evite-mcp
A Model Context Protocol server for Evite — read and act on your events as both guest (invitations received) and host (events you created): list events, view guest lists & RSVP tallies, RSVP, message guests, and create/edit events. Built on @chrischall/mcp-utils.
Status: read + write tools live. The five read tools work against Evite's internal API, authenticating from email/password (tier-1,
POST /ajax_login), a raw cookie env var, or a signed-in browser tab (fetchproxy bootstrap). The thirteen write tools ask you to confirm first — nothing is sent until you approve (see Confirmations) — and their endpoints are live-verified (seedocs/EVITE-API.md); a couple of request bodies are still assumed rather than captured (#3).
Tools
Six read tools (all read-only), thirteen confirmed write tools, plus evite_healthcheck:
Write tools (confirmed)
Every write tool asks you to confirm before it sends anything. A client that can show a confirmation prompt (Claude Code) shows one with the exact values that would be sent (unless MCP_CONFIRM_ELICITATION=off). Elsewhere (claude.ai, Claude Desktop) the first call performs no write (at most a read-only lookup — e.g. evite_update_guest reads the draft guest list to build an exact preview) and returns that preview plus a confirmToken; only a repeat call with the token performs the write. The token is single-use, expires, and is bound to the tool and the exact values — change anything and it is refused (DRAFT_CHANGED) with a fresh preview. See Confirmations. Endpoints are verified; the CSRF token (X-CSRFToken, read fresh per request as it rotates) is attached centrally.
The authoring flow is evite_create_event → evite_add_guest → evite_send. evite_send, evite_send_message, evite_broadcast, and evite_cancel_event have real-world effects (emails / cancellation notices), so their confirmation matters.
Confirmations
Photo uploads
Architecture
Fetchproxy-archetype MCP. Evite has no public API, so the server calls Evite's internal /services/ web API using your session. src/auth.ts resolves that session in priority order:
EVITE_EMAIL+EVITE_PASSWORD(tier-1, preferred) — headless email/password form login: POST the creds tohttps://www.evite.com/ajax_login, then build the session from the responseSet-Cookiejar (x-evite-session,evtsession,csrftoken,x-evite-features). No browser bridge, no hand-copied cookie. Both vars must be set, or the resolver falls through. (Live.)EVITE_SESSION_COOKIE— a rawcookie:header copied from a signed-inevite.comtab (or set in CI). Used verbatim. (Live.)- Fetchproxy bootstrap (fallback) — lift the session cookies (
x-evite-session,evtsession,x-evite-features,csrftoken) from a signed-inevite.combrowser tab via@fetchproxy/bootstrap, which needs the ContextMint Bridge browser extension (Chrome: load the chrome zip from the releases page unpacked. Safari isn't available yet — it will ship inside the ContextMint app, which has no public download — so use Chrome for now). ContextMint Bridge is the fetchproxy browser extension under its new name, from the same maintainer — fetchproxy's own README points to it. Its source is public at nullnet-app/contextmint-bridge: build it yourself, or check a release zip against the.sha256file published beside it (shasum -a 256 -c contextmint-bridge-chrome-<version>.zip.sha256). Bootstrap runs once; every API call then goes out via plain Nodefetch()with the cookies attached. Opt out withEVITE_DISABLE_FETCHPROXY=1. (Live.)
One tier is intentionally deferred (the resolver is shaped to slot it in):
- Fetchproxy as transport (bot-wall retry through the browser bridge) — a fallback only needed if plain
fetchtrips a wall; not observed during discovery.
The thirteen write tools (rsvp, add/update/remove-guest, send, send-message, broadcast, upload-photo, create/update/cancel/reinstate/duplicate event) ask you to confirm first (a prompt, or a preview + single-use confirmToken; see Confirmations). The single private client.write() helper attaches the CSRF token via one centralized header (CSRF_HEADER = X-CSRFToken; the csrftoken cookie rotates mid-session, so it's read fresh per request). Endpoints span three bases — REST /services/…, the legacy /ajax/event/{id}/… guest list, and the /tsunami/… messaging service — all live-verified; a couple of request bodies remain assumed (#3).
Development
npm install # resolves @chrischall/mcp-utils from a local tarball (see issue #4)
npm run build
npm test
Docs & roadmap
- Design spec:
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-31-evite-mcp-design.md - Plan 1 (scaffold + spike):
docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-31-evite-mcp-scaffold-and-spike.md - Plan 2 (auth + read tools):
docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-31-evite-mcp-auth-and-reads.md - Internal API reference (verified from a live session):
docs/EVITE-API.md
Open work: #3 — write endpoints + CSRF are now live-verified; only a couple of request bodies (send / send-message) remain assumed. #4 tracks publishing the shared lib. (Discovery #1, tier-1 email/password login #2, and the read tools are done.)
License
MIT