Tracekit MCP Gateway

io.github.Cygnux-Labs

MCP gateway you deploy: a Tracekit signer decides and signs each call; agents send each run's token.

Add to Cursor Add in Claude Add to VS Code Run on PlugMCP

1{2  "mcpServers": {3    "io.github.cygnux-labs-tracekit-mcp-gateway": {4      "url": "https://{tracekit_gateway}/mcp",5      "headers": {}6    }7  }8}

.cursor/mcp.jsonMCP server

Transport: http
Status: Remote

Power your agent

Add this server

The publisher's own URL. Not a PlugMCP endpoint.

Add to Cursor Add in Claude Add to VS Code Run on PlugMCP

Host a copy with our keys and logs.

Server URL

https://{tracekit_gateway}/mcp

The Claude button above opens Claude with the name and URL filled in. You still confirm it there.

shClaude Code

1claude mcp add --transport http io.github.cygnux-labs-tracekit-mcp-gateway https://{tracekit_gateway}/mcp

Run in a terminal.

jsonClaude Desktop

1{2  "mcpServers": {3    "io.github.cygnux-labs-tracekit-mcp-gateway": {4      "command": "npx",5      "args": [6        "-y",7        "mcp-remote",8        "https://{tracekit_gateway}/mcp"9      ]10    }11  }12}

claude_desktop_config.json

Remote · HTTPPublisher installStep-by-step: add this in Claude

Remote URL or a command on your machine? How the two installs differ

Run on PlugMCP

Host a copy with our keys and logs.

A new server you create. It is not this listing's official endpoint. Use the publisher install when you want their URL and their credentials.

Launch

Server facts

Remote

Transport: http
Version: 1.3.0
Last checked: 2026-10-28

Stars: —
Tools: —
Uptime: —

Tools

No tool list yet. Remote servers get one after the first health check.

FAQ

Questions

How do I install Tracekit MCP Gateway?

Copy the http config for Cursor, Claude Desktop, Claude Code, or VS Code on this page. It uses the publisher's install, not a PlugMCP proxy.

Does Tracekit MCP Gateway need an API key?

No required environment variable is listed on this record.

What transport does Tracekit MCP Gateway use?

Tracekit MCP Gateway is reached over HTTP.

When was Tracekit MCP Gateway last checked?

Last checked 2026-10-28. MCP gateway you deploy: a Tracekit signer decides and signs each call; agents send each run's token.

From the publisher

Documentation

Agents can edit logs. They can't hide the edit.

Tracekit checks every tool call your agent makes before it runs, signs each call and decision into a hash chain, and gives you one .tkb file per run that anyone can verify offline.

Built like Certificate Transparency: signed records in an append-only log that independent witnesses cosign Open file format · verifiers in Python and TypeScript · MIT · runs on your own machines

Try it · Add it to your agent · What it proves · What's in it · Proof · How it works · Pilot it · Contribute · Docs

When an agent does something it shouldn't, you ask three things: what did it do, was it allowed, and can you trust the record? The agent's own log can't answer the third, because the agent can edit it. Here is one run, recorded both ways:

The same run, recorded: the database, the signer, the viewer and both edits are real; the model is scripted. Watch it with sound (1:47)

In this demo the signer ran as the agent's own user (dev mode), so an agent that knew how could have read the key and re-signed the log. Run the signer where the agent can't reach it, with a witness, and it can't.

Try it

uvx --from tracekit-ai tracekit demo --server

No API key, and nothing to install with uv. From an empty cache on a Mac it took 5 seconds (10 with pip install tracekit-ai in a fresh venv). The package is tracekit-ai: tracekit on PyPI is an unrelated project. A scripted agent makes three calls, and you should see:

== agent run (SCRIPTED: fixed tool calls, not a model)
  Bash 'ls': allow
  Bash 'sudo rm -rf /': deny TK-D001 TK-D004 TK-F003
  Bash 'echo "unterminated': ask TK-SHELL-PARSE
...
Integrity: VERIFIED.

== tamper test: rewrite the denied call as allowed in a copy, then verify again
[FAIL] signatures — 11 record(s), keys valid at their position
        seq 4: hash does not match the event
Integrity: FAILED.

The delete was denied before it ran, the held call ran after an approval, and the run verified. Then the demo rewrote the denial as allowed in a copy, and verification failed at the record it changed.

Add it to your agent

Three lines:

pip install tracekit-ai

import tracekit; tracekit.instrument()     # the first line of your agent; then run it as usual

tracekit last                               # Integrity: VERIFIED. / Assurance: dev; ...

tracekit.instrument() starts a dev signer (or reuses the running one) and gates and records every tool and model call of the frameworks it finds. tracekit last exports your latest run, verifies it and says where it is. tracekit view --dev shows every run. On a clean machine the LangGraph example (a mock model, no API key) installed, ran and verified in 27 seconds: examples/v2/clean-machine.sh langchain.

Stable: Claude Code, the OpenAI Agents SDK, LangChain / LangGraph, the Claude Agent SDK and MCP. Experimental: Codex CLI, Cursor, Gemini CLI, CrewAI, Browser Use, Pydantic AI, Google ADK, Haystack, LlamaIndex, Microsoft Agent Framework, Strands Agents, the Vercel AI SDK, NVIDIA OpenShell, E2B, microsandbox, agentgateway, Wassette, LiteLLM's MCP gateway, Docker's MCP Gateway and the TypeScript SDK. In NVIDIA OpenShell sandboxes, Tracekit decides and signs each HTTP request OpenShell lets out, and signs OpenShell's own blocks, process events and policy changes into the same run. Setup: coding agents · OpenAI Agents SDK · Claude Agent SDK · LangChain / LangGraph · MCP · Wassette · CrewAI · Browser Use · Pydantic AI · Google ADK · Haystack · LlamaIndex · Microsoft Agent Framework · Strands Agents · NVIDIA OpenShell · LiteLLM · TypeScript · Vercel AI SDK · agentgateway · microsandbox · E2B · Docker MCP Gateway · OpenTelemetry · any other agent

Coding agents: tracekit init --dev --v2 wires Claude Code's hooks to a dev signer; add --agent codex, cursor, gemini or opencode for the others (experimental). With Claude Code's sandbox on, Tracekit holds each unsandboxed retry for a person (Claude Code's sandbox); with Codex's, see what Tracekit sees and the settings to use (Codex's sandbox); with Gemini CLI's tool sandbox, Tracekit holds each sandbox expansion for a person (Gemini CLI's sandbox). Running sandbox-runtime's proxy on its own, Tracekit decides each request it forwards (experimental, sandbox-runtime). Sandboxed with agentsh? tracekit follow signs each decision agentsh logs, as it writes it (experimental, agentsh). Without uv: pip install tracekit-ai, then tracekit demo --server. --why (experimental) shows a held email whose cause is found by replay and cited by its signed record:

tracekit demo --server                # exit 0
tracekit demo --why                   # exit 0
tracekit init --dev --v2

From a checkout, the shipped sample bundles (v1) check with the verifier alone (pip install --no-deps tracekit-ai is enough), and python examples/v2/langchain/agent.py --scripted runs a LangGraph agent with a mock model:

tracekit verify docs/sample/demo-run.tkb --key docs/sample/signer.pub            # exit 0
tracekit verify docs/sample/demo-run-tampered.tkb --key docs/sample/signer.pub   # exit 1

TypeScript needs Node 18 or newer: npm install @cygnuxlabs/tracekit, and npx @cygnuxlabs/tracekit up starts a dev signer without Python on Apple Silicon Macs, Linux and Windows (TypeScript SDK). Python 3.9 to 3.13; the framework integrations need 3.10 or newer.

What it proves

Three guarantees. They're related, but one doesn't give you the others, and each needs something different.

Guarantee	What you get	What it needs
Evidence integrity	A record that was edited, deleted, swapped or inserted fails verification at that record	Only the signed log. Cutting off the end of the log, or re-signing it with a stolen key, takes a witness to catch
Execution control	Each call is checked before it runs. A denied call is blocked; a held call runs only after a yes, with exactly the arguments that were approved	The call goes through Tracekit: an SDK, a hook or a gateway. Code that skips it isn't stopped
Independent assurance	An operator who rewrites or forks its own log is caught	A witness the operator doesn't control, and a monitor. Both are experimental, and no public witness is running yet

Limits

Dev mode protects nothing against an agent that runs as you. Dev runs say isolation: same-user (FAQ).
A verified run proves the record is intact: not intent, not that a reported tool result is true, and not that every action was captured (FAQ). tracekit analyze --v2 compares what was asked, what the model said and what ran, but what the model said is its own account, and findings are an opinion beside the integrity, never part of it (findings).
Actions outside the capture path leave no record, such as a subprocess a hook never sees and no kernel sensor import covers, or code that skips the adapter (adapters).
Policy rules match text and tool names. A determined agent can reword a command; the protection is the signer's isolation (policy reference).
Commitments hide content, not timing, sizes or counts (privacy).

What each deployment guarantees, from dev mode to a signer the agent can't reach: guarantees. Every limit, with what to do about it: limits. How it maps to the EU AI Act, ISO/IEC 42001, the NIST AI RMF and OWASP: compliance.

What's in it

One signer. The core is stable and is hardened first. The rest ships in the same package as experimental: it works and is tested, but may change between releases (what's stable).

Core	What it does	Measured
Record	Every tool call, decision and result in one signed hash chain per run. A lost event becomes a signed gap, never silence	6 of 8 tamper attacks caught by the log alone (E1)
Decide	Allow, deny, or hold each call for a person, before it runs. Packs for shell, files, SQL, HTTP, cloud CLIs, browsers, email, messaging, payments, secrets and MCP	699 of 699 harmful calls stopped, 1 false alarm in 800 (E17)
Approve	A held call runs only after a yes from the command line, bound to its exact arguments and used once (approvals)	Edited arguments, a replayed snapshot or another run's approval: refused, in the contract tests every stable framework integration runs
Prove	`tracekit verify` checks a run's file offline against keys you pinned	8 of 8 insider attacks caught (E8)
Watch	`tracekit view`: every run verified, blocked and held calls, approvals, gaps, replay and a run review (viewer)	Not measured

Experimental	What it does	Measured
Witness	Independent witnesses cosign each checkpoint; a monitor watches the log for rewrites and forks	8 of 8 tamper attacks caught with a witness (E1)
Cross-check	The signer compares the calls the model asked for, as an LLM gateway or the session transcript saw them, with the calls the agent reported. A skipped hook or a made-up call is flagged	12 of 12 seeded discrepancies flagged, 0 false (E10)
Contain	Signed incidents hold or quarantine a run. Tools run on credentials the agent never holds (executor, MCP gateway). An egress observer flags traffic no call explains. A kernel sensor import records the processes, connections and file writes Tetragon or Falco saw	8 of 8 containment and 10 of 10 detection checks (E17)
Explain	Where each argument came from, and `tracekit why`: which input caused an action, found by replaying the run without it	6 of 6 true causes named, 0 false blames, one 7B model, small sample
Check	`tracekit analyze --v2`, signed: an action with nothing said before it, an edit of a file nobody named or said they were changing, a write outside the project, a broken "don't touch X", data sent out, files deleted or a package added without telling the person, a prompt line the harness never submitted, and how much of the run's reasoning could be read (which agents' reasoning is readable); `--review` adds a reviewer model's second opinion (warn only). Live constraints hold the call that would break "don't touch X" for approval	On a blind pool scored once (E20 pool v3, synthetic; the final review's fixes to the checks after that run moved none of its numbers): unrequested edits behind generic, sealed or reviewer-addressed cover text, or named innocently, caught in every session when no request names the file; after a "don't touch X", 79-100% by cover (67-92% held before the edit ran); a failed test run claimed as passing, 86%; a file sent out or deleted, or a package added and pushed, with nothing said of it, 96-100% by cover, except a file sent out under an innocent mention of it (33%); an appended prompt line flagged every time; 5 false findings and 1 call held in 1,812 honest calls. On the development pools, read while fixing the checks, after a "don't touch X": 88-96% on pool v2 (29-75% before) and 54-92% on pool v1
More approvers	A web page with passkeys, Slack, or a reviewer agent that approves within bounds	7 of 7 abuse cases against agent approvers caught (E18)

Proof

Our own experiments: small, synthetic and written by us. Nothing rounded up. The misses stay in.

Experiment	Setup	Result
E1 tamper detection	120-record signed logs, 8 attacks, 60 trials each, re-run on 1.2	6 of 8 caught by the log alone, 8 of 8 with a witness
E8 insider attacks	Real unprivileged users against a Linux system-mode signer: a decoy signer, a stopped signer, a swapped policy, fabricated runs	8 of 8 caught, a merge gate on every pull request
E17 policy packs	699 harmful and 800 benign tool calls in 11 classes, decided by both regex engines	699 of 699 stopped; 1 false alarm, a draft email held for a person
E21 policy robustness	420 harmful and 432 benign calls written blind to the rules; 130 developer-session calls	server pack: 211 of 420 stopped or held on the one blind run, 245 after rules were added that target the pool (read since); 18 of 432 false alarms, 2 of 130 in sessions; p99 150 µs
E10 reconciliation	30 runs, 12 with a seeded discrepancy: a missing hook, a fabricated call, changed arguments	12 of 12 flagged, 0 false positives
E9 overhead	Signer round trip over a Unix socket, file storage, macOS quick run	0.45 ms p50, 0.91 ms p99 per call; 5,356 events/s
E3 the v1 regex gate, on a rougher set	16 harmful and 20 benign calls written after the rules	11 of 16 caught, 1 false alarm. Rules are tripwires, not a sandbox

The two E1 misses are the design: a log can't see its own tail cut off, and whoever holds the key can re-sign it. Only a copy of the head held elsewhere, a witness, catches those, so an unwitnessed run verifies as dev. The test sets were written by us, and no one outside has reviewed the threat models yet. Every experiment, and what isn't measured: evaluation · technical report.

How it works

The agent never holds a signing key and never assigns sequence numbers.
Each record is signed and carries the hash of the one before it, so a changed byte fails verification at that record.
Nothing the agent reports about itself is trusted: not its isolation, its fail mode, gaps, or who approved a call.
Who can rewrite the log decides what a run is worth, so put the signer where the agent can't reach it. The agent's code is the same in every mode; TRACEKIT_SIGNER points it at the signer.

Where the signer runs	Who can reach the keys and log	Recorded isolation
Laptop dev	the agent's own user	`same-user`
Laptop system mode (Linux; macOS experimental)	root and the signer's OS user	`separate-user`
Container or Kubernetes sidecar	the signer's uid and the node's administrator	`separate-user`
Docker Compose stack (`deploy/compose/`)	the Docker host's administrators	`separate-user`
Central signer over HTTPS	the signer host's administrators	`remote`

The operator who runs the signer could still rewrite its log with its own key; an independent witness and a monitor make that visible. Each mode end to end: deployment. The full model: architecture, laptop and server threat models.

Is it for you?

Use Tracekit when	A plain tracer is enough when
Your agent acts on real systems: a shell, files, databases, email, payments, the cloud	It only reads, or runs in a throwaway sandbox
Some calls must be stopped or held for a person before they run	Seeing what happened afterwards is enough
Someone outside the team has to trust the record: a customer, an auditor, an incident review	Only your team reads the logs, to debug

For debugging a prototype, a tracer such as OpenTelemetry, Langfuse or LangSmith is the right tool. Tracekit doesn't replace one; it's the record you can hand to someone who doesn't trust the agent. How it compares with tracers, guardrail libraries and other tamper-evident logs, and when it's the wrong choice: comparisons.

Pilot it with us

Running an agent that acts on real systems, with someone who has to sign off on it: a customer, an auditor, an insurer? We'll set up Tracekit with you for two weeks, free: one agent, on your machines. At the end you have a verified evidence file for every run and a written review of what the agent did that you didn't expect. Email [email protected] or open a pilot request.

Commands

tracekit demo --server                      # allow, deny, approve, then a tampered copy fails verification
tracekit up                                 # start the dev signer, or find the running one
tracekit last                               # export your latest run, pin the dev key, verify it
tracekit view --dev                         # every run, verified: calls, decisions, gaps, replay, why
tracekit approvals list                     # calls held for a person; tracekit approvals approve ID
tracekit export --v2 --run ID -o run.tkb    # one run as one .tkb file
tracekit verify run.tkb --trust trust.json  # offline, against the keys you pinned in trust.json
                                            # (tracekit signer trust -o trust.json, or the one tracekit last wrote)
tracekit policy lint policy.yaml            # check a policy before the signer loads it
tracekit doctor                             # check this setup
tracekit init --dev --v2                    # wire Claude Code's hooks; add --agent codex, cursor, gemini or opencode

Nothing to install for whoever checks a run: the browser verifier, one page, takes the .tkb and its trust file, sends nothing anywhere, and says VERIFIED, FAILED or UNVERIFIABLE with what it means and what to do next.

The evidence format

Specified. Evidence format v2 aims to be precise enough to write an independent verifier, with normative test vectors.
Built on standards. Records are signed with Ed25519 over RFC 8785 canonical JSON. Each log is an RFC 6962 Merkle tree, the structure Certificate Transparency uses. Checkpoints are C2SP signed notes, and witnesses cosign them per C2SP tlog-cosignature.
Self-contained. A .tkb file is a zip of records, inclusion proofs, checkpoints and the policy snapshots that decided the calls. It holds no verification code.
Old files keep verifying. Formats only grow, each format's verifier is frozen, and an older verifier reports a newer file UNVERIFIABLE (needs tracekit >= x), never FAILED. Verify such a file with uvx --from "tracekit-ai>=x" tracekit verify run.tkb --trust trust.json, npx -y @cygnuxlabs/tracekit@latest verify run.tkb --trust trust.json (Node 20.12 or newer), or the browser verifier, which checks it in your browser and sends nothing. From 1.4.0, an addition an older verifier can leave unread is non-critical: the bundle verifies, and the report names what that verifier didn't interpret.

Verify a v1 bundle in GitHub Actions with uses: Cygnux-Labs/Tracekit@main (bundle: and key: or witness:). require-anchor defaults to true, so an unanchored bundle fails the step; set require-anchor: "false" to only report it.

Contribute

Each of these is useful on its own, and none needs to know the whole codebase:

Write a verifier in another language. The evidence format is specified and has test vectors. A Go or Rust verifier written from the spec alone is the best test that the spec is complete.
Find a harmful call the packs let through. Add it to tests/data/policy/deny/ with a rule that catches it; E17 runs every case.
Run Tracekit on your own agent and report what broke. Doing that with two open-source agents found real bugs (case study).
Add a framework. An integration is done when it passes the adapter contract.
Try to break it. Find a tamper or a bypass that E1 and E8 miss, and report it privately as SECURITY.md describes. Everyone who finds one is named in the hall of fame unless they ask us not to.

To start: make install, then make check (contributing). Smaller tasks are labelled good first issue. Everyone taking part follows the code of conduct.

Docs

To	Start here
Read your first verify report	Tracekit for auditors
See every step on a clean install	walkthrough (recorded on 1.2.0) · recorded demos · viewer tour
Wire up an agent	v2 quickstart · coding agents · TypeScript SDK
Put the signer out of reach	deployment · compose · container · Kubernetes · agent-sandbox · doctor
Decide calls	policy reference · approvals · incidents · webhooks
Check evidence	reading a verify report · auditor guide · witnesses · monitor · compliance mapping
Ask why an action happened	tracekit why · its architecture
Understand the design	how Tracekit works · architecture · evaluation · technical report · case study
Know what's stable	support · limits · FAQ · security checklist · changelog
Run the v1 laptop signer	coding agents · signing · v1 adapters

License

MIT, Copyright Cygnux Labs. This is 1.4.2, and 1.x is the supported line. Report vulnerabilities privately as SECURITY.md describes.

Cite

The paper: Tracekit-v2-paper.pdf (arXiv:2609.35659).

@misc{ghosh2026tracekit,
  author        = {Bravish Ghosh},
  title         = {Tracekit: Tamper-Evident Intent-Reasoning-Action Auditing for AI Agents},
  year          = {2026},
  eprint        = {2609.35659},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url           = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35659},
  note          = {Code: \url{https://github.com/Cygnux-Labs/Tracekit}}
}

Agents can edit logs. They can't hide the edit. A star costs nothing and helps other teams find Tracekit.