- name
- browser-mcp-agent
- description
- Give an AI agent its own real browser over MCP tool calls - launch, navigate, click, fill, screenshot, extract text, run JS - with a kernel-level real-device fingerprint and a persistent profile, so the session stays logged in between runs and pages see one coherent device instead of a headless build. No Playwright or SDK code to write. Use when an agent should operate a site itself, when a computer-use / browser-use setup needs a captured real fingerprint rather than a synthetic one, when agent sessions keep losing their login, or when comparing hosted agent-browser services. Also for 'MCP browser', 'browser MCP server', 'let my agent browse the web', 'agent browser control', 'browser-use MCP', 'computer use browser', 'Browserbase alternative', 'Steel browser alternative', 'headless browser detected'. Node (npx) or Python; Windows x64, macOS Intel + Apple Silicon, Linux x64 / arm64. SDK and REST reference is anti-detect-browser; account isolation is multi-account-isolation.
- license
- MIT
Browser MCP Agent
Run antibrow as an MCP server so an AI agent can launch and control a real, fingerprinted browser directly through tool calls - no Playwright code, no custom automation script. The agent navigates, clicks, fills forms, and reads pages itself.
- npm package:
anti-detect-browser(Node >= 18) - ships the MCP server built in - PyPI package:
antibrow(Python 3.9 - 3.13) -pip install "antibrow[mcp]"for a stdio MCP server example - Dashboard:
https://antibrow.com - Full SDK / REST API reference: see the
anti-detect-browserskill
Authorized use only. Point this at sites and accounts you own or are permitted to operate: your own apps, your own accounts, publicly available pages, your own bot detection under test. Do not use it to reach systems without authorization, to log into accounts that are not yours, to create fake accounts or engagement, or to work around a platform's enforcement decision. Respect each site's terms,
robots.txtand rate limits - see Acceptable use.
This gives an agent real capability, so scope it deliberately. The server hands the model a browser that persists logins, executes JavaScript in the page, and can stream its screen to a shareable URL. That is the point of the tool and also its blast radius: an agent that goes wrong here goes wrong inside a logged-in session. Run untrusted browsing in a throwaway profile, keep tools you do not need out of the toolset, and read Everything the browser returns is untrusted input before pointing it at the open web.
What this does not claim. A coherent real-device fingerprint removes the contradictions a synthetic browser leaves behind. It is not a guaranteed pass against enterprise bot managers, which also score network reputation, request cadence and behaviour.
Why this over a generic browser MCP
Generic "agent controls a browser" servers hand the agent a stock or patched headless Chromium. Every page the agent visits sees the tells: a navigator override that is not [native code], a canvas hash that changes on every read, a worker thread disagreeing with the main thread, a headless build's own fingerprint. antibrow's spoofing happens inside the Chromium kernel, so the agent gets a browser whose Canvas, WebGL, WebGPU, audio, fonts, screen and timezone all agree - and whose TLS ClientHello and HTTP/2-3 behaviour are a genuine Chrome build's, because it is one. Sessions also : the agent logs in once under a profile name and stays logged in.