing authentication on remote endpoints, Dockerfile misconfigs, unpinned AI deps, LangChain unsafe settings, system prompt leaks, and more.
$ aguard scan ./my-project/
🔴 CRITICAL: Unsafe execution of LLM output: eval() (MCP05:2025)
🟠 HIGH: Hardcoded OpenAI Key detected (MCP01:2025)
🟠 HIGH: .env file not in .gitignore (MCP01:2025)
🟡 MEDIUM: Unpinned AI dependencies (MCP04:2025)
📊 Risk Score: 100/100 ██████████████████████████████████████████████████
📋 Findings: 1 critical · 14 high · 3 medium
CI flags: --max-risk 50 / --fail-on high / --format sarif
False positive? Suppress it via a .aguard.yaml file or an inline # aguard-ignore comment — see docs/suppressions.md. Use --no-suppress to see every finding regardless of suppression rules.
Not every check applies to every config: transport/auth/secrets checks work on any real claude_desktop_config.json, but the permission-wildcard and tool-poisoning checks look for metadata (permissions, tools[].description) that only exists in AgentGuard's own extended schema or in gateway configs that add it themselves — see docs/config-schema.md for exactly what's standard vs. extended, and examples/claude_desktop_config.json for a scan of a real, unmodified config.
aguard testPolicy coverage linting, not adversarial testing: for each of 22 named attack scenarios, checks whether the tool it would invoke is in your policy's denied_tools or require_human_approval list. Reports what gets caught vs. what gets through. No LLM needed — nothing is executed and no prompt text is evaluated. A scenario's attack_prompt is documentation of the threat it represents, not an input this command interprets; two scenarios that name the same tool (e.g. execute) get the identical verdict regardless of how different the underlying attack is.
⚠️ This tests whether your policy document would block each attack — not whether your actual LLM agent would resist it. Real agent resistance requires runtime testing against a live agent (planned for v1.2).
6 attack packs: prompt-injection, data-exfiltration, permission-escalation, approval-bypass, tool-poisoning, context-manipulation.
$ aguard test --policy agent-policy.yaml --attack-pack all
✅ PASS PI-001 Direct instruction override execute Blocked
✅ PASS DE-001 File export of sensitive data file_write Blocked
❌ FAIL DE-004 SQL data dump sql_query NOT caught
📊 Results: 21 blocked · 1 missed · 22 total
Recommended fixes:
→ Add sql_query to require_human_approval
CI flag: --fail-on-miss exits with code 1 if any attacks succeed.
aguard owaspEvaluates 20 controls mapped to an OWASP-inspired control framework. Control IDs use a project-defined MCP01–MCP10 taxonomy that draws on OWASP LLM Top 10 and the emerging OWASP Agentic AI initiative, with MCP-specific extensions the existing standards don't yet cover.
$ aguard owasp ./my-project/
❌ MCP01:2025 Token Mismanagement: 3 failed, 1 passed
✗ AGC-MCP01-001: No hardcoded secrets
✓ AGC-MCP01-002: No static long-lived tokens
✅ MCP07:2025 AuthN/AuthZ: 2 passed
✓ AGC-MCP07-001: Remote servers have auth
✓ AGC-MCP07-002: HTTPS transport
📊 Control Coverage: 9/10 risks
Controls: 8 passed · 6 failed · 6 not tested · 20 total
aguard whatifSimulates policy changes and shows risk score impact before applying them. Output below is the real, reproducible result of running aguard whatif --config examples/insecure-agent-config.yaml:
$ aguard whatif --config examples/insecure-agent-config.yaml
Current Risk Score: 100/100
✅ Restrict SQL tool to SELECT-only queries → 56 (↓ 44%)
✅ Add human-in-the-loop for file operations → 97 (↓ 3%)
✅ Rotate API keys to ephemeral tokens → 82 (↓ 18%)
✅ Add rate limits (100 calls/minute) and timeout (5 min) → 57 (↓ 43%)
✅ Restrict outbound network access to allowlisted domains → 82 (↓ 18%)
✅ Convert from implicit-allow to explicit tool allowlist → 82 (↓ 18%)
✅ Run agent in sandboxed execution environment → 82 (↓ 18%)
💡 Apply all 7 → Risk drops to 5 (↓95%)
aguard evidenceGenerates a launch readiness packet — risk summary, findings, tool permissions, policy coverage, required mitigations, and sign-off checklist. See examples/sample-launch-readiness.md.
aguard baselineSave a security snapshot, compare later to detect drift.
aguard baseline create . # Save current state
aguard baseline compare . # What changed?
aguard baseline compare . --fail-on-drift # CI: fail if new findings
aguard monitorReplays agent action traces against a declared policy. Detects denied tool calls, unauthorized access, permission escalation, and missing/expired approvals.
aguard monitor --trace-file traces.jsonl --policy policy.yaml
Accepts real OTel GenAI semantic-convention traces (gen_ai.tool.name, gen_ai.operation.name — what OpenLIT and OTel-native LangChain instrumentation actually emit), this project's own OTel-shaped format, or a flat simple {"tool_name": "X", "tool_args": {}} format. See docs/trace-ingestion.md and examples/otel-genai-traces.jsonl.
Approvals are single-use — one approval authorizes exactly one matching call, not every future call to that tool — and, when both sides carry a timestamp, an approval recorded after the action it's supposed to cover is flagged as a DRIFT-BACKDATED-APPROVAL. See docs/approval-semantics.md.
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ LAYER 1: Content Guardrails (existing) │
│ Azure Content Safety · NeMo · Guardrails AI │
│ → Protects what LLMs SAY │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ LAYER 2: Agent Security (Pluto AgentGuard) │
│ scan · test · owasp · whatif · evidence · baseline │
│ → Watches what agents DO │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
See docs/risk-scoring.md for the full scoring methodology — formula, weights, examples, CI threshold guidance, and limitations.
See docs/owasp-control-matrix.md for the complete mapping of 20 controls. Control IDs draw on OWASP LLM Top 10 (LLM01–LLM10) and introduce MCP-specific extensions (MCP01–MCP10) for risks the existing standards don't yet cover.
aguard monitor already ingests real OTel GenAI semantic-convention traces (see docs/trace-ingestion.md) — a framework-specific setup adapter is what remains.pluto-aguard/
├── src/pluto_aguard/
│ ├── cli.py # 7 CLI commands
│ ├── models.py # Finding, RiskScore, ControlResult, etc.
│ ├── scanners/ # MCP + AI config + permission scanners
│ ├── testing/ # 22 attack scenarios across 6 packs
│ ├── controls/ # 20 OWASP-aligned control definitions
│ ├── evidence/ # Launch readiness packet generator
│ ├── baseline/ # Snapshot + drift comparison
│ ├── monitor/ # Behavioral trace audit
│ ├── simulator/ # What-If policy simulation
│ ├── suppressions.py # .aguard.yaml + inline finding suppression
│ └── reports/ # HTML + SARIF output
├── examples/ # Demo project + configs + traces
├── docs/ # Risk scoring, OWASP matrix, suppressions, GitHub Action docs
├── tests/ # 174 tests
├── action.yml # GitHub Action
└── SECURITY.md
See CONTRIBUTING.md for setup and guidelines.
Apache License 2.0 — see LICENSE.
Security scanner and launch gate for AI agents & MCP apps — config scanning, policy coverage, risk modeling, drift detection, CI/SARIF, and launch-readiness evidence
Tools
No tool list yet. Remote servers get one after the first health check.
FAQ
Copy the stdio config for Cursor, Claude Desktop, Claude Code, or VS Code on this page. It uses the publisher's install, not a PlugMCP proxy.
No required environment variable is listed on this record.
Pluto Aguard runs locally over stdio.
Last checked 2026-10-28. Security scanner and launch gate for AI agents & MCP apps — config scanning, policy coverage, risk modeling, drift detection, CI/SARIF, and launch-readiness evidence